THE

SĀMKHYA--KĀRIKĀ

Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāmkhya Philosophy
with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda Cārya

श्रीमद्वैशाश्वकणेन सम्पूर्णायः

सांख्यकारिकाः

Critically edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes

BY

Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,

ORIENTAL BOOK AGENCY
15, Shukrawar, POONA 2 (India)
THE
SĀMKHYA-KĀRIKĀ

Īś'vara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāmkhya Philosophy with the Commentary of Gaṇḍapādācārya

BY
Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Sanskrit, Sanātana Dharma College, (Nawabganj) Cawnpore.

POONA
THE ORIENTAL BOOK AGENCY
1933
PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Īvara Kṛṣṇa’s Śāṅkhya Karikās with the Bhāṣya of Gaṇḍapādācārya are to be published in three parts so as to suit the convenience of students and teachers.

Part I. For students of Sanskrit—

It will contain correct text of the Karikās, Bhāṣya of Gaṇḍapādācārya and foot-notes containing different readings and short notes. Price An. 12.

Part II. For teachers of Pathashalas and others not knowing English. In addition to the above, it would contain a critical introduction in Sanskrit. Price Rs. 1-4-0

Part III. For University Students and Professors—Part I plus an exhaustive introduction, translation and notes in English. Price Rs. 2-0-0

Sanskrit उपोद्धात available separately for An. 12.

English Introduction available separately for An. 12.

INTRODUCTION

I. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Sāṁśāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, “Every one desists from pain ; every one desires happiness.” But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as ‘pleasure’ day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. The Significance of Śāṅkhya Philosophy

Of all the philosophical systems, Śāṅkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Sāstra is recognised by all the systems. Sāṅkarācārya says—“The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-
difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—

“There is no knowledge like that of Sāṁkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṁkhya being the highest knowledge.” (Śānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word Sāṁkhya is found first of all in the Svet. Up.—तत्कारणं सांस्कृयोगाविचारम्, etc. (VI, 13), yet Sāṁkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this Śāstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṁkhya is derived from the word सांक्षया. The word saṁkhyā is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. “चत्वारी संख्या विचारणा” (Amara I. V. 3). Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'ākti, atasti, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijnānabhaṅku in his preface to Sāṁkhya-pravacana-nabhasya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—

“तत्त्वादं प्रवाहुं चेत्त प्रकृतिः च प्रचारितम्।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विधं संख्यं प्रदर्शितम्।”

So, Sāṁkhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe’s opinion that the word Sāṁkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n. and pp. 190–191). Jayacandra S’armā says with regard to Sāṁkhya in Sāṅskṛta-Candrika, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṁkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Adipūrṇa quoted. VII of 1821 S’a’ka. Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṁkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īśvara in the Sāṁkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha or opposed to S’ruti (S. S., p. 21 ff.; S. P., 13 ff.). Sāṅkārācārya also, seeing that Sāṁkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Sāṁkhya is not rooted in the S’rutis.

“Although there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṁkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, ‘He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṁkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters’ (S’ve. Up. VI, 13). ......... we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṁkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297–8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Sāṁkhya, the great S’āṅkara says—“The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila’s knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294).
Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṃkhya to Sruti. Truly speaking, Sāṃkhya could be divided into two—one ses'vara, the other nirīs'vara. Let the theists not take the nirīs'vara—Sāṃkhya, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in Sruti, but who can take exception to the vaidika character of the ses'vara—Sāṃkhya as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across ‘yathā-s'rutinidars'ana’ as a synonym of Sāṃkhya in—

एनानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि २ नराधित्व |
चतुविविदिनतिनानि यथाभूतिनिय कन्तरात ॥

(Mbh., Sānti, 310, 25)

In the 313th chapter of Sāntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the vibhūtis of Prakṛti many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṃkhya are met with; e.g., ब्रह्माणातस्ययमिनः (p. 1) तत्तवादः;
(2) योगादिनिनः,
(3) संयमादिनिनः;
(4) संस्कृतादिनिनः;
(5) व्यासादिनिनः;
(6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्तवदेशिनाः;
(10) व्याशःविविदिनाः;
(11) तत्तवदेशिनः;
(12) व्यासविविदिनः.

Here the word ‘Yathās'rutinidars'inaḥ’ being repeated four times establishes the vaidika character of theistic Sāṃkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṃkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣats, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṃkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhya in the later Upaniṣats, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. vide—Ent. Gott. p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the a śrīyas of Sāṃkhya in the offering to Rṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṃkhya. (8., p. 22). This could not have been possible if Sāṃkhya was not founded on Srutis.

III. Germ of Sāṃkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāṃkhya categories in the Srutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṃkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṃkhya–Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tāmas described in the Rigveda (X. 129, 3) “तमं आस्रोत्त्रसकं गुर्वशःस्यार्क्रेते” etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very Sruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkāravāda. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his bhāṣya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Aja (the unborn) as the name of Pradhāna—

तमिद्वम् प्रथमं देश आ(s) थि यथा यथा समान्यत्र विविष्य ॥

अजै नामाध्यक्षमपिन्न् यस्मिन् विविष्यन् भूतनाम तस्माः ॥

(Rigveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣats into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I, p. 141 ff.).

1. The most ancient: as, Brhadāranyaka, Chāndogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kaushitaki.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (
INTRODUCTION

red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna = Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bala, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra “अजगरेको भोगित्वकुडापाय” (S’v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Iśādi). The trivṛtkaṇa (trebling) S’ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word trivṛta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in “तमकस्मिन्वितन्यादादादा” (S’v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāṁkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, e.g., in Kaṭha “नमस्तु पदुं युद्धक्षेत्रम् महान् परः” (III, 10). Mahat is the synonym of Ahaṅkāra. Similarly we find Aśvākṣa and Puruṣa in “महतः परमात्मन् मातृवर्गलिङ्गः परः पुरुषः परिभाषेत् काः सा परा गति: II” (Ibid., III, 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of Puruṣa have been indicated in “का मृणं सर्वं सत्त्वं समानं सदृशं परिष्वज्जते। तौपर्य: त्वपि वृद्धिः अनात्थम्यो अभिवृद्धिमाति II” in the Munḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, I n].

It is a well-known fact that S’vetās’vatara is essentially a Sāṁkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāṁkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words Sāṁkhya and Kapila have been used for the first time.“तत्कारणं सांख्य-
any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of Satva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṁkhya categories of kṣetrajña, saṅkalpa, adhyaśaya, abhimaṇa and liṅga clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system.

As—‘‘तमो वा श्रेणेष्वास्मात् तपस्यात्मपरंपरांतः विचारम् प्रायत्वेन्द्रेष्वे रजस्तत्त्वे ’’ (१४ १०) ‘‘तात्त्वविद्याविवेचनं विश्वाणिश्वास्यायाम्’’ (१४ १३) ‘‘Also, the mantra ‘‘तात्त्वविद्याविवेचनं विश्वाणिश्वास्यायाम्’’ (१४ १४) propounds the categories of Sāṁkhya. The word trīṣṭa refers to the three guṇas, the word sūdaṇānta refers to sixteen vikāras, the word satārdhāra points to the fifty varieties of pratīyoga-sarga. Keith’s doubt about the Sāṁkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S.S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, “The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahanical schools.” But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṁkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṁkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like ‘‘मयः प्रकृति विद्यामार्थिनं तु महे भगवः’’ (S’v. Up. iv, 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṁkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṁkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be
context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāmkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S’ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, vide my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f.

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabha, the latter uses the word Sāmkhya in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, ‘—“सौरस्यं सांख्यवाद चोमि निर्णयं सप्रदेशः। पश्चात्यथेन अन्तानि वक्ष्यिततिं द्वै। सौरस्यं च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रवतिप्राप्त:। क्रिययाधिकलित्रं सा सांख्यसूचनामयादै॥” (S’ānti, 320, 79 and 82).


So it has been said:—“विभिन्नि-द्वि-क्षेत्र हि गुणम्: सांख्यतान्त्रिकम्: सांख्यतान्त्रिकम् सांख्यतान्त्रिकम्॥” (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of Prakṛti and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same parvan. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāmkhya books. They are as given below:—

(1) The creation of mahat from avyaktā, (2) from mahat there is the creation of ahaṇkāra, (3) from the latter of manas, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “connected with the senses (aindriyaka),” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Paṅcas’īkha in S’ānti, 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāmkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96–112 of the S’ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāmkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or Is’vara. Even though the plurality of puruṣas has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide—“वहोनं पूर्वाङ्ग तथा यथाक यत्निधित्तुम्,” S’ānti 350, 26). Asuri, having taught Sāmkhya to Paṅcas’īkha, got merged in Brahman—“यत्रेकाक्षे यद्य गणनाः प्रतिष्ठानं। आनुश्रिष्ठेष्ठ तत्तत्त्वं तत्तत्त्वं॥” (S’ānti, 218, 13).

In the Bhāgavatdaigītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāmkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāmkhya propounded in it (Tilak’s Gitarahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāmkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; e. g., “स्वाधीन्तं कदाचिं शुभं:” (Bh. G. 8, 26). Here the Sāmkhya path without karman is only a synonym of Jñāna. Therefore S’ānkāraçārya explains the word kṛtānta as “इत्यमिति करोपयते। तत्तत्त्वं पर- समासितस्य सं करोपयते:। करोपयते ह्यं तत्तत्त्वं॥” (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S’ānkāraçārya explains the word gunasaṁśākhyāna (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three gunas, vies. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāmkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāmkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI, 5, 2–8; VI, 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13–15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (S. 8, p. 52) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24–52) and reference to the three pramāṇas (ibid, 105). But the word Sāmkhya is not found
1. Kapila

Kapila is known as the founder of the Sāmkhya philosophy, as mentioned in the Sv. Up. (5.2) for the first time. But Garbe, criticizing the views of Max Müller, believes that this statement is fictitious; there is no name of Kapila in the Vedas. Sāmkhya is also known as the philosophy of the Kāshāya, a small tribe of the Sakatas, mentioned in the Veda. It is therefore assumed that Kapila was not a historical person but a theoretical construct.

IV. Sāmkhya Teachers

Names of the twenty-six Sāmkhya teachers are met with in the Sarvapātika, Daṇḍinī, Nyāya, and Pāṇini. They are as follows:

1. Kapila
2. Kaṇṭha
3. Patraśāla
4. Vīdhyārasa
5. Gargya
6. Gargiya
7. Jagnavṛda
8. Vīdhyārasa
9. Vāśātra
10. Vāśātra
11. Vāśātra
12. Vāśātra
13. Vāśātra
14. Sūtra
15. Vāśātra
16. Vāśātra
17. Vāśātra
18. Vāśātra
19. Vāśātra
20. Vāśātra
21. Vāśātra
22. Vāśātra
23. Vāśātra
24. Vāśātra
25. Vāśātra
26. Vāśātra

Names of the four teachers of the Śaṅkha Sāṁkhya are mentioned in the Sarvapātika, Daṇḍinī, Nyāya, and Pāṇini. They are as follows:

1. Kapila
2. Kaṇṭha
3. Patraśāla
4. Vīdhyārasa

2. another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the

Buddha (S. Y. 2. 3). King Kapila, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person but the name for Haryyagudha (S. S. 9). In Mahābh. Sūtra, 39. 667., as expressed by H. A. Brähman, he is found identified with Ayur or Vāstha or Sīra, and is therefore another Kapila, Kapilāchārya, who is the author of the Kapilaveda. He is identified with Shāntakapala (S. S. 9. 5. 24). Kapilavataraka, also agrees with this opinion. Introduction to Jayasūtra published by me (P. 3), Balarama Udana, in his footnotes (Ch. S. S. P. 62).
2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jaya., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3). Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa. The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamangala and the Maṭharavṛti. In the Maṭh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas'ikha “...tubhāttākālaḥ naṃ kāripīriḥ mahāmuḥ: iti...” (Sānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz., “...vibhīde dūkṣeṣvaratīrtha pedaḥ bhāṣyaḥ kāryavete. Pratibhāniṣṭvā: sthūlo yathā cakkvāṃṣasampratī” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Saḍdāns'ānasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas'ikha

Pañcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works:

A. Y. Bh.—

([A]) “...ekameva divānāḥ kuṭāsāreṇa dūkṣeṣvaraḥ” [1. 1]. (Aa) “...aṁśā-vidhiḥ nirmāṇaḥ niśamāniḥjñaḥ bhāṣyaḥ deśagāraḥ pratyākṣaṃ yāti jñānamantāya tāne yeṣvam” [1. 25]. (Aa) “...tamaṇānataścānānaścānānaprayāṃśeṣvāṃ nāvāśamajīrṇā” [1. 3]. (Aa) “...yāajagyānāṃ nyāśvetāṃ sāvāmāsīṃ ete śāṃkāvāṃ bhavat” [1. 5]. (Aa) “...sabdenājīrṇā” [2. 5]. (Aa) “...bhavyaḥ prabhavaḥ” [2. 6].

