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FOREWORD

The Pûrva-Mîmâṃsâ is one of the six systems of Hindu philosophy which have come down to us from hoary antiquity. They fall into three groups, viz., Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāmkhya and Yoga, Mîmâṃsâ and Vedânta. Each has its special field of inquiry, where it zealously defends its findings, but in other matters it is content to borrow from the others. The word pûrva means initial, and mîmâṃsâ, a reasoned conclusion. The system is so called because it aims at a rational settlement of the doubtful points in the initial or ritualistic portion (karma-kânda) of the Vedas, while the Uttara-Mîmâṃsâ or Vedânta deals with their final or philosophical portion (jñâna-kânda), consisting of the Upanisads.

Some millenniums ago, sacrifices to different deities formed a very important part of the religious life of the cultured sections in India, and for a proper performance of them the Mîmâṃsâ was indispensable. Even to-day it has great influence over Hindu society, inasmuch as the Vedas and Smṛtis, which prescribe religious duties for the Hindus, as also Hindu law, are interpreted according to the tenets of the Mîmâṃsâ. But as its speculative side was intended to serve the purpose of rituals, it is neither comprehensive nor very convincing as a philosophy.

According to the Mîmâṃsâ (as also the Vedânta), the Vedas are eternal, being only revealed to certain gīts or seers. As such they are free from human defects, and their authority is unquestionable. The Mîmâṃsâ goes so far as to say that even words are eternal and their meanings fixed. Unlike the Nyāya, both systems regard knowledge as self-valid, that is, as carrying conviction of its truth unless invalidated
later. But the Mīmāṃsā is sharply at variance with the Vedānta both in its objective and method. For it is an inquiry into righteous action (dharma); it believes in a real objective universe as well as in a plurality of selves, although these are admitted as eternal and omnipresent, and it glorifies heaven, to which the performance of rituals is held to be the way. But the Vedānta in its highest or monistic phase is an inquiry into Brahman or the Supreme Reality, it looks upon the whole phenomenal world as illusory, and it exhorts us to strive for Liberation, consisting in the realisation of our essential oneness with Brahman, through knowledge, to which devotion and selfless work are indirect helps. The whole emphasis of the Mīmāṃsā is on the mechanical performance of rites, and it has no use for God as the author of the periodical manifestation and dissolution (stistī and pralayā) of the world, nor does it believe in them.

The basic work on the Mīmāṃsā is the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, or Aphorisms, of Jaimini (probably 200 B.C.), which has been commented on by Śabara Svāmin. Two other illustrious thinkers, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara—the latter supposed to be a pupil of the former—have written expositions on this work and have come to found two distinct schools of this system. Subsequent writers on the Mīmāṃsā have more or less elaborated the views of these two masters, notably Kumārila, who tried to bring the Mīmāṃsā as close as possible to the Vedānta.

Some knowledge of the canons of the Mīmāṃsā is essential for an understanding of the philosophical literature of India. The Mīmāṃsā-Parabhaṣā, which means, "A lucid exposition of the Mīmāṃsā," is the smallest popular treatise on the subject. Very little is known of its author, Kṛṣṇa Yajvan; but his book, setting forth some of the salient ritualistic principles of the system, culled from Jaimini's Sūtras,
is a veritable boon for beginners. Somewhat more comprehensive is the *Artha-Samgraha* by Laugākṣī Bhāskara, and still more so is the *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* (or *Apadeva*) by Anantadeva. Of these, the former has got two English translations, but the *Mīmāṃsā-Paribhāṣā* has none. Hence the present attempt.

In preparing this edition, I have received substantial help from the excellent edition with two Sanskrit commentaries by Professor D. T. Tātācārya Sīromani of the Sanskrit College, Tiruvadi (Tanjore). I am also indebted to Mahāmahopādhyāya A. Cinnasvāmi Sāstri, Professor of the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta in the Calcutta University, as also to Pandita Paṅcānana Sāstri Tarka-Sāmkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha of the Yogendra Catuspāthī and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, for helping to clear some doubts. For the text I have consulted, besides the edition named above, the Nirmaya-sāgara edition of Bombay, the Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series and another edition of Benares, and three editions published in Calcutta. Valuable information on the intricacies of Vedic sacrifices has been obtained from the *Yajña-kathā*, in Bengali, by the late Principal Rāmendra Sundara Trivedī.