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāganes'a in his Tattvavāyānātīthīdyapana and by Haribhadrasūri in S'astrārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Maṭharavṛttī). Bhāvāganes'a was the disciple of Vijñānabhusikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.
from him in the Rājamārtanda of Bhoja: "तत्त्वज्ञानसूत्र वेदांतप्रवृत्तिः। (Y. S. 1V 23). Medhatithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I. 55: "सार्पमा विवेकदिवससत्कारयोऽवधियों काशीयान्वति।" (p. 704). Also in the Saṃdarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him: "पूर्वप्रतिविहारित स्वभाबसमुत्त्यतम। मन्त्र: कार्तिक सार्चाण्डीपावे: स्वतंत्रविद्या।" (p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāmkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh. I. 231, 2793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Mātharavruttī (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyādi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Sānyāmināmamālā. He says: "तच्छातनं वर्णश्च शिष्यो नदिम- कालीन: (Kathasaritsāgara, I. 2) पाणिनिप्रसंहारं संहस्तबहद्वक्ष्या: कस्मिचिन्ता कृपायं करो। दशश्वयं पत्तनेशति पुराणमाणि सार्वद्वाराचारयं।" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin alias Vyādi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Sāmkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belvarkar, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāmkhya-kārikā (ibid. 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says: "The Anuyogavārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kanaksaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarṇaspātī or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Sāmkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Mādhara also in the list of the Anuyogavārasūtra. If Mādhara stands for the Mātharavruttī then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogavārasūtra was written in the 1st

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation
century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Mātharavṛtti we find: "यथा शरणामावत् आपल्लानी" a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Sāṅkarācārya (i.e. 780–812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanagasattari. And, if Vyādi alias Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyakasapti, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṅkhya-kārīka, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B.C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣagānya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣagānya as about the former teachers of Sāṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) "सृवत् विद्विविमा विद्विविमा विद्विविमा विद्विविमा \ यथवर्णयण:।" (III, 3, 2) "एवं वर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्णवर्ण
(1) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Saṃścitānta. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmati with the remarks: "अत एव योगोद्वीप या त्रायित त्रायित त्रायित:।" (on the Brahmaśūrābhāṣya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣagānya, "पद्यवर्त्ती अविनाद्यो वर्षयेष स्यामान्यस्य वर्णयण:।" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—"पुराणांतः प्राणां प्रवर्तानिति।" found in the Gaud., and the Māth. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣagānya by Keith (S. S., 73, 3n.). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Saṃścitānta to Paṃcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣagānya being the author of the Saṃścitānta (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanna: "Saṃścitānta and Vārṣagānya").

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīṣavaya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavaya was a class-fellow of Paṃcaśikha (S. S., 51). This Jaigīṣavaya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II, 55 and III, 18). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtiśānopāyaṇa as the author of Dhāraṇāśstra (on Nyāyaśūtras III, 2, 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12, 67), Arāḍākalāma refers to Jaigīṣavaya, Janaka and Parāśkara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṅkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavaya.

7. Vodhu

Vodhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Raṣṭarpāṇa, we find the name of Vodhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Paṃcaśikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha’s name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhu’s name before that of Āsuri in one of the parīśīlas of the Atharvaveda (S. S., 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābārata (Sānti, Ch. 274). There we find eight kinds of bhūtas (bhūva, abhūva, kāla, prthvī, ātman, vāyu, ākāśa and tejās); and kāla impelled by bhūva creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the kṣetrajña. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhi and the highest of all is puruṣa. The ear, the skin, the eye.
the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there: पुप्पयत्वर्म हि सामक्षान् विरूध्यते। तत्त्वज्ञ हर्षस्वर्गविरूधता। परे गतिः।’’ (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāmkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāśa very much (See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Anandārama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7.). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikārās, viz., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (See p. 218.). But Udayavirāstrī says that Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr. Sāstrī), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865.). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475.). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory of the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Māṭharvṛtti: ‘‘कापित्तस्मिन्नः प्राप्तिः अस्तस्मिन्नतत्: परवस्मिन्नतत्वाः भाग्य-रक्षक-वात्स्याके-द्वित्ते-मेंवन्त्यं तत्त्वानामाधामतं’’ (p. 84.), where the word prabhṛti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Māṭharvṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māṭhara’s quotation can only establish Devala’s priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9-26. Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Vōdhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (Sānti. 340, 67-69.), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanačārya in समान-नामांतरित्वम् इति स्मवनन्ताप्राप्तां (S. Su. VI, 69.). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Śruti, in the Nīrṇayānsidhā and the Tristhistisut (H., Dh., I, 656.). Similarly we find Bṛgu. Sūkra, Kāśyapa, Parās āra, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Arsiṃeṇa, Agasty, Pulastya and Harita mentioned as writers of Śruti (Ibid. index.). The dialogue between Parāś āra and Janaka named the Parāś āra-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (Sānti., Chs. 290-299.), deals with the duties of the vṛṇas and ās'ramas and has no vestige of Sāmkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parāś āra came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāmkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcaśikha (Mbh., Sānti., 320-23.). Ulūka is a synonym for Kauśika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāmkhya Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kauśika family (Jay. Int. p. 2, 2n.). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Sūka as teachers of Sāmkhya.

V. Standard Works on Sāmkhya

A. Available —

Of the standard works on Sāmkhya, only three are available. They are ‘‘Sāmkhya-Sūtras’’, ‘‘Tattva-saṃśāsa’’ and ‘‘Sāmkhya-Kārikā’’.

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, ‘‘अनुसत्त्वरत्नं सुचिकरणाम्’’ (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū. IV. 3; ‘‘उद्ध: परम्! हितक्रिया:’’ (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū. III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the śūtras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū. V. 40-51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāmkhya-Kārikā, quoted in the
hand, when S’āṅkarācārya and others quote from Śāṅkyā-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Śūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then S’āṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a rṣi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is’vākṛṣṇa

Mr. S’āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is:

(1) "माधवसूपमन्त्रमतर्थतिस्मान् नातत्व उपाधयान्यितम् चक्षुद्वयवेदये क्रिष्णपदस्यस" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48)—here उपाधयान्यितम् is borrowed from "उपाधयान्यितम्" (S. Sū., I. 1, 115). This very śūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., viz., "वरुणस्य—पारमेश्वर: कार्य नातत्व उपाधयान्यितम् इति". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after "उपाधयान्यितम्" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपाधयान्यितम्" but the whole passage, viz., "पारमेश्वर: कार्य नातत्व उपाधयान्यितम्." Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāyaścitādhya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the śūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed from the S. Sū.

Mr. S’āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patanjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—"पद्धतिः: प्रकारः: सत्तं भावानाम्—"
In reply to Mr. S'asti's arguments, the following may be stated. In the first place, the word śruti is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author. Here, the word śruti denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patañjali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the word śruti used by Kaiyyaṭa, it is even admitted that Patañjali quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the Sūri, wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I. 218-219). Again, there is nothing to oblige Kaiyyaṭa, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. I., p. 431), to borrow from the Sūri. He might have borrowed from the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Patañjali tally more with those in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā than in the Sūri.

The arguments of Mr. S'asti do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyāpi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijnānabhinīśa has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. S'asti's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. S'asti says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणमुद्रिता: प्राणाय वात्योऽपि" and read it as "सामान्यकरणमुद्रिता: प्राणाय वात् अपि" we attain anuṣṭubh metre in place of aṣṭāni. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'asti has failed to disprove that the Sūri are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557-569 A.D. (Bh., Com., pp. 175-178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhhamitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyāvīśa, the Sāṅkhya-teacher; Vindhyāvīśa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyāvīśa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyāvīśa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣagānya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣagānya composed Hiranyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyāvīśa, the author of Hiranyasaptati and Īśvarkena, the author of Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. Das Gupta also thinks Īśvarkena and Vindhyāvīśa as two
Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti—To this we reply: Īs'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pāṇcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Ṣaṭṭītantra is the work of Pāṇcas'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Īs'varakṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. Unavailable.

(i) Ṣaṭṭītantra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pāṇcas'ikha or Vārṣagany as the author of Ṣaṭṭītantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Ṣaṭṭītantra in Jay.

(a) "तेज्य च पतितनमर्यादाय तिथिः पतितनय चक्रमहति। विस्मितम् विभवस्थाय तिथिः पतितनय ब्रम्हायम्।" (p. 1).

(b) "बिकिन्मुन्नयायकाश्चत्र सर्वत्र पतितनय नानामात्राय। गुरूवर तेज्य तिथिः सामायमोद्धिनिति।" (p. 2).

(c) "पनि पतितनय नावं तिथिः। तदय शर्म चक्रपतित्वान्ते।" (p. 56).

(d) "तेज्यः तिथिः। चक्रपतित्वात्र सर्वत्र पतितनमर्यादाय। तिथिः पतितनय नावं। नावं तिथिः पतितनमर्यादाय।" (p. 68).

(e) "सर्वत्र पतितनमर्यादाय सर्वत्र पतितनाय तिथिः। चक्रपतित्वान्ते।" (p. 69).

(f) "तिथिः पतितनाय तिथिः। सर्वत्र पतितनमर्यादाय।" (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hirianna infers the following facts (See—"Ṣaṭṭītantra and Vārṣagany", J. O. R., April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112.)—(a) Ṣaṭṭītantra has 60 parts, (b) its author is Pāṇcas'ikha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called "Ṣaṭṭītantra". Vārṣagany is not its author, as others think. As regards the verse—

"गुणानं परमं हृदं न राज्यमप्रचयन।"

which is quoted in Y. Bh. and Bhāmatī, Vācaspati alludes it to Ṣaṭṭītantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣagany in Bhāmatī. On the basis of these two references, people have come to
the conclusion that Vārṣaganyā is the author of Śaṅhitāntara. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुचालस्म, while as the reading in the Bhāmāti is मायेश् सुतुचालस्म. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganyā as found quoted in Buddhist works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara’s remark, viz., “कथितमहाेयमितकरणार्थकर्मेऽत्तमस्तो” (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṅhitāntara. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. Sāstri states Śaṅhitāntara is the real Sāmkhya-darsana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṅhitāntara of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas’ikha in his Śaṅhitāntara.

To this we reply—one should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22–30) from Sāmkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark “तथाहि कविज्ञानाः”. As regards the alteration of मायेश् into मायेव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganyā whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भवताव वाचपर्वर्ण:’. The opinion of Vārṣaganyā, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakośa (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that which is existent, is ever existent; that which is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kārya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāmkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣaganyā altered मायेश् into मायेव. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of Śaṅhitāntara is still undecided.

(2) Rājavārtika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

“प्रभाषनानित्वंकर्मेऽपदावृत्तम्
पारस्ये च तथास्माते च ब्रह्मवेदं क्षयं च.
श्रीमुल्लिकर्त्तवः मौलिकायाः
स्थानं दृष्ट॥

विधिनाय पञ्चविक्षयोऽस्मानं नव तुष्य॥
करणायासामस्वधीविविषिक्षणं सतम्॥

इति पर्यः पत्रान्तरान्तरस्थिः: सह सिद्धिः”

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakārini (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70–73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y., p. 7). These maulikārthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māti, Sāmkhya-tattva-viveçana (Ch. S. S., No. 245, p. 12). Tattva-yādārtha-dipana (ibid., p. 80) and Tattva-sāmāsā-sūtra-vrītti (ibid., p. 135).

VI. The Teachings of Sāmkhya

It has already been pointed out that the activity of all rational beings is directed towards acquiring happiness and avoiding misery. Thoughtful people, on the other hand, avoid happiness even as it is mixed up with misery. Now the nature of this misery, although known generally, is still outside the purview of ordinary people. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has broadly divided that misery into three classes; viz. (1) intrinsic, (2) extrinsic, and (3) superhuman. (1) The intrinsic misery is due to the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and is also caused by passion, anger and so on. (2) The extrinsic misery is caused by men, beasts, reptiles and the rest. (3) The superhuman is the outcome of evil influences of spirits, stars and so on.
It may be asked—Why should we engage in philosophical remedies, when we see that ordinary and obvious remedies can very well remove all the miseries? We see that intrinsic miseries in the shape of various diseases are removed by physicians by means of medicines; as regards miseries due to passion, anger and the rest, they are removable by the acquisition of desires for objects in the shape of flowers, scent, women and so on. The extrinsic miseries can also be removed by the knowledge of Politics, residence in safe places and the rest. Similarly superhuman miseries can also be avoided by charms, incantations and the rest. Thus, when obvious means can uproot all the kinds of miseries, it is useless to engage in inquiring into the philosophical remedies.

We reply, yes; but these remedies are not absolute or final. Nobody can take the guarantee that the obvious remedies suggested above will remove the miseries certainly and absolutely.

Thus, as we see, the obvious remedies are not helpful to us, and we should, therefore, enquire into extraordinary remedies for removing the miseries.

If it be said,—Well, granted that the obvious remedies are not of any help to us; but there are means revealed by the Vedas. By performing the various sacrifices prescribed by the Vedas, we can get over the miseries and acquire heaven and other higher regions,—then our reply is the same as above. We know that stay in the higher regions even is of temporary character. After enjoying the fruits of good actions performed on this earth the dwellers in heaven have to revert back to this earth and undergo all the miseries again. Moreover, there is impurity in the Vedic rites. One has to kill animals in performing some of them. Again, the heaven-dwellers are not free from jealousy. If one particular sacrifice leads to bare residence in heaven, the other leads to supremacy over there. This must give rise to jealousy in the minds of the people over there. Thus, we see even the Vedic rites are not absolute or final means for releasing one from misery. Therefore, we should enquire after some other means.

That means is the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. The Sāmkhya Philosophy divides the objects into four kinds viz., (1) Root-matter, (2) Evolvent and Evolute, (3) Evolute and (4) the Spirit.

(1) The Root-matter or Nature is not a modification. It is the root-cause of all matter. Intellect and the rest are the evolutes of this Nature. Intellect, which is the product of Nature, produces Ego. Ego, born out of Intellect, produces the five subtle elements and the organs of sense and action. The five subtle elements, which are produced from Ego, produce the five gross-elements. The five gross-elements and the eleven organs produce nothing, and they are, therefore, Evolutes only. The Spirit is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; so it is neither an Evolute nor an Evolvent. Among these, the Nature has been termed as Unmanifest, the Spirit as the Knower and the rest as Manifest. So, by the discriminative knowledge of these three, one attains salvation.

The means of Right cognition (or Pramāṇas) recognised in this Philosophy are Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. The other Pramāṇas recognised by the rival schools are included under these three. The process of Perception may be stated thus:—

Suppose there is water in a tank. On account of the absence of any outlet, this water, the very nature of which is to flow, is tranquil. But now a small channel is dug. Then water flows through this channel and assumes the form of the object into which it flows. It will be rectangular if it
enters a rectangular field and so on. Similarly, intellect, the very nature of which is to apprehend all the objects, is at a stand-still, being enveloped by the Attribute of Tamas or Darkness. But after the contact of an organ of sense with any object, this darkness is removed. Then this intellect flows through the channel of an organ of sense and assumes the form of the object with which the organ of sense is in contact. This assuming of a particular form of an object by the intellect is called Perception or determination or knowledge. Of course, the result of this perception is experienced by the Spirit. For, intellect being a modification of matter and non-intelligent can produce only a non-intelligent determination. And the phrases like “I am happy” refer to the Conscious Spirit. So what really happens is this:—A part of intellect runs out through an organ of sense to assume the form of an object. The other part reflects the image of the Conscious Spirit. Now, the out-going part of intellect, having assumed the shape of an object presents itself to the part remaining behind and reflecting the Conscious Spirit. So the Spirit, which in reality is free from activity, contact, agency and such other qualities, becomes active or agent through its image reflected in the intellect. The real enjoyer or agent is the reflected image of the Spirit.

Inference is based upon Perception. The materialists like Cārvākā deny the authenticity of Inference. But, they may be asked—suppose you talk to a man. After his departure if you are asked about that man, you will very readily say about him that he is intelligent or ignorant. Now, how can you perceive ignorance or knowledge of another man? You will have to infer them. Therefore, inference will have to be recognised as a means of Right Cognition. Inference leads to conclude the presence of Major term in the Minor term on the basis of the concomitance of Middle and Major terms and the cognition of the presence of Middle term in the Minor term. For example,—we see smoke (Middle term) on the Hill (Minor term). Now we remember the concomitance of smoke (Middle term) and fire (Major term). Thus we conclude that there is fire (Major term) on the Hill (Middle term).

The Inference is of three kinds viz., Pūrvavat, (A priori), S’esā’at (A posteriori) and Sāmānyatodṛśa (commonly seen). These are defined and explained in the notes on the 5th Kārikā.

Valid testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. A reliable person is that, who ascertains facts on the basis of strong proofs; and when he states a fact exactly as he has seen it, then his assertion is Valid Testimony. The other means of Right Cognition are included under these three. This has been exhaustively explained in the notes on the 4th and 5th Kārikās.

Thus, Nature, Spirit and the rest are cognised by Inference or Valid Testimony. It may be asked—why should not the non-perception of these lead us to conclude their total non-existence? We reply—Mere non-perception of an object cannot lead to its total non-existence in every case. We see that even existent objects are not perceived for various reasons. For example, a man in Conjeevram cannot perceive the Himalayas; one cannot see a piece of straw fallen in one’s own eye; a deaf person does not apprehend the sound of music; a person absorbed in something does not perceive anybody seated near him; one who is not a yogin cannot perceive an atom which is existent; people cannot see the moon or stars during the day-time because their light is overcome by the sun; drops of water, falling in water cannot be differentiated afterwards. Therefore, the non-perception of Nature and the rest is due to their minuteness and not total non-existence. For, when we see the effects of Nature,
in the shape of intellect, ego and so forth, we infer Nature as the cause of these effects.

Now, we state the theory of cause and effect according to the Sāmkhyas. They state that an existent effect is produced from an existent cause. The Buddhists proclaim that the existent Effect is produced from the cause, which is non-existent. The Vedāntins assert that there is no existence of Effects, but they are illusionary forms of one existent. The followers of Nyāya and Vaisēṣika say that the non-existent Effect is produced from the existent cause.

The Theory of the Buddhists is:—"The existence comes into being from non-existence, for without destruction nothing can be produced." (N.S.IV. 1. 14) We observe that a sprout is produced out of the destruction of seed, curds are produced from the destruction of milk. Thus, we see that destruction (= non-existence) produces an object.

But, really speaking, the Buddhists have missed the point. It is not the destroyed seed that produces sprout. It is simply the modification of the structure of particles of a seed that we see in a sprout. That is, when particular kinds of particles are in a particular form, they constitute a seed. When that particular form is changed, then those particles constitute the sprout. If non-existence in shape of destruction were to produce existence, then it will lead to great confusion. The point has been clarified by Śāṅkara-cārya (Br. S. Bh. II. 2. 26) as follows:—

"If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purposeless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For, the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of the horns of hares and the like, i.e., non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, etc., originate from the horns of hares, etc.,—a thing certainly not observed." (S. B. E. XXXIV, p. 416).

The view of the Vedāntins, viz., the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change, is also untenable. They say that as the cognition of silver in pearl- oyster is false, for it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the real pearl-oyster, so the superimposition of this inanimate world on the intelligent Brahman is also false. To this we reply:—The cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is contradicted by perception; we subsequently cognize pearl-oyster and thus our first cognition of silver is contradicted by the second cognition. But we do not find any such thing in the case of this world. There is no subsequent cognition which could render our first cognition of this world false. Therefore, this world cannot be regarded to be mere illusion. Moreover, we find a similarity between silver and pearl-oyster. Both are white. But what similarity is there between the non-intelligent world and the intelligent Brahman, both being poles asunder? How can the world now be superimposed on Brahman?

[The Vedantin replies—For the sake of illusion it is not necessary that only similarity between two objects can lead to superimposing of one on the other. We see that people whose minds are highly excited by passion, experience the illusion of embracing their wives in dream. The same can be said of waking state also. Moreover, when ignorant people superimpose dark colour on the sky which is beyond perception, then the question of similarity does not arise at all.]
The Naiyāyikas assert that the effect is non-existent before the causal operation. Non-existence is produced out of existence. From the existent lump of clay is produced a jar which is non-existent in that lump of clay.

Their view is not correct. For, non-existence cannot be produced. Nobody can bring non-existence into existence. Who can produce yellow color out of the blue wherein the yellow color does not exist? It may be argued:—People use phrases like ‘The jar is non-existent,’ with regard to the lump of clay from which jar has not yet been produced, and ‘The jar is existent,’ after it is produced from that clay. Therefore, the jar has the quality of existence at times and non-existence at other times; otherwise, these phrases cannot be used.—To this we reply:—All agree to the view that a quality exists in the qualified. According to the objector’s view-point, the jar was non-existent before it was produced. That is, the qualified (jar) did not exist then. Then, where did the quality of non-existence reside in the absence of the qualified? Therefore, the objector will have to admit the existence of jar even against his will in the lump of clay. Moreover, the objector had stated, non-existence is a quality which resided in the jar before its production; for, otherwise one cannot use such phrases as ‘The non-existent jar.’ To this we reply:—How can you use such a phrase.—‘The jar is non-existent before its production? Before its production, the qualified (jar) being non-existent, how can the quality of non-existence be appended to it? For example, we say ‘A blue lotus.’ Here lotus is the substratum of the quality of blueness. Similarly, ‘A non-existent jar’ means that the jar is the substratum of the quality of non-existence. Now, when the jar is not existing before its production, then how can it become the substratum of any quality as the lotus is of blueness; therefore, an effect does exist even before the operation of cause.

It may be asked:—If the effect does exist even before the operation of cause, then, wherein lies the utility of the causal operation? To this we reply:—In the stage of cause an object remains latent and minute. The causal operation simply makes that object gross and patent. Thus the causal operation brings about the manifestation of an effect which is already existing in the cause. For example, the pressing of sesame seeds manifests the oil which is already existent in those seeds.

Again, the effect is existent in its material cause, because the former is related to the latter. A lump of clay is related to a jar even before its production. If the jar were non-existent, then it could not have any relation with the lump of clay. A lump of clay cannot produce anything which is not related to it. If unrelated things could be produced out of anything, then why not produce cloth out of a lump of clay? Or for that matter, why not produce everything from everything. But this is not so. On the other hand, wherever cause is patent enough to produce a particular effect, that cause will produce only that effect. The sesame seeds have the potency to produce oil and not jar or cloth. The yarns have the potency to produce only cloth. This potency is always related to a potent effect. Had there been no existence of jar before its production, then who can instil the potency to produce it in a lump of clay.

Again, it is observed that an effect is of the same nature as its cause. An effect is not different from its cause. A jar is not different from a lump of clay, but is of the nature of clay. If the jar were different from clay, then the jar could not be of the nature of clay. Only those things differ from each other which are produced out of different materials, as a jar and the yarns. The objects which are different can have conjunction or separation. A jar and a piece of cloth can be brought together. The Himalayas
are always separated from the Vindhya. But in clay and jar there can be neither separation nor conjunction. Moreover, the weight of clay from which a jar is made is the same as the weight of the jar. For example, a seer of clay will produce a jar weighing neither more nor less than a seer. Therefore, jar is not different from clay.

An objector says:—Well, jar is different from clay, because (1) We find that with regard to jar, we say it is born, and not with regard to clay; (2) It is the jar which is destroyed and not the clay; (3) The notions about the jar and clay are also different; (4) One is named jar, the other clay; (5) The jar serves the purpose of bringing water which clay does not; (6) We say that the jar exists in clay and not the reverse.

To this we reply that these arguments for proving a difference between a cause and its effect, do not prove the real difference. For, these apparent differences can be explained away by attributing the notions to be appearance and disappearance of certain factors.” For instance, the limbs of a tortoise appear from its body and again disappear into it. Nobody on this basis can call these phenomena to be the birth and death of its limbs; similar is the case of a jar etc., which are said to be produced when they emanate from clay, etc., and destroyed when they merge into clay, etc. The difference of notions also can be similarly explained; we call clay as clay as long as jar has not emanated from it. As regards the usage of such expressions as, jar exists in clay, it is like the usage of such phrases as, “Tilaka trees exist in forest.” Really speaking the whole forest is made up of Tilaka trees only, still we use a phrase like that. With reference to the difference of purposes served by a cause and an effect (e.g., by clay and jar), we reply that the same things serve different purposes collectively or singly. The atoms of clay collected in the form of a jar, can bring water; they cannot do so when they are single. “Each individual bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin.” If the Naiyāyika were to say again:—

You say that an effect already existing in its cause is manifested by the operation of the cause. Now, tell us, does this manifestation exist before the causal operation or not? If it does, i.e., if manifestation exists before causal operation then what is the use of the latter? If, on the other hand, you say that manifestation does not exist before causal operation, then it would mean that causal operation produces a non-existent thing. This goes against your sat-kārya theory.

We reply:—

The Naiyāyika has overlooked his own fault. For the same fallacy can be shown to exist in his theory also. He says that a non-existent effect is produced from its cause. Now, we ask—does this production exist before the cause or not? If it does then what purpose does your cause serve? If it does not, then that production must have another production and the latter another and so ad infinitum.

If, on the other hand, it is said that this production of jar is nothing else but jar itself, then “jar is produced” would be tantamount to production is produced, which is absurd. It will be still more absurd when we say, “jar is destroyed,” for, it would then mean production is destroyed.

Thus it is proved that the effect is always existent.

Pradhāna, Prakṛti and Atyakta are the synonyms of Nature. It is uncaused as it is not produced out of any other thing, eternal, one, of the nature of three Attributes and pervades all its products. The three Attributes are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, and is light. Rajas is of the nature of pain
and activity, and is mobile. Tamas is of the nature of delusion and enveloping, and is heavy. These Attributes are able to bring this world into being, and carry on its business by their nature of being mutually subjective, and supporting and productive, and co-operative. Sometimes, Sattva subjugates the Rajas and Tamas; sometimes, Rajas subjugates Sattva and Tamas; sometimes, Tamas subjugates Rajas and Sattva. These Attributes have no power of creation singly; they become productive by taking the support of each other. They are always found in union, all three together. And for the purpose of serving the end of the Spirit, they are seen to co-operate, although they are mutually opposed. The end of the Spirit is the worldly enjoyment or emancipation.