The translation has been made faithful and reasonably literal. Copious notes have been given to elucidate the text, which has been divided into sections with suitable headings, and references have been given to a good many of the quotations. An Index also has been added. It is hoped that the book will fulfil a real need of the English-knowing students of Indian philosophies.

Belur Math, 
November, 1948.

MĀDHAVĀNANDA
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-V.</td>
<td>Ṛg-Veda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan. Vār.</td>
<td>Tantra-Vārttika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tāṇ. Br.</td>
<td>Tāndya Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tai. Ā</td>
<td>Taittirīya Āranyaka</td>
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<td>Tai. Br</td>
<td>Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<td>Tai. S.</td>
<td>Taitturiya Samhitā</td>
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<td>Mār. S.</td>
<td>Maitrāyanī Samhitā</td>
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<td>n.</td>
<td>Note</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pū Mi. Sū.</td>
<td>Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras</td>
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<td>Rām.</td>
<td>Rāmāyana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vāj. S.</td>
<td>Vājasaneyya Samhitā</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sat. Br</td>
<td>Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śaḍ. Br.</td>
<td>Śaḍvimśa Brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

Introductory .............................................. 1
Varieties of Brāhmaṇa Sentences ...................... 3
The Injunction Regarding Performance .............. 8
Three Kinds of Injunctions .............................. 19
Six Tests of a Subsidiary ............................... 23
What is a Subsidiary .................................. 31
Two Main Divisions of Subsidiary Rites ............. 34
A Fourfold Division of Subsidiary Rites ........... 41
How an Injunction Functions ........................... 46
Four Tests of Names .................................... 56
Corroborative Statements ............................... 69
Sacred Texts ............................................. 73
Criteria of a Difference of Rite ....................... 82
Threefold Vedic Subject-Matter ....................... 87
Order .................................................. 89
## KEY TO TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sounds like</th>
<th>Sounds like</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अ a</td>
<td>o in son</td>
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<tr>
<td>आ ā</td>
<td>ah</td>
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<tr>
<td>इ i</td>
<td>i short</td>
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<td>ई ā</td>
<td>ee</td>
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<td>उ u</td>
<td>u in full</td>
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<tr>
<td>ऊ ū</td>
<td>oo in boot</td>
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<tr>
<td>ऋ r</td>
<td>r (almost)</td>
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<td>ए e</td>
<td>e in bed</td>
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<td>ऐ ai</td>
<td>y in my</td>
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<td>oh</td>
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<td>ओ au</td>
<td>ow in now</td>
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<td>क k</td>
<td>k</td>
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<td>ख kh</td>
<td>ckh in blockhead</td>
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<tr>
<td>ग g</td>
<td>g hard</td>
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<td>घ gh</td>
<td>gh in log-hut</td>
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<td>ङ ng</td>
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<tr>
<td>च c</td>
<td>ch (not k)</td>
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<tr>
<td>छ ch</td>
<td>chh in catch him</td>
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<tr>
<td>ज j</td>
<td>j</td>
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<tr>
<td>झ jh</td>
<td>dgeh in hedgehog</td>
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<tr>
<td>ञ nā</td>
<td>n (somewhat)</td>
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<td>ट t</td>
<td>t</td>
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<tr>
<td>ठ th</td>
<td>th in ant-hill</td>
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<td>ड d</td>
<td>d</td>
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<td>ढ dh</td>
<td>dh in godhead</td>
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<td>n</td>
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<td>त t</td>
<td>French t</td>
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<td>थ th</td>
<td>th in thumb</td>
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<td>द d</td>
<td>th in then</td>
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<td>ध dh</td>
<td>theh in breathe here</td>
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<td>न n</td>
<td>n</td>
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<td>प p</td>
<td>p</td>
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<td>फ ph</td>
<td>ph in loop-hole</td>
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<td>ब b</td>
<td>b</td>
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<td>भ bh</td>
<td>bh in abhor</td>
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<td>म m</td>
<td>m</td>
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<td>sh</td>
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<td>ष s</td>
<td>sh (almost)</td>
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<td>ह h</td>
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MIMAMSA-PARIBHAŚA