It may be argued that under these circumstances, every existing entity should have all the three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion, as it is composed of the three Attributes. Vācaspati argues—if these external objects themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, then sandalwood should impart pleasure in winter even. Sandal never ceases to be sandal. Similarly, paste of saffron should be pleasant even in summer. Saffron-paste never ceases to be what it is. In the same way, thorns which are pleasant to a camel should be pleasant to men also. They do not change their nature in the case of any particular individual. Therefore, sandal, saffron, etc., are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They give rise to these different feelings on account of the difference of individuals, times, and condition, etc. (Bhāmati on Br. S. II 2-1).

To this Bāla replies (p. 141)—Although pleasure, pain and delusion are common to all objects, still they do not spring up accidentally, so as to affect everybody uniformly. They require certain conditions for their generation. Pleasure for its generation, depends upon virtue, and stands in need of Sattva. Pain, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Rajas. Delusion, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Tamas. Vācaspati has also explained it well (Tatt. K., Kār. 13)—“A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives,—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or stupefies another man who is unable to get her,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things.” (Dr. Jha’s translation, pp. 49-50)

Thus, the Nature also is made up of the three Attributes, because it is the cause of all the manifest objects which are made up of the three Attributes. The Attributes in the Nature are in equilibrium. Of course, the Attributes are not free from modification even at this stage, for modification is their very nature; but the modification of each Attribute is similar. Sattva is modified into Sattva, Rajas into Rajas and Tamas into Tamas, till the Nature does not come into contact with the Spirit. The moment Nature comes into contact with the Spirit, the equilibrium of the Attributes is disturbed. On account of this disturbance, diverse forms in this world are created from the Attributes. For example, one and the same water produces different kinds of juices in cocoanut, lemon, grape, etc.

It has already been pointed out that all this creation by Nature is for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Now, the existence of the Spirit is proved. We observe that all composite objects are for another’s use. Bed, seat, etc., do not serve any end of their own, but are meant for a man. Similarly, the composite Pradhāna, Mahat, etc., being composed of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, much exist for another’s use. This another cannot be a composite object. For, the latter would then require to serve another composite, and
becomes blind, all should be blind. Therefore, there is a plurality of Spirits.

If it be argued that just one Ākāśa appears many on account of coming into contact with jar, house, etc., similarly, one Spirit appears many on account of coming into contact with different bodies, then it would not be correct. For, as body is the upādhi (condition) of the Spirit, so the limbs are the upādhis of a body. And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, would such phenomena be called the births and deaths of the same body?

Moreover, if there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then when that Spirit moves one body all the bodies should move simultaneously. Again, we see that beings are divided into gods, men, beasts etc. on the basis of the three Attributes. Those abounding in Sattva are gods, those in Rajas are men and those in Tamas are demons. If there were only one Spirit, then these differences would never arise, but the whole creation would be uniform. Thus, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

The Spirit, being devoid of the three Attributes, is the seer or witness of this creation, which is of the nature of the three Attributes. The Spirit is isolated, inactive and indifferent, again because it is free from the three Attributes. This different Spirit appears to be active, although the activity really belongs to the three Attributes. This illusion arises out of the union of the insentient Nature with the Sentient Spirit. As a result thereof, the activity belonging to the insentient Nature is transferred to the Sentient Spirit.

A question arises—why should there be a union between the Nature and the Spirit? The reply is:—The Nature is an object of experience; it stands in need of the Spirit, the experiencer. Therefore, one cause of union is that the Spirit may experience the Nature. But, when the Spirit imagines
itself as suffering on account of its union with the Nature, then it desires isolation. This isolation is the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. And as this discrimination is impossible without the Nature, the second cause of union between the Nature and the Spirit is the purpose of bringing about the Spirit’s isolation.

The Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit, desists like an actress who has shown her skill on the stage. The Spirit then attains isolation. And as a delicate and newly-wedded girl when seen by a stranger does not appear again before that stranger, so the Nature also, when seen by a Spirit does not come into union with that particular Spirit.

Thus, bondage and isolation which really belong to the Nature are ascribed to the Spirit by mistake. By practising such discriminative wisdom, a person never errs about bondage or emancipation. That is, he attains isolation or salvation.

Har Dutt Sharma

अथ कारिकाणं सूची.

(अकारादिक्रेण.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>कारिकाणं</th>
<th>प्रणाली</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>७ अतिसरतसमीयताः</td>
<td>५५ तत् जसर्वमकक्षां</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२३ अपवसयोढ़ुपथं ज्ञानम्</td>
<td>३८ तन्मात्रणविशेषम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३३ अस्तेकणमविवर्धयो</td>
<td>१५ तत्सत्पीयस्मात्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२४ अभिमन्दिभक्षांकरः</td>
<td>२० तत्सत्पत्तिन्निम्नवर्तमानान्तरम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१५ अविवेक्यातः सिद्धि:</td>
<td>६२ तत्सत्पतिविवेचनम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५३ अशंकितकारों देवः</td>
<td>६५ तेन निवृत्तप्रत्यथाम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>९ अस्त्करिकत्वं उपाढ़नाभ्रणान्</td>
<td>३१ नियुग्मविवेचकी विषय:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५० आर्याविशिष्टशः</td>
<td>१ दुःध्वन्तविशिष्टातातः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५६ घ्येष प्रतितिक्षति</td>
<td>२ दद्विद्वुधविक:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>२० उभयास्तकारः साधने</td>
<td>४ दद्वृत्तमात्रभवचनम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५५ ऋष्यसत्वविशील:</td>
<td>६६ रक्षित हृदयेशक एको</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५१ रहिति शरीरवनस्मानम्</td>
<td>४४ चस्रोगमनमुच्छ्यं</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४५ एवत प्रतिविपरीतश्च</td>
<td>५२ न विना भवेशीतम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५२ एवत निर्देशनविद्याः</td>
<td>६० नानाविद्यायाय:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५३ पात्र विचयवेद्याः</td>
<td>४७ पात्र विचयवेद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ परेयं प्रतीक्षाठाल:</td>
<td>२१ पुरुषस्मृतिर्विद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ परेयं प्रत्यक्षासि</td>
<td>६२ पुरुषविद्यार्थिविद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>६२ पुप नायस्यस्या</td>
<td>६२ पुरुषविद्यार्थिविद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>५८ अन्वलक्ष्यविनोऽस्मात्</td>
<td>५० पूर्वविद्यार्थिविद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>३३ कणुन प्रवृत्तिविश्वासान्</td>
<td>२२ परेयं प्रतीक्षास्विद्याः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१६ काॅम्यस्यानस्मात्</td>
<td>६१ प्रकृते: सुकृपातस्मान:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>४१ विचर्ये वथाद्येवत्</td>
<td>५३ प्रतितिख्यातिविद्यायो द्वितीय:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>१८ जननमनकरणानामास्रतिनियमान्</td>
<td>६८ प्राते नानादेवश:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>कारिकाणं</th>
<th>प्रणाली</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>१२ प्रध्यानविवेचकानिश:</td>
<td>१६</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kārika Ā

Handed down by tradition of disciples, this was summarised in Ṭrīyā verses by Is'varakṛṣṇa of noble mind, having fully understood the demonstrated truth.

Kārika I

The topics of these seventy verses are those of the entire Śaṣṭi-tantra; they are devoid of anecdotes and also omit discussions of rival views.

SĀMKHYA KĀKIKĀ

NOTES

I

About the sons of ब्रह्म, कवित, आधुरि, पद्मचिन्ध्र and द्रवरक्रमण see Introduction. The quotation 'पद्माविषयतित्वम्' etc., is taken from पद्मचिन्ध्र; see Introduction.

आनुपित काल: The word भूत stands for living beings, according to चन्द्रका.

आनुपित, according to गोदो, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवामार्गदेवे, Davies remarks—"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7). Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (daivya)." (p. 15).

The reading adopted by गोदो, viz., तदन्यात्के is more expressive of the सांत्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदन्यात्के of वाचो (See, S. N. S., 1, 1in.). cf. तत्वविद्ध-द्रवरक्रमणत्वतिरिवर्त्तिनयस्यायम: (सं. व. १. १.). The reading of जयो विदा, तदन्यात्के does not materially differ from तदन्यात्के. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading.

विशुद्ध: describes the three द्रव्यas in the following verses:

अत्यादिकोऽयो द्विविषय: दारीरो मातस्तथा |
शारीरो वचुभिवेदाभिविषये श्वरः च स: || २ ||
सिद्धोग्रामविद्ययुज्यकोविन्यम्यन्ते: |
गुल्मारशायत्रीविकारविवेदकोऽधिकेः || २ ||
तथा शारीरीसारकुटसङ्गमाः तिर्थस्वरोऽधिकाः || २ ||
भिषेत्ते देहवस्तायः मानसं श्रोतुमहति || २ ||
With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—
धृत  च  दुश्वदुहु  सत्यासूपात  सत्य-
विद्याये। वाल्मीकीय लिपिकल्प: ॥ (१.१०.२१)
तथा  तोहरे  च  विद्यानाथ  कर्मभिषेकम्। ॥
सत्यात्मकविषयं  यथा  मण्डलविनन्दन् ॥ (६.३.२०)

The reconciliation of वैदिकं हिंसा with the अ०  तext—मा  हिंसात्  सत्  धनातन्ति—is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, In.; Sovani, p. 400). बाद्रम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24-36).

The order of व्यक्ताचारमिहियन is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following शास्त्रयुज्यम्—
—विद्यात् पादस्तमारेय (२.२२) वाणात्यतमारम् (२.५३);
तेनाहारस्यत (२.६४); तत: प्रहसे: (१.६६); and संहतपरार्थमार्य दुर्योगम् (१.६६).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word ध्यक्त. Some call the महाशुन्तद्वाणा यक्षक, whileas, the author of कारिका seems to regard everything यक्षक (and, therefore, प्रस्तुतमय:), except the प्रयोग and पुरुष. वाचा agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says—
—सहायतात् द्वाणात्यतमारेय अतिरिक्तार्यां प्रथापुपथिनान्यां प्रतीति:।
He would seem to include महाशुन्त तथा, by the word आदि (See बाद्रम p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to बाद्रम, to mean the union between प्रहसे and पुरुष, cf. आदि नांस्योऽणां (इङ्ग: प्रहसे: १८३)। See Sovani, pp. 401 and 403, and notes 36 and 37.
In connection with Jacobi’s remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṁkhya (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. “Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for the same substance.” (Maudsley’s Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पूर्व is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकारे सत्यायन सूत्रये: । आपातिवेण्येप्रम, विद्येनोत्पवियसामायासिद्धिरावृत:। Unlike the देवयिको, the संवैयस maintain that सामायिक is a product.

On पूर्व as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—“It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light.” (Phiol. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अह्वार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रिय, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the ‘base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions’ (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—“If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality.” (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदाविनिर, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अह्वार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (सूत्रये),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी—चौद also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The संवैयस विद्याविनिर, does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानमार्द बाध्यतिः: (स. ४, ४२.).

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यय, अभ्यास and शस्त्र, recognised by the सांख्याचरित्र, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recognised by other schools. The चार्याचार्य नेतान्त्रिक recognises only प्रत्यय, the ज्ञान and वैदिक schools recognise प्रत्यय and अभ्यास, the संस्कृत also recognise only two प्रमाण, but they are प्रत्यय and शस्त्र according to them. The followers of रामायान, the ज्ञानेयाचार्य, and the संस्कृत and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यय, अभ्यास and शस्त्र. The oldest and the most modern नेतान्त्रिक and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मूलमान्त्रिकs of प्रभाकर school add अभ्यासित, as the fifth. The मूलमान्त्रिकs of कुमारिपंडित school and the आद्येयाचार्यांनांs recognise one more, viz., अभ्यासित or अभ्यासित. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संकल्प and एक्यम to the list. Some नेतान्त्रिकs recognise चैत्य also in addition to the above; others add अभ्यास to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिका, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

वचो विभाज याययो, अभ्यास और शस्त्र;
मार्द उपमान के अभ्यास;
ज्ञान इसे उपमान और शस्त्र;
जोड़ो इसे उपमान और शस्त्र;
वेदाविनिर इसे अभ्यास और शस्त्र और चन्द्रिका अभ्यास में।

2. अभ्यासित—

All the commentators include it under अभ्यास.
3. अभावः

वाचः and जयः regard it as प्रत्ययः.
मात्र includes it under अव्ययः. Although गौड़ोः's.
remark—सम्मानाभावत्रस्मितस्मितोपप्रमाणाय प्रत्ययः
suggests its inclusion under शब्दः, yet another remark of his,
viz., शब्दाय्यत्रस्मातुदात्तर्थज्ञाश्च गव्यः, would lead us
to infer that he will have it under अव्ययः.
चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्ययः, and,
therefore, no independent प्रमाणः.

4. संबंधः

वाचः, जयः and मात्र include it under अव्ययः.
गौड़ो and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्दः.

5. शैलसः

वाचः opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable
person, then it is शब्दः, otherwise it is no प्रमाणः.
गौड़ो and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्दः.
मात्र includes it under अव्ययः.

6. प्रतिमा

वाचः and चन्द्रिका do not mention it:
जयः includes it under प्रत्ययः and अव्ययः, when it is
correct, otherwise it is no प्रमाणः; मात्र includes it
under अव्ययः; and गौड़ो includes it under शब्दः.

7. चेता

Noticed only by चन्द्रिका and मात्र, and included
under अव्ययः.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसकः
do recognise six प्रमाणः, yet गौड़ोः's remark that they are अर्थातः,
संबंधः, अव्ययः, प्रतिमाः, शैलसः and चेता, is not correct; for संबंधः,
शैलसः and प्रतिमाः are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणः by the मीमांसकः;
rather, "the author of शाश्वेतशास्त्र अचिन्तित शाश्वेतायुधम्"
( p. 28 ). जैविक nowhere mentions the प्रमाणः, but the six प्रमाणः
(viz., प्रत्ययः, अव्ययः, शब्दः, अव्ययः, अर्थातः and अव्ययः ) are discus-
sed by शब्दाचार्य in his भाष्य on मीमांससामग्री 1. 1. 5. प्रामाणकः
does not recognise अव्ययः, but तूलार्थः does.

—V] NOTES

Pramāṇa has been defined as the instrument of pramāṇa. Pramāṇa is
that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory,—
and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition
by mind. But वाचः says—वाचः पास्यः; पास्यः प्रमाणः. This might
mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit ?
No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is re-
lected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, (the
Spirit ) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of mis-
apprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the
Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगामुन्सः—
'दशः दशमिन्तः; चक्षुस्तिरः प्रत्ययः प्रतिस्थापितः' ( II. 20 ) and 'चित्रेक्षितसःकर्मायेतः स्वदिष्टविद्धम्' ( IV. 22 ).

V

Following the न्यायसूत्रः—सामान्यायायम् पूर्ववतः शेषवतः
सामान्यतोऽधिकृतः च ( I. 1. 5 ), वाचः first divides अव्ययः into three
kinds. Again he gives another classification:

अव्ययः

| शैलसः | चेता or शेषवतः |
| पूर्ववतः | सामान्यतोऽधिकृतः |

The commentators differ in the explanation of these
terms. वाचः himself proposes two alternative explana-
tions.

(1) (a) पूर्ववतः—A priori or inference of effect from
cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.
(b) शेषवतः—A posteriori, or an inference of cause
from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.
(c) सामान्यतावली—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,—e.g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) दृष्टि—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) चेष्टा—Inference by exclusion (प्रस्तुतप्रतिप्रेक्ष्यम्: प्रस्तुताय चिन्हायणं संस्क्रिय: परिक्रम:). The question is,—under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, शुभ्य, etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, चेष्टा and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under शुभ्य.

(c) सामान्यतावली—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the दृष्टि in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वास्तवप्रति show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruba's paper—'Tridham anumānam', POC, Poona, pp. 251-280.

वाचक agrees with the second explanation of वास्तवप्रति. But इतिहास or चेष्टा, according to वाचक, is a negative reasoning. वास्तवप्रति's instance of चेष्टा, viz. शब्द is a शुभ्य, is rejected by वाचक in his तत्त्वज्ञान (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतस्वरूप. The inference of शब्द being a शुभ्य is not a व्याप्तिवधान तस्मात् अत्यन्तव्यावधिक. The correct example of चेष्टा, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आकाश. These qualities cannot reside in विद्युति, जल, तेजस् and वाता: nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being चिन्हप्रकार cannot be the qualities of रिश्य, खाल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्य are सामान्य. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth द्रव्य, viz., आकाश. So there being no शब्द of आकाश it is an instance of व्याप्तिवधान, जयः and गाहः agree with the first explanation of वास्तवप्रति, गाहः and मारत explain चेष्टा differently—सच्चारे जगद्धिता व्याप्तिवधानयात मन्त्रायतनात्त्मक व्याप्तिकारण इति (गाहः) II.

विकृतिः प्रकृतिप्रेक्ष्यम्—वाचक would read one more विकृति i.e. विकृति. विकृतिः प्रकृतिप्रेक्ष्यम्, गाहः has a curious explanation to offer—tadādhānān विकृतिप्रकृतिकृतं यतनेलितिः अवैधीति, यथा ईत्यहयो यथा। विकृतिः प्रकृतिः यत विकृतिः विकृतिः अवैधीति, यथा ईत्यहयो यथा, अस्थिर विश्वासिति. जयः agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सत्त्वार्थ which ought to exist between the विकृति and the विकृतिः. They are—

1. सत्त्वार्थम् as between राजा and पुरुष.
2. प्रकृतिविकृती यथा यथा सक्ति.
3. कथेकारणावली चेष्टा नाम आकाश.
4. पारमार्थिक चेष्टा नाम बिधित्व.
5. साहित्य चेष्टा नाम ब्रह्माकाल च चक्राकाली.
6. प्रबोधित्व नाम नानात् उपाय.
7. निमित्तालार्थिक नाम भोज्य भोजनक.

As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the वेदांत school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रस्तुत, but include it under अथवा. वाचक says that the relation between a वाचक and its अथवा is not that of विकृति and विकृतिः as between पुरुष and विकृति. वाचक, being only an object of cognition cognised by the वाचक, cannot be known by inference.
It will be interesting to know how वाचो has tried to bring the other प्रमाणस under the three recognised by the लाखय.

उपमान. According to the नेतिरक्षक (प्रतिकालत्व प्रमाण सामान्यता—ग्रहण सं 1 i. 6), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the लाखय, बावल is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the बावल. It is the विश्वसूति alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अनुमान. According to the धीमानक, उपमान is the सादृश्य-मान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the directly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गवल in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवल directly perceived. This is the बुद्ध of उपमान. वाचो replies that this उपमान and its बुद्ध are both included under प्रतीय. For, सादृश्य is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोला in गो, so we have गोलाद्यल in गी. And as we directly perceive गोला along with गी, so we perceive गोलाद्यय and गवलाद्यय along with गवल. Therefore, गोलाद्यय (उपमान) and गवलाद्यय (उपमानफल) both are प्रतीय. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संबंध) which should reside on two objects; it is only यथार्थसब्यः-पालय that is, the existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गोला; and if it is perceived in गी, then it is perceived in गवल also.

अप्राप्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चेत outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the धीमानक objects—देशासामान्य चूर्णितं हेयमुक्तेनोपपावनि पालक: etc. He says that when we hear जीवन चेति: कवित्विति, then the substratum of the existence of चेति is देशासामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of चेति also. Thus, चेति's non-existence in the गुह is opposed to चेति's existence in देशासामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अप्राप्ति. वाचो replies that गुह (in which the non-existence of चेति has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशासामान्य. Similarly चेति's non-existence in गुह (which is opposed to his existence in गुह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रतीय. For, अभाव व्यवस्था is merely a modification of भूतित. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? Answer. Under एं चूर्णितं विनियमण परिणामव्याख्यानम् व्याख्यात: यो च III 13, व्यास has defined परिणाम as अविनियमण ध्वस्य पूर्वकर्मिनिलुभुती चतुर्विनियमणित: परिणाम हृत—i.e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूतित, then it was सत्रियपर्यायम् of भूतित; and when there is no घट, then it is the भूत or अध्ययपरिणाम of भूतित.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now "things beyond the senses are not only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes" (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्वकर्म अभावम, which वाचो regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रतीय. The most important kind of अभाव, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोद्ध (and व्यक्तित, which is not mentioned by the नारिकत, but added by वाचो), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जयो rejects पूर्वकर्म and शेषत भूत both (p. 9).
VII

The seven defects (vāyūvaraṇa) laid down six causes of ātmanātman (mahābādaya IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of ātmanātman mentioned in the kārikā are reduced to four by jātaro—

1. देख्यकोष includes अबिद्र and अविनामी.
2. इनियनकोष इनिययायत and मनोनवयाय.
3. विस्तोष = धीम्य, and
4. अर्धेनियनकोष includes स्वच्छ, अमिशव और समाहितार.

Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two—इनियनकोष and विस्तोष (See p. 405). चाहुर lays down the causes of ātmanātman of अस्तु (non-existent) things even—हातामतां चहुरः भवति. तत्तथयते-पाप्यध्वसंहरत्ततामतामयेदात.....

VIII

On the reading प्रकृतस्तुपेय, Davies remarks—"Lassen has in the text स्वर्ण (having its own form), from the सांक्षेप, which must be referred to intellect (mātra). All the Mss. but one have स्वर्ण (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has "dissimile et simile." (p. 27, 1n).

IX

वायुर here lays down the opinions of (1) the चाहुर, (2) the मेथ्यादिन्तक and the भौभेष्यिक, and (3) the विद्याधित्व as देख्यकोष.

1. The चाहुर maintain that existence comes into being from non-existence (अस्तु: साध्यते).
2. The मेथ्यादिन्तक and the भौभेष्यिक maintain that an existent cause produces a non-existent effect (साध्यतावस्तुते).
3. The विद्याधित्व maintain that the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सत्ता विनिमयं: न कार्यात्मातं वस्तु सत्ता). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

X

हेद्युत, i.e., caused. ब्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to मात्र, is of two kinds: कारक (producer) and शास्त्र (illuminator or indicator). प्राप्त, इत्यादि, अहुराद्य and पञ्चतमाय आदि are the कारकेवार, as they produce effects. That is, इत्यादि, अहुराद्य and पञ्चतमाय are हेद्युत and हेद्युत both, while, अयुक्त (i.e. प्राप्त) is only a हेद्युत. The शास्त्र एवें are five-fold, viz., विप्रयोग, अयुक्त, आरम्भ, अद्यतन and अहुराद्य. Now, विप्रयोग, अयुक्त आदि और सिद्धि are the पञ्चतमाय (i.e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्व. (But what is this अयुक्त?) Thus अयुक्त is only a कारक हेद्युत.

अनित्य—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. Cf.—मात्र: कारणमयः (मात्रायुक्त नं 1921). For, according to the theory of सत्ताययार, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्राप्त शिशय, because it has no कारण to which it could return.
contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, In.)

XII

Why can there be no अवयविकल्पित संयोग between प्राण and बुद्धि, etc.? Because, between these, the relation is तत्त्वाय ( =identity or तत्त्वाय ), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तत्त्व and the प्राण produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहंकार, etc.? No commentator answers this, although here also we can show that अहंकार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in संयोग relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गोदः और लोकः explain the word अवयव as श्रवण, धर्म, हस्ति इत्यादि. But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire धर्म (viz., बुद्धि, अहंकार etc.) cannot be called as श्रवणानन्दिकारित्य. It is urged that श्रवण and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that श्रवण and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्राण also. Even वाचः, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि प्रधावय: परस्पर संयुक्ते वस्मिने प्रक्षेपित।

XII

Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्व is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रक्षेप. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहंकार, and the latter in producing the हस्ति and the तत्त्वाय, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रक्षेप, the fountain-head of all energy.

XII

The three गुणa or Attributes are the essence of प्रक्षेप; प्रक्षेप is nothing but these three गुणa in equilibrium. The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the संयोग theory of three गुणa, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—"In the system of Valentinus the
Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुण of कारक and is probably an importation from India.” (p. 37, n2)

"विषय:—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् चीर्द is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. ‘सहीर्दमनियमाद्विदो शीर्दिदियो।’ वेदश आत्मिक विज्ञानविद्यनुसंदासिवादाय।’ (सर्वदासिनः, p. 32). Vachchānti’s refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बांढ़िय—यथा किरिकाक्षेन यात्रीतुष्कि वस्तुनि रक्षितं स्वतं जनानि विज्ञानाध्याय सर्वदासिन्युपादकमात्र तव प्राप्तत्वं परवात्तितत्वं वस्तुमूले वात्तित्वं ज्ञानभात्ति द्वस्यते। यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानास्त्र ध्वस्य नहीं विज्ञानस्यास्त्रास्त्रानेनविज्ञानस्यास्त्रानेन ध्वस्यास्त्रानेन साधारण वस्तु न सम्बन्धे। अतः वस्तुसमाप्तोपपत्ति विज्ञानास्त्रानेन तदस्पर्श्यमिति। (p. 128).

अधेतनान्य—क्षेत्र (intelligent) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चेतन, and not identical with it, because क्षेत्र is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तिर्पितत्त्वाच पुरुष means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>व्यक्त</th>
<th>अव्यक्त</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>गुण</td>
<td>अधेतनान्य</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विचित्र</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सामान्य</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अंतर</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>प्रस्तुतिमिति</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
<td>अव्यक्त</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that गोद्वान and माद्वास say पुरुष एक:, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषस्त्रानेन. जयो और वचो, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अवेक्त. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—“Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Celebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), ‘individual’; So in the Śūtras it is said, ‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels’ (I. 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes ‘one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.” (p. 65)

XII

The गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the व्यय and वेशेन्द्रिक systems. They are of the S. N. 2.
nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of 

prokrti. Hence, vā微妙 means—गुण भूति परम्परा:। That is, they are 
called गुण (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and 
not for themselves.