INTRODUCTORY

ञुर्यनारायणं बन्दे देवीं निपुणसुब्रीमः।
गुजलयिगतायोऽध्य जितत्तमहं सजे॥ १ ॥
बाजानां शास्त्रसिद्धार्थोदशबोधाय धीमता।
मोमान्सापरिभाषेयं क्रियते श्रणयज्ञा॥ २ ॥

1 I bow to Śūryanārāyana and Tripurasundari Devi,¹ and also bow constantly to my teachers, who² were well versed in different subjects.

2 For the understanding by boys of a few³ of the principles established in the (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) system, this Mīmāṃsā-Paribhāṣā (compendium) is being composed by the learned Kṛṣṇa Yajvan.

[¹ Presumably the parents of the author. The words, meaning the dity Sun and the Divine Mother respectively, serve the purpose of an invocation. Or they may refer to the two Chosen Deities of the author.

² Or the clause may mean. From whom I have learnt the subject.

³ Or the line may mean. For the understanding in brief by boys of the principles, etc. One edition reads ‘āklesā’ for ‘leśa,’ which would give the meaning. For the easy understanding by boys of the principles, etc.

⁴ Many editions read ‘āḍimataṁ’ instead of ‘āḍimataḥ,’ in which case the adjective, meaning ‘intelligent,’ would refer to boys.]
Here, in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā consisting of twelve chapters, the great seer, Jaimini, has discussed only righteous and unrighteous action as being capable of performance. Of these, righteous action is that which is described by the Vedas as, bringing on what is desirable, as, for instance, sacrifices etc. Unrighteous action is that which is described by the Vedas as, bringing on what is undesirable, as, for instance, eating kalanja and so on. Regarding both, the Vedas, the Smṛtis, and (approved) usage are the authority. Of these, the Vedas are independently authoritative, while the other two are so as being based on the Vedas.

Now the Vedas have two forms, as consisting of sacred texts (mantras) and sacred commentaries (brāhmanas). Regarding these, it will be stated later on (p. 74) that sacred texts have utility as helping to recall the things concerned at the time of performance. Prayoga in the text means performance; relating to that—this is the meaning (of ‘prayoga-kālina’). A sacred commentary (brāhmana) is a sentence enjoin-
ing something And a corroborative statement (artha-vāda) is an auxiliary to that. It will be stated later on (p 69) that a corroborative statement is authoritative as forming a unitary passage with a sentence inculcating an injunction, by leading to the impression that the thing enjoined is praiseworthy.

1 The word ‘laksana,’ literally meaning a characteristic, here means a chapter

2 As opposed to Brahman, which is the theme of the Vedānta, dealt with by Bādarāyana

3 That is, beneficial

4 That is, harmful

5 Meat of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow. It is the spiritual evil resulting from the eating of such meat that is meant, and not any possible physical evil. The word also means a red onion.

6 Books composed by sages to regulate human conduct on the basis of the Vedas, which are believed to be the eternal wisdom of God, revealed only to certain gifted persons called gītas or seers

7 Otherwise they would be regarded as superfluous

8 Viz., the sacrificial offerings, the deities to whom the sacrifice is made, and whatever else is connected with a sacrifice.

VARIETIES OF BRAHMANA SENTENCES


ddhyāṇavākya cha nekavibhāgaḥ—karmottṣayah kāmaḥ, guṇavākyaḥ, falaśāraḥ, falaśāraḥ guṇavākyaḥ, sajna-karmottṣaḥ kāmaḥ vājyāṃ 


tat eva bākṣyena ‘dṛṣṇā kṛtā kāmaḥ’ dhāti bhoṣyate tatāḥ karmottṣaḥ kāmaḥ; yathā “abhāgihūṃ juhāte” dhāti. dhātābhāgihūṃ kāma, kāmaḥ vājyāṃ vājyāṃ dhāti karmottṣaḥ kāmaḥ vājyāṃ 


tāhītāḥ kāmaḥ tadbhūte śvāyāvāt-vibhāgaḥ vākyaḥ guṇa- 

vākyaḥ; yathā “vṛjna juhāte” dhāti. dhātā bhūvasvābhāvāt vājyāṃ
Sentences constituting sacred commentary are manifold, being divided into sentences originating a rite, those dealing with accessories, those setting forth results, those inculcating the accessories for results, those originating a rite together with its accessories, and so on.

Of these, a sentence originating a rite is that by which one understands that such and such a rite is to be performed, for example, “One should offer the Agnihotra” (Tait S. 1 v ix. 1) Here the homa⁴ called Agnihotra is enjoined as a thing to be done; hence it is a sentence originating a rite.

A sentence that enjoins, with regard to a rite that has already been enjoined, materials, deities, etc. as its subsidiaries, is called a sentence dealing with accessories, for instance, “One should perform homa with curd” (Tait. Br II. i. v 6?) Here, with reference to homa, curd is enjoined as its subsidiary; hence it is a sentence dealing with accessories. Curd etc. are accessories, just because they are enjoined as subsidiaries to a rite.

[¹ Though the verb in such cases may be in the present tense, it is to be interpreted as being optative.

² Offering oblations in the sacred fire.

³ The lifelong offering of milk in the sacred fire, every morning and evening, by married men of the upper three castes among the Hindus.]
Here the *homa* is called a matter under reference (\textit{uddeśya}), because it is already known from another authoritative source,\(^1\) and is at the same time capable of being described as that with which an enjoined rite comes into relation. That, again, is called the thing restated, when, as already known from another authoritative source, it is mentioned once more. And, as having curd etc. related to it as its accessories, it is designated as the principal matter. The curd etc., not being known from any other authoritative source, are the things enjoined here itself, being means to the *homa*, they are accessories in respect of it; and being used by a person, they are things to be utilised. Here we must understand that ‘being obtained from another authoritative source’ in the text means ‘being known from another authoritative source,’ and ‘not being obtained’ means ‘not being known.’

An injunction about results is that which, when a rite has been originated,\(^2\) and there is an expectancy about its result, inculcates the connection of that rite with a particular result; for example, the sentence, “One who desires heaven should offer the Agnihotra.” It means: One who desires heaven should,
as a means to it, bring about or perform the *homa* called Agnihotra. Here we understand the connection of the rite originated by the sentence inculcatug the Agnihotra, with a certain result. Hence this is a sentence setting forth results.

[\(^1\) *Māna* or *pramāna* is a means of vahd knowledge. Here it is another scriptural text.\(^2\) That is, originally enjoined by some other text.]

\[\text{prāṇa कर्माग्रिथ्यं फलायुष्म गुणविधिः फलायुष्म गुणवाक्षम्; यथा “कृष्णन्द्रियकामस्य सुहुः” हृत। क्षणाम्यहोत्राक्षमोत्पत्तिः होमक्षणितयेनिष्ठफलायुष्म दुधिस्पर गुणो विषयेत—होमक्षणितेन दुधा दुधिरुपरं फलं भावेयत् हृत। होमक्षणितेन होमक्षणिते-भूतनेत्यद्वं। अयमेव गुणफलविचित्रं, गुणकारसविनिवर्तितं चोज्यते।}

Where, with regard to a rite already known, an accessory is enjoined for obtaining a certain result, it is a sentence incultating the accessories for results, for instance, ‘For a person desiring (vigorous) organs (the priest) should perform *homa* with curd’ (*Tai. Br. II. i. v. 5, adapted*). Here, with regard to the *homa* originated by the sentence incultating the Agnihotra, an accessory, viz., curd, is enjoined for obtaining (vigorous) organs as a result; the sentence meaning, ‘One should bring about (vigorous) organs as a result by means of curd used in the *homa*. ‘Used in the *homa*’ means, ‘forming a constituent of the *homa*.’ This is also called ‘an injunction incultating results due to (particular) accessories,’ and ‘an injunction incultating desired objects due to accessories.’