गोङि, मात्र and जयि mention अन्योपन्यास: also, whereas वाचि and चिन्तकः add अन्योपन्यास before and बृत्ति after अभिम्म, 
अभिम्म, जनन and निम्यन each. बृत्ति according to वाचि, means चिन्तक (operation). जयि explains बृत्ति as सवाहिर्वेपण परिणाम:। According 
to गोङि, अन्योपन्यास: means परस्पर वर्तन: i.e. are reciprocally 
function. मात्र, however, seems to take बृत्ति in the sense of 
function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—“बृत्ति 
means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning 
is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the 
nature of the others or be the same in effect.” (p. 36, in.)

गोङि, मात्र and जयि quote one verse, viz., रजसो मिहुय सत्त्व, etc.: जयि ascribes this verse to विद्युता, which it is 
difficult to identify, unless it stands for दरियतत्वाभिधियता। बृत्ति 
But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता। The verse found 
there is—राजैवयवः भवति भारत। रजस: सत्त्व तस्य तमस: सत्त्व 
रजस्तथा तथा। (XIV. 10)। We find a similar verse in the अथवे- 
पर्वें of the महाभारत—तमसो मिहुय सत्त्व सत्त्व मिहुं रजस:। रजस्तथापि 
सत्त्व स्वातु सत्त्व मिहुं तमस:। (35, 6).

XIII

अभिम्म—जयि and वाचि explain it as दुह्महत:; but गोङि takes 
it in the sense of लायणा, and मात्र explains it as कामत्रथातु।

Now, these गुण, on account of their having the characteristics of 
अन्योपन्यास, etc., assume different shapes. But, 
how do these गुण perform functions of so different a nature?
In reply to this वाचि gives an example of a woman, who, 
according to him, illustrates all the different functions of 
the गुण। गोङि, मात्र and जयि, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्व by 
a lady, रजस् by warriors and सत्त्व by clouds. A virtuous

woman (and therefore, a साधना type) pleases her husband, 
pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The 
brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रक्षत्) of a king 
please their master, pain their opponents and delude the 
people. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a नामस 
type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity 
among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, 
there is one difficulty. The 3 गुण ( =प्रकृति or पुरुषकारण ) 
assume various shapes by permutation and combination. 
This amounts to saying that the पुरुषकारण is not one but many. 
Now, how does this position differ from that of the योगिका 
who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नवीनः पुरुषकारणपय 
परिवर्त्तितां स्वस्थितिविद्वेधयथाविभिन्नतः। वाचि 
कारणस्वपन्न स्थवादिर्विदिप्तमन:। बिमुनः 
ज्ञानोत्तमलोकप्रभावनायम्।। बृत्ति विद्युतादिदिप्तम्।। बिमन= 
(1.128).

But are not these गुण opposed to one another? The 
reply is—yes. Still they unite for दुह्महत: as wick, oil and 
lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find 
any apparent opposition between तृप्त, बृत्ति and दृष्ट in spite of 
the attempt of वदिन्द्र:—च।—दृष्टस्य तदपतनम दृष्टस्य 
त्वात्तपाय दृष्टा दृष्टिविद्या, एवं बृत्तिका स्वपन्न 
दृष्टस्य दृष्टानितिका।। For this reason वाचि 
gives another example of this विद्युत:—विद्युत: यथा वातावरणेते भावः। 
परस्परिहित: शरीरयोगार्थयोगकारणकारणः। बाघाम 
quotes a parallel 
passage from the देवीमार्ग (3.9)—““प्रीतथा तथा 
प्रकृतिविधान:। बृत्तिकेति यथार्थ विद्युतादिदिप्तमपरस्म:।। 92। विबृत्ति हि तथा 
तृप्तिमया सह सहकृत:। तृप्ति दृष्टानितिविद्य: पावकोपदिप्तमपरस्म:।। 10। एवतथा: 
पदार्थों प्रतिनिधिप्रतिप्रशमल:। (pp. 139-140). Really speaking, 
there can be no बृत्ति of these गुण in any evolved thing 
(say, a human body). If at all there could be any विद्युत: 
then it would be in the सावधानत्व i.e. प्रकृति। In no परिणाम 
of प्रकृति are the गुण in equal quantity. On the other hand, 
there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no 
विद्युत्तल in the विद्युत:। Cf.—स्वाभाविक दृष्टिविद्य: परस्परिहित: 
सामान्यत : लतायें। सह प्रतिपद:। (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15).
XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्धित्वयोराभावात्. गोदे and मार ऋषिवेच्छिन्त। गोदे and मार explain it as—‘on account of the absence of the contraries of गणन in the प्राप्त, अतःविभार्य रीतेषा in the प्राप्त, ’ वा शास्त्र ऋषिवेच्छिन्त। ऋषिवेच्छित्र resides in the प्राप्त and its constituents.’ चाविन्त्राय ऋषिवेच्छित्र adopts the second explanation. ज्यो also agrees with it. cf. बाघुण्यापाणिविवेच्छित्रयोराभावात् ( ? )। न हि निःशक्तस्य पुनर्विवेच्छित्रयिरः संशयित। तत्साधू नाग्गुण्यापाणिविवेच्छित्रियः संशयित। जत्या ( p. 20 ). The explanation of गोदे, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. ज्यो uses a curious expression, ( संतानित्र) for cause. It seems that the word संतानि stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तत्साधूतेप्रस्तोते संतानित्रा भविष्यम्। तथैव संतानित्रयुक्त स्तोत्रायति ( p. 21 ).

समन्वय = एकाप्रयात्म, similarity, or एकार्ययुतम (i.e. belonging to one genus), according to ज्यो. गोदे understands समन्वय in the sense of ‘inference’—यथा वाक्यार्थस्य वच्च द्वरा समन्वयति, तृतीय प्रत्ययादेव ब्राह्मणिति। The explanation of समन्वयम् (सू. सू. इ. 131) as offered by विजयान मित्र., उपवाचित्रिता श्रीणि हि उद्धारादित्वमादिहिमि: समन्वयसं समुन्तेन पुनर्विकृतेत् (i.e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast, are again strengthened by food, etc.), ’does not directly fit in this कारिका,’ as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).

कारणशिष्यभागान्तः ज्यो understands the word विभाग as, ‘emergence’,—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay.

etc. ज्यो, मार and गोदे explain it as ‘separation’ or ‘distinction’ between the functions of the cause and the effect;—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (पवमयोनियत्रायति। But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तत्साधूतेप्रस्तोते संशयितम्। ज्यो here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable)——अस्मात् वास्तवः, ‘कारणशिष्यभागान्तः तथ कारणशिष्य’, इस्थनेवविवेच्छित्रयोराभावात् वास्तवात्युते—युपकरोति तत्र कारणशिष्य, युपकरोति तत्कारणशिष्य, संवेदितात्, उपकार्यवाचित्रितायादेव भविष्यम्। यथा वाचित्रितािित्वात् बाणान् च वेश्यकार्यवाचित्रितायािित्वात् उद्धारायादेव उद्धारायादेव कारणशिष्यिते निःशक्तिः। (pp. 21-22).

अतिविभाग—वेश्यकार्य—According to वाचि, गोदे and मार, the term अतिविभाग means ‘merging’;—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. ज्यो also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading आविभाग, where अविभाग means यवि. ज्यो’s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविशिष्ट, and explains the phrase as—‘because this diversity is produced out of unity.’ cf. ऐद जोक्ते निभाश्चारस्यदुर्योग्यस्यकारितािितायािित्वात् वेश्यकार्य नानाम नृत्ते—... (कारितााििित्वात् बाणान् च वेश्यकार्य। तत्साधूतेविवेच्छित्रयोराभावात् ( p. 22 ).

प्रस्तथे विगुणात्—समुदयाच—According to वाचि and ज्यो, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रृति of गणम्, because गणम् are in constant modification—cf. परिवेशितत्व गणम् (वास्तवम् on सू. सू. IV. 33). The first kind of modification is that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. Here, the सामान्यतम् is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विपिनयण (or समुदय), we have creation. Here सत्त्व and the rest combine with one another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take विगुणत् and समुदयाद् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रृति.


XVII

The reading संहेत्यपरायन्त्वति, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गोड. who reads संहेत्यपरायन्त्वति. Wilson’s reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सं. सू. —संहेत्यपरायन्त्वति, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

अन्वितान—पुरुष is the अन्वितान of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question: —But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्युपित—निविनय, is not active; how can he become an अन्वितान? Reply: —It is not essential that only an active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्संयनानादिरित्वत्तुं मणिपुर (सं. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न ्च सर्वं तृष्णं स्वात्प्रयोगकक्षमायूष 
चलनेन हस्तम ग्येनां प्रक्वेकं चेतेष्टन प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥

सेवायांत्व वर्णयां बिनिविजायक: 
राजा साधिश्रितमाणः विनियुक्तके कथान ॥ ८५ ॥

तत्स्मादाचलोदोपि स्त्रापने कदन्तातमन: ॥

( कुमारिन्द्र कोषवाचित on मी. सू. I. 5. Chowkhamba edn., p. 710).

बालायण thinks that this argument about the अन्वितान of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by श्लोकायां in his भाष on रचनातपरस्त्व and प्रृद्धेष्ट (ब. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2).

फळयां प्रुद्धेष्ट—मार्द assigns this प्रुद्धेष्ट to प्रधान, whileas, वार्ष and others take this प्रुद्धेष्ट as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—आगमां महाधियं ॥

—XVIII—

NOTES

XVIII

On जनम and भरण, विष्णु says—जनममणे चाव गोत्पत्तिविनाशी नृत्यक्रियामयायन। किंतुपुराणिद्विविधातिविचारिणभ्योगमां वियोगव भोतदेशाभियमिषयताति (सं. सू. I. 149).}

The view of the वेश्वरिष्ठन is that one and the same आत्मन assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. "उपाधिमेवेक्श्यम् नानायों आकारस्तेन प्रणातिचिनम्:। "

"उपाधिमेवेक्श्यम् न तद्नास्त। " "वेश्वरिष्ठन परिवर्तिणायन न विद्वद्धमायाय न। " (सं. सू. I. 150—152). वेश्वर sets the पूर्वेष्ट in the following words:—

इह क्षेतिरायां वेश्वरिष्ठन इति मन्यन्त:—केकराण्य: पुरा: वेश्वरिष्ठनकम्यं मणिन्तत्वम्। इह रसनायां वाक्तो मणिन्तत्व: सर्वेष्टकम्यं प्रवजयते। एवं मणिन्तत्वमुद्रिते विरोधे विक केकराण्य: पुरा: वेश्वरिष्ठनकम्यं मणिन्तत्वम्। इह क्षेतिरायां वेश्वरिष्ठनकम्यं मणिन्तत्वम्। इह क्षेतिरायां वेश्वरिष्ठनकम्यं मणिन्तत्वम्। इह क्षेतिरायां वेश्वरिष्ठनकम्यं मणिन्तत्वम्।

Cf. प्रमाणात्व (स्वयमस्यविनिर्देश, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):—"आकारस्तेन परिवर्तिणायन विचारिणभ्योगमां जनामयाय शरणायां: किंतु वाक्तो मणिन्तत्वम्। वेश्वरिष्ठन आवायां, इत्स्वयं वर्त्तमाणायाय एकामां, तता च त्वा:—

एक एव हि मूर्तिः पुरा: मणिन्तत्व: एवं प्रकृतिः। एक एव हि मूर्तिः पुरा: मणिन्तत्व: एवं प्रकृतिः।

( This verse from प्रकृतिविद्वारिण, १. २, is quoted by विष्णु also on सं. सू. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of पुराणविष्ठन contradict the गुरुंचित which lay down the unity of soul (i.e. आत्मन:)? The सं. सू. says, No.—"गोत्पत्तिविनाशी जातिप्रवचन (1. 154).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मन: in the sense of class notion. वार्ष also tries to reconcile the आदेशुनयित्विरेष्ट as follows—

"एकात्मा सर्वायां च प्राणायां तत्त्वातिकाभिषेकाधमायायन भक्तमाय पवेन:। प्रकृत्येकामायायन अधमायाय शुद्ध: सार्वै प्रकृतिविशेषाय अधमायाय:। अधमायां दीर्धितशुद्धक्रम:। भजन: ज्ञान: सार्वै:। अधमायां उपायूपायः:। वर्थस्य क्षेत्रमेवार्थस्य क्षेत्रमेव अधमायाय:। अधमायां तत्त्वातिकाभिषेकाधमायायन भक्तमाय पवेन:।। (सं. आ. I. ५०)॥" तत्त्वविशेषाय, on प्रो. सू. II. 22.

Further on, says the संहार, if you are going to explain away this नास्ति by वार्ष: then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as पूर्व: is the जगत्तिः of आत्मन:, so the limbs (अन्त्वः) are the उपाधिः of a body (संहार). And
when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदांतित्व call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body?

XIX, XX and XXI

माधवस्य or भारानीय is of seven kinds according to जयो—
सतियों वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं, वा तथा चाच्योऽपद्यं श्रृणूणां सर्वसंग्रह प्रदेशं च नापि।
तथा सार्वसर्वात्मानां सर्वसार्वात्मानाः जयो। जयो, further raises the question that if पूर्ण is महापयव अथवा अर्नत, then how is he a भोक्तर—

अवेतन मेतनातिद्विद्ध क्रियांभ इत्यादि. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—'I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महापयव, अक्षुर and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपराजः कुर्सिन विश्वासनाब्राह्मण (सं. म. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—‘यवप्प्रयोगान् तोहम्मणायितुद्देखते।’ (जयो) अर्नाश्रितोऽहुँ शीतारेविद्धि। संस्कृति शीतोऽभस्यम्, अधिका संयुक्त द्वारूण। (महार) ‘व्यायामदृश्यौऽपि चतुर्दश्शत्रम तर्कतहोत्त्रिप्रस्तुतम्।’ (जयो) सर्वार्ज्जितोऽहुँ शीतारेविद्धि। संस्कृति शीतोऽभस्यम्, अधिका संयुक्त द्वारूण। (महार)

अर्नासित्वम् रकुमतः यथां धिम्मकसत्तमम्।

XXII

In his भाष्य on म. म. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्र as the products of महापयव—(संस्कृतमात्रायणम् महापयवविशेषपरिणामम्). But there the महापय �should not be taken as the immediate cause (i.e. producer) of these तन्मात्र. व्यास has himself said at another place (म. म. I. 45) that these तन्मात्र are the products of अहंकार.

महार and गोदह hold that these तन्मात्र singly produce the महापयाः. The other commentators hold that each succeeding महापय is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्र. For example, स्वतंत्रमात्र and रूपतंत्रात्र produce व्यास; श्वर्तंत्रमात्र, रूपतंत्रात्र and रूपतंत्रात्र produce तत्त्वज्ञान so on. But this theory of व्यास violates the orthodox पञ्चक्रियाकरण theory of the वेदांतित्वम्. The point is noticed by क्षतिकार, who says—

क्षतिकार महापयम् पञ्चक्रियाकरण द्वारा सत्यम्।

(quoted by क्षतिकार in his comm on तत्त्वार्थसूत्रि, p. 293 Chow. S. S.).

महार gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहंकार—पञ्चक्रियाकरण: पराविभुविभुविभस्तिक्रियात्मकभिभीत द्वारा महापय तत्त्वार्थसूत्रियायात्मकभिभीत विद्वत्व: प्रायः प्रयाङ्गिनाह्नकार इत्यभिषेयम्।
XXIII

Gāṇḍā and Mātrā curiously divide Jñāna and Vēraṇa into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as Jñāna means only Prabhāsanukāya-njāman in this kārika, and not the knowledge of the Vedas and the rest. Similarly, the Ādhyātmaka-Vēraṇa (viz., Prabhāsanukāya-samaveda-vināṁ amitam vijñāna mokṣeśvarāntāyāntāyānta) is the principal Vēraṇa which leads to the Bādharāyana also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is mokṣeśvarānta?

Bādharāyana does not read Gāṇḍā in his text of tathēkārānta. Our edition of tathēkārānta, Jyā, Mātrā and Gāṇḍā mention nine kinds of Eṣṭhāna although each one (except Vācā) says Anavibhāvyam. It seems, therefore, that Bādharāyana’s text is the correct one. Our edition of tathēkārānta and Vādha’s edition, however, combine Ānubhāvyam and Ānubhāvyam and thus make the total eight.


XXV

Adbhūt is divided into three kinds—

Adbhūt

| साधित्व | ज्ञात्व | तमस

or वेक्तु | वेक्तु | वेक्तु

The eleven śāntikṣa

This is the scheme adopted by Vācā and others. But Vījñāna (on स. म. II. 18) would have—

XXVII

The first phrase उभयात्मक, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पप्रकार, man: gives the proper function of the mind. Gāṇḍā interprets sāṁvit-kāryam, i.e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of śāntikṣa). Vācā understands sāṁvit as viśeṣaṇa-vishēṣapātana kāryam, i.e., perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. Jyā and Ānubhāvyam agree with Vācā. What Vācā means is that all the senses of perception cognize their respective objects vaguely, and this is viśeṣaṇa-vishēṣa or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is
sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सत्वक्षेत्रप्रस्थ or complex-perception. The first is नामजायस्यित्यजनास्यां अतिचिन्तमार्य, and, therefore, निमित्तकः; the second is नामजायस्यित्यजनास्यां अतिचिन्तमार्य, and, therefore, सत्वक्षेत्र. In his support, बांधव cites अतिचिन्तमार्य etc., from इमार्यां स्थितातिक (on मी. I. 4., verses 112 and 123, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.).

The reading adopted by म्हडळेराव is—सत्वक्षेत्रम् मनः ततः चतुर्वतीयन्यम् समावेष्टायां। (See S. N. S., p. 126; but he quotes सत्वक्षेत्रम् कामः मनः अयायायामर्यं च सार्यां in J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 631). The Chinese version of the साम्क्या कार्किक also reads “Manas is that which discernes” and thus agrees with म्हडळेराव’s reading. आयायामर्य has been thus illustrated by परमार्य—“It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time.” (Tak. S. K., p. 35).

इत्यादि तथा सार्यां—ततो च भावणि प्रकृतिः। But बांधव criticises this view. भावणि प्रकृतिः: सत्वक्षेत्रम्-पश्चात्तथा सार्यां, न किंद्रि धीयमानुवस्तु। यद्यपि भावणि प्रकृतिः सत्वक्षेत्रम्। तथा प्रकृतिः पारमार्यादिनित्तिकत्रिकृतद्रिश्यम्। न तु प्रृत्तिनिलितम्।

म्हडळेराव reads वाणादेखित in place of वाणापारः. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. म्हडळेराव’s reading is preferable, because the second line of the कार्किक lays down the reasons of the नामार्य of इत्यादि, the two reasons being, गुणपरिशिष्टवाद‍ and वाणापारः.

The question is—how can one अहंकार create these manifold उद्देश्य whose functions differ? This question is raised by योगकर in his योज्याशातिक (Chow. S. S., p. 70)—यद्र पुनर्भवित्यावर्णादिनित्तिकार्काः थुः। कार्काः भवावास्यावर्णादिनित्तिकार्काः थुः। सर्व सार्यां तथा सर्वादेशित थाः। The reply to it is—गुणपरिशिष्टवादः। Although अहंकार is one, yet the three गुण, accompanied by वाणान्ता and वाणापारः, act and react upon one another: therefore, the modified effects of अहंकार (i.e., the उद्देश्य) differ in their functions.

इत्यादिनां वाणायां नाम कार्यत् कारणासमादित। This seems to be an interpolation or a mistake. In the first place, वाणायां is not recognised as a cause in the साम्क्य philosophy. म्हडळे, in his गुण on the 31st कार्किक says—इह साम्क्येन पुनर्वेदस्यात्त्व मानयते। Secondly, even म्हडळे himself says so in the अविष्कार on the 61st कार्किक—इह साम्क्येन पुनर्वेदस्यात्त्व मानयते। सत्वक्षेत्रम् होऽ। तस्मात् कारणां न कारणोऽविष्कारे। न कारणां न प्राधान्य; न कारणां न प्राधान्य; न प्राधान्य, सत्वक्षेत्रम् हुष्टगुणपरिशिष्टवादः।

But if we compare म्हडळे on the 31st कार्किक, we find—अविष्कारे न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य न प्राधान्य, न प्राधान्य, गुणपरिशिष्टवादः। On the basis of म्हडळे’s reading, I propose that we ought to read गुणपरिशिष्टवादः. That is, this, गुणावलम्ब न is not caused by God……..or Spontaneity, but by the modification of the Attributes.

Wilson has translated it—“but from modification of qualities produced by spontaneity.” Keeping the text as it is, I have tried to steer clear of spontaneity as the cause. My translation is—“but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes.” But to have this sense even we ought to read सत्वक्षेत्रम् हुष्टगुणपरिशिष्टवादः.

परमार्य seems to translate the word सत्वक्षेत्र by ‘Special Being’ or ‘a Special Dharma’, which may be called “Being”.

The reading गुणावलम्ब गुणावलम्बवाद is also faulty. I think we ought to read गुणावलम्ब गुणावलम्बवाद प्राधान्यवादः. निष्कृति प्राधान्यः।

The following classification of the organs by परमार्य, has no parallel in any commentary.

“Among the organs, there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body. ‘To avoid danger’ (relates to the eyes and ears, which ) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. ‘To protect the body’ (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects
approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects." (Tak. S. K., p. 37).

The word मात्र stands in the sense of "uniqueness" according to वाचा and मात्र; but, according to वाचा, this word means "bareness." परमार्थ, seems to waver between the two senses. [See, Tak. S. K., pp. 37-38; S. N. S., p. 63, In. and J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632 (I)].

**XXIX**

स्वाभाविक | गाहा and मात्र read स्वाभाविका.

सामान्यकरणाः प्राणायाम वाः: प्राण। Does the word करण stand for विवेक अन्तःकरण or वियोगशृविक करण? While वाचा adopts the latter interpretation, although मात्र curiously says at one place —समस्तात्मन: करणाः प्राणः। विजान अन्तःकरण as also explains the word करण in his बालमय (on सांस्कृत, III 39). But वाचा, while commenting on सामान्यकरणाः प्राणायाम जीवम् (योगाभाय on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., स हि प्रयामेव: शरीरस्वूतिविद्यान्तथापमेव: संस्कृतात्मनः प्राणायाम: 'सामान्यकरणाः प्राणायाम: प्राण।' बालमय correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगाभायेशि समस्तात्मन: करणमेव प्राणायाम, न तु बालमयमेव, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

**XXX**

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांत्वय philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्येक) inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (सांवत्त). Now, in प्रत्येक, the three अन्तःकरणस and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नेत्रयस्यs, there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. जानवयायायथ यथा (सांस्कृत, III. 2. 57), न युपान्तकस्यविद्यानां (ibid, III. 2. 58); अयोगान्तःकरणस्येकार्योदयवर्त्तानास्य (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नेत्रयस्यs, the mind is अयुपायप्रायः. The followers of सांत्वय, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मयमपरियम, and, therefore, there can be a युपायप्रायः.

In the case of अन्तःकरण and युपाय, only the three अन्तःकरण function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

**XXXI**

आहू०—Davies observes:—'अकुया is glossed in the Petersb. Lexicon by Absicht (= purpose). Antrieb (= motive). Colebrooke's translation is "incited by mutual invitation."...... The meaning of "incitement to activity," mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of अकुया...... It is composed of आ, to, towards, and कुया, to cry. Gauḍapāḍa says that it means ādharasambhrama (respectful eagerness in action ).' (p. 68, In.).

Davies is wrong in considering that गोहा is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, In.). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every शिष्मृत्य functions for गुप्तस्य.

The spirit of the सांस्कृत, "स हि सर्वित्तरस्वर्तकः" (III. 55) and "देवस्यस्यस्मित: सिद्धा" (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कारस्य, where no इव तत्त्व is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विजान's remark, viz., प्रकृति-सिद्धिः यः सर्वार्थस्य स्यायमय: ततः | इवर्थशत्तिः सर्वस्य संस्कृतिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः सिद्धिः (सांस्कृत, III. 57).
XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus “the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas.” (ibid.) According to गाह्य, आह्य and ध्यान belong to केमेदियम and प्रकाश to बुद्धिविद्या. ध्यात ascribes आह्य to इतिहास in general, and ध्यान and प्रकाश to अह्य and ध्यान respectively. वाच्य, स्थार, अह्य and मन्न न, and प्रकाश to बुद्धिविद्या. According to पर्याय, आह्य belongs to अन्तं, प्रकाश to बुद्धिविद्या and ध्यान to केमेदियम [see Tak S. K., p. 42].

The word देश in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच्य takes देश with आह्य, ध्याय and प्रकाश each. The objects seized by the इतिहास, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into ध्यात and अध्याय. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अन्तं, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also ध्याय and अध्याय, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धिविद्या are also tenfold because of being divided into ध्याय and अध्याय varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कार्य. The objects

---

XXXIII

बाच्य explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the राज्य धर्म. According to the वेदांतिकत्व “अर्थविधाय युगमिति विप्रष्ठिति विनाशिति” (II. 2. 6), काल is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—according to different circumstances. प्रस्तुति clarifies this point—“एकादशा समवेषायामायायामभित्तिविक्षित्विमुखाति निविधाय निष्प्रायोगिकथाय निबन्धितौ सभास्म नानास्त्राहेतु;” that is, just as one and the same man is called पाठक or पाठक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and persisting. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच्य replies—Why should we first assume one काल and then assume different circumstances or उपास्य to make this काल multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपास्य only? Cf. स वाच्य काल सतर्क्यां ध्यायां ध्यायां श्रीद्वारानुपछी ध्यायां सुविदार्थानां संस्कृताः हनुमासेय योगायां on III, 52.

XXXIV

अतिशय = non-specific, i.e., तन्मानस. विशेष = specific, i.e., पद्धतिमानस.

XXXV

The word देश has been translated by S. N. S., as ‘principal’. The translation is based upon नया’s phrase दारायय संस्कृति. I think that ‘warder’ expresses the sense of देश better than ‘principal’. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तं, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to ध्याय, as S. N. 3
is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अनुवादक were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अनुवादक acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one). परमायण renders विचित्र करण इरि as the three internal organs master the gate. (Tak. S. K., p. 44).

XXXVII

वाचक interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुधि. गोङर, on the other hand, interprets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माउर quotes the following speech of अह्नूनाऴ.—

—अह्नूनाऴो धिरं श्रेष्ठे मैत्रेय सुप्रभाव ।
—प्रेरणे नवमात्रे न वर्ते नाहि न तजगत्व ॥
—सत्य तिरुपदं पुरुष: पञ्चविश्व: ॥
—तत्कुछुंदु रसिणय स कथं मोक्षमित्वत ॥
—मोदीं स्वेच्छार्या देव: सर्वस्यापि जगातु: ।
—वेद्वश्व परस्पर: हा ममयांतर्भु: हृत: ॥

माउर further remarks—त हि समवत् कपिलस्य में किमपि
—कलेवयुद्धवतासा, किं तु संस्कृतियां पञ्चविश्वरितश्रावणेव सार्थेत्वं विपश्येन च
—भिधिथानस्तहुः। उपज: च—

इति तिरुमहान निर्मित निर्माणमुतुऽुधु कु कण माइयाम। यदि विद्विहि ते
—कपिलम्बनं तद्वाकर्तो नोदुर्साक्ष्यं च ॥। This verse is more of tirade against the सांस्कृत ऐतिहासिक रूप than an exposition.

XXXVIII

Why समाज are called अविशेष?—This has been explained by गोङर and माउर as देवानामके तु लक्ष्यक्रम विधा हु:कमोहरिता:; which is wrong. For, समाज, being evolved out of विशेषानात्मा, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह ( = रजस् and

—XL] NOTES

तमसा). Therefore, the explanation of वाचक, viz., न चेमु श्रावणकालिकत्वमािहोकोिविशेष हिति सामयः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तमांस, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—

(1) Subtle body: (2) those which are born of father and mother: and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

It (subtle body) becomes specific by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are "non-specific" or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाचक, समाजं आत्मं युक्तयुक्तयुक्तदिवेदसांविकारात्मक: (Kar. 40)—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

प्राकृतिकात—According to वाचक, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सं. स. समाजं धिरात्र (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विनाता विध्वस्तिर्यानं, तत संगीता समाजं धिरात्रिकानेव भवतः. इत्येऽ: Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the वाचक replies—धिरात्रिकानेव इत्यादिर्यानं (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विनाता comments—यथापि समाजं धिरात्रिकानेव इत्यादिर्यानं, ततापि तत्वय पराभुक्तो एव भगवानं प्रधानं धिरात्रिकानेव नामत्तमाः भवति। But, is not this idea of धिरात्रिकानेव foreign to सांस्कृत?

The word धिरात्र is explained as प्राकृतिकात तत्वय पराभुक्तो एव भगवानं प्रधानं धिरात्रिकानेव कर्यते प्रधान तासेये दयाये गोङर. वाचक and माउर agree with it. But, पराभुक्त means by it, "endowed with the mark of subtlety", and explains it as;—"The subtle body migrates through the existences and it is what the sages alone see. (That is why one says it has the mark of subtlety.)." (Tak. S. K. F. 59).
According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of विद्विद्वारिः is eighteen, but according to मुनि, it is seventeen. विद्वारिः has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहंकारय च बुद्धवेतन्त्वादः.

**XLIII**

A distinction should be made between चिद्विद्वारिः and विद्विद्वारिः. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अहंकारय: पुर: in the authority quoted by वाचः.

The reading of गोदः and माहः is विना अविशेषः; while as वाचः has विना विशेषः. वाचः calls the सूक्षमतिः as विशेष in कारिका XL. So विना विशेषः means विना विशेषः शारीरः. But this is confusing because, to say that the चिद्विद्वारिः (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्षमतिः (composed of चिद्विद्वारिः and ज्ञातमात्राः) is not logical. गोदः’s explanation isbetter when he says that चिद्विद्वारिः cannot exist without अविशेषः विशेषः, the five subtle elements.

The reading of परमार्थ also seems to be विना अविशेषः; and he agrees with गोदः in explaining विशेष as the five subtle elements. (Tak. S. K. p. 50). चिद्विद्वारिः gives a different opinion of some commentator.—केवल सूक्षमतिः चिद्विद्वारिः शारीरिः कामात्मात्रिः तथा विना चिद्विद्वारिः चिद्विद्वारिः विशेषः. चिद्विद्वारिः विना निरालयः स्वतः तत्त्वः, कितन्त्र सूक्षमतिः मात्रिः स्वतः तत्त्वः। अतो न चिद्विद्वारिः सूक्षमतिः-स्वान्त्यतिः तत्त्वः.

**XLIV and XLV**

According to माहः, the सूक्षमतिः rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are झाडः, ज्ञानपत्यः, एक्तः, विष्णु, गण्नायः, नाति, नाटिः and विशाचः. गोदः gives समायः for विष्णु, and यास has been dropped in Wilson’s text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूक्षमतिः sinks to the five states of पशु, पशी, स्त्री, सरिगुणः and त्यागः. The प्रहस्तिक्षणः, according to वाचः, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रहस्तिः itself; but माहः includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रहस्तिः) in this bondage. The वेदार्थक्षणः, according to वाचः, is the identification of the Spirit with the विवाहस्तिः (i.e. the evolutes); but according to माहः, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the झाडः, ज्ञानपत्यः and others, as the summa bonum. These three
kinds of bondages are explained by वाच at length in his लक्ष्याकारस्य on योगभाषा 1. 24.

The word वृक्कतिः in प्रत्यक्षित्यः stands for महाबार्त्रुत्तिंनदिङ्यानि, according to वाच but, according to गोष्ठि and माठ. the word denotes प्रथाकत्तुद्वपंह्वादत्मिवारः.

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or “the conduct of the human understanding” (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गोष्ठि and माठ illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अवत्रि, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is गुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the post. The explanation of वाच is better. विपर्यय is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. “Incapacity (अवत्रि) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (गुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue.” (Davies, pp. 84-85).

XLVII

विपर्यय or अवत्रि is of five kinds:—अविय, अस्तित्व, राग, द्रुष्य and अभिमिश्त, which are called तमस्य, माहृ, महामाहृ, तामस्य and अन्यायाभिमिश्च by the खानिक.

XLVIII

तमस्य or अविय is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five ushtle elements.
I am tempted to quote the interesting explanation of these terms given by Fuji, the Japanese commentator, and quoted by Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in Tak. S. K., p. 62, in.

(1) 'lubricating water,' because Nature penetrates all, as water lubricates all; (2) 'moving,' because by the necessary objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; (3) 'running', because with time a river joins the ocean; (4) 'lake-water,' because the influence of the acts committed in other existences is like the water of the lake which the rain refills; (5) 'well-penetrated' because one renounces the acquisition of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; (6) 'easily crossed,' because one has not to occupy oneself any more with protecting, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; (7) gushes without ceasing; (8) 'transparent,' for there is no more attachment; (9) 'excellent and pure,' for not to injure others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

LI

No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः; जयः which gives them—तां च असिद्धियां। सोप्यक्षणारंभिताया। (?) संबंधः—, has a defective reading.

वाचः criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamangali and other commentaries on the Sāmkhya-Karikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to जमः; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.
Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to भावं:

1. अध्ययन
2. श्रवण
3. मन
4. सुद्धार्थमाति
5. शान

6. प्रमोद
7. मात्रदत्त
8. मात्रध्वस

The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

परमार्ये’s original gives a very beautiful tale in explaining how शान secures सिद्धि.

"A brâhmin is hated by others and he sees it. He becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself: ‘In this village, there are no brâhmins; I can pass there my summer (varṣa) retreat’. During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds. All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him: the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of S’akra, he says to the villagers: ‘Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for me.’ Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts.” (Tak. S. K. P. 65)

These eight सिद्धिः, viz. तार, चुतार, etc. are thus translated by परमार्ये:

(1) तार = Crossing by oneself.
(2) चुतार = Crossing well.
(3) तारतार = Crossing all.
(4) प्रमोद = Crossing with joy.
(5) प्रवृत्तमाति = Crossing with an excessive joy.
(6) प्रमोदमाति = Crossing with full joy.
(7) राधण = Crossing by love.
(8) समुद्रभ्रसित = Crossing by universal love.

परमार्ये adds to it a lengthy explanation of his own which slightly differs from the original commentary at places. For instance, the शान-सिद्धि, which is equal to समुद्रभ्रसित, is explained by परमार्ये thus:—

‘Crossing by universal love’. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case ‘Crossing by universal love.’

While भावं construes अहुः as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्ययं, अग्रवेद and तुष्टि, निवारक (on स. III. 44) explains अहुः as अवार्थक and refers by it to the three सिद्धिः, viz. ज्ञान, च्यवस्त्र and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृत्तमाति and शान as of secondary importance. He criticises भावं as follows—कालिदासामहामेघसिद्धियो निवारक- पृृष्ठिनियो विपर्ययायाकृतितत्त् भवति निवारकमाति व्याप्ते तत्र। तुष्टि—
The word विज्ञ has been explained as महत्वम् बुद्धिरिति by विज्ञ (on म. स. III 45). But this is not correct. बाच्छा is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks:—“Some commentators make the लिंगa itself to be बुध्दि (intellect) and भूवास to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i.e. बाच्छा H.) is preferable, for the लिंगa, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’. (p. 93).

Curiously enough, Colebrooke translates ग विना विज्ञ भाव-नित्तितम् as ‘without person there would be no pause of dispositions.’ This is accepted by Wilson also in his translation of the गोद. But, the word in the text is नित्तितम् and not नित्तितम्. I have, therefore, translated it as ‘without लिंगa, there can be no elaboration of dispositions.’ Because, virtue and the rest are acquired by the formation of gross and subtle bodies. The Spirit cannot experience or acquire virtue or vice. For this purpose, there is always the necessity of gross and subtle bodies. Therefore, Wilson’s explanation ‘but is equally necessary for their occasional cessation’ (p. 216) is quite beside the mark. (See also Davies, p. 89 with 1n; S. N. S., p. 97).

The phrase ब्रह्मान्दास्तम्यस्यान्त: refers to all the three creations above, in the middle and below. Davies thinks (p. 90, 2n) that Wilson construes this phrase with मध्ये रघुविषयात. Thereupon, Davies remarks, ‘Brahmā does not belong to it (i.e. midst), but to the region ‘above’. I think Davies has misunderstood Wilson who does not distinctly join the two phrases given above. (See Wilson, p. 220). परमाथं explains ब्रह्मान्दास्तम्यस्यान्त: as ‘Brahmā is at the commencement and pillar at the end.’ He goes on to explain तस्य—‘Why is the last of all the creations called ‘pillar’? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks etc., support the three worlds; that is why one calls it ‘pillar.’’ (Tak. S. K., pp. 69-70).

LV

पत्रन्विष्ठ also expresses the same idea—‘परिणामार्प्यकरुष्यश्च भूवे स्वस्वविचिन्ता’ (श्र. श. II. 15). Compare also, समानं जगार्मणं दुःखम्’ (श्र. श. III. 53).

स्वभावत् is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वतं तत्र समाते हुँगुः, विचिन्त्यामिलितेष्यम्.

मात्र reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समातेन in place of स्वभावत् in the text. The former term he explains as विज्ञ लेकेकः and the latter as संबंधेत्.
As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गोङडो, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction "पुनः देवनुमयूषति दुर्प्रवर्तिते"—वाचो explains it as—अग्रसत्तास तथा कृष्णसारसारसानानि न युः पद्यमित्। This is not a good interpretation. गोङडो is much nearer the mark when he says—अहंसमेव पर्यःनेन द्राक्षीयस्य उँच: जुष्टिनानां प्राप्यातः।

LXIII

Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks (see Tak. S. K. p.77), "This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the Sūtra, III. 73."

On page 58 of our text, read एताभि सस्त्र ग्राहयने च मेंः, वैशाय, चेष्य च इमि place of चमि:, मानि, वैराय, एष्याकृति.

LXIV

The word तत्त्वायाम, according to जयो, गोङडो and मात्र, means अयास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्व. वाचो clarifies this अयास as तत्त्वविपयायामयाम, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पृथक्कृति and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नाशिम, वैशाय, च में और नामस्य, as given by various commentators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>जयो</th>
<th>मात्र</th>
<th>गोङडो</th>
<th>वाचो</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नामिषि</td>
<td>अहो विक्रयानां</td>
<td>नामिषि तत्त्वायामि</td>
<td>नामिेवः भवतायामि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न में</td>
<td>न में वैस्मालिनि</td>
<td>न में तत्त्वायामि</td>
<td>न वा सर्वेऽह, यत्रोदयमयः, शरीरस्यः प्रकृति:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नामस्य</td>
<td>अहो वैशाय</td>
<td>नाई तत्त्वायामि</td>
<td>अहंकाराहरितो- इत्यादि</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LXVI

The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (i.e., शुरुवार्य). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more शुरुवार्य. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXVII

S. N. S. remarks—"Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of jīvātmukti. His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowledge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested like the body (or force) of the potter's wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see B. F. E. O., IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory." (p. 116, 1n).