\[\text{द्रव्यदेवताविशृण्विशिष्टकम् वाष्ट्रं सागुणफलोत्पतिः- वाक्षम्; यथा “सोमेन यजेत” हृत। अय सोमलताबिशिदो यागो विषयेत। विशिष्टविधार्थिपि विशेषणत्वार्थांत्विन्य।}\]
A sentence originating a rite together with its accessories is one that enjoins a rite characterised by its accessories, such as the maternal and deity; for example, "One should sacrifice with the soma' (juice)." Here a sacrifice, of which the soma creeper is a characteristic, is enjoined. Although it is an injunction regarding something possessed of a certain characteristic, yet the injunction is necessarily with regard to the characteristic also.

Sometimes a sentence originating a rite is also indicative of its connection with a result; for instance, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid" (Tān. Br XIX. vii. 2). Here a sacrifice called Udbhid, which is not enjoined by any other sentence, is simultaneously enjoined to obtain animals as a result. Hence this one and the same sentence enjoins both the result and its means, the sacrifice.

[¹ An annual creeper yielding an invigorating and slightly intoxicating juice, held sacred in ancient times; also its juice.

² Viz., a sacrifice.

³ Viz., the ingredient soma, which distinguishes the sacrifice.

⁴ For a thing possessed of a certain characteristic cannot be used without using the characteristic, too. Hence the injunction, although purporting to lay down the former, automatically implies the latter also. Since the characteristic is not directly enjoined, there is not a split of the sentence, which would be a defect.]
The injunction regarding a principal rite, forming a unitary passage with injunctions regarding subsidiary rites, becomes a comprehensive passage, and since it enjoins the performance of the principal rite comprising all its subsidiary rites, it is designated as an injunction regarding performance\(^1\); for instance, the sentence, “One who desires heaven should offer the Agnihotra.” Here the meaning is understood to be: “One should bring about heaven through the homa called Agnihotra.” ‘Should bring about’—that is to say, ‘should produce,’ or ‘should perform.’ Here there is an expectancy as to the process: “How should one bring about heaven through this homa?”—just as when it is stated, “One should cut in two with an axe.” there is the expectancy: “How should the
THE INJUNCTION REGARDING PERFORMANCE

cutting in two be done with this?" Then one understands that it should be done through such means as raising the axe and letting it come down. Similarly, here also the performance of the Agnihotra together with its subsidiary rites is enjoined with a view to heaven by the following comprehensive sentence, assumed from the context. One should bring about heaven through the *homa* called Agnihotra, with the aid given by the totality of subsidiary rites such as leading the fire,² laying the fuel and purifying the altar, prescribed by injunctions regarding subsidiary rites such as, "One should lead the fire," and "One should add fuel to the fire." Such is the injunction regarding performance. The subsidiary rites taken together are also designated as the manner or *modus operandi*. Here the *homa* called Agnihotra is the principal rite, and leading (the fire) and the rest are all subsidiaries.

¹ According to another classification, there are four types of injunctions, dealing respectively with origination (*utilus*), application (*umyoga*), performance (*prayoga*) and qualification (*adhyakara*). Of these, only the third one is described here, as being necessary to explain the different unique results, the other three are left out as following from what has gone before. For example, the first type of injunction is the same as "sentences originating a rite" mentioned on p. 4. The second, which brings out the relation of principal and subsidiary between certain things, comprises the second and third types of sentences mentioned there, for in the former an accessory is allocated to a certain rite, and in the latter a rite is prescribed for a particular result. And the last type of injunction is included in "sentences setting forth results," which also mention what kind of aspirant is qualified for a particular rite.

² Taking a portion of the Gārhapatya fire, in which the daily Agnihotra is performed, to the pit of the Āhavaniya, the fire for special Vedic sacrifices.]
Objection  But this does not stand to reason, since rites, which perish very quickly, cannot serve as the means to heaven etc. that are to be realised at some future time ¹

Reply:  Not so, for when acts enjoined or forbidden have been known from particular texts to be the means to particular results, in order that acts which perish very quickly may be the means to results taking place at some future time, a principle called the unique result (apūrva), consisting of merit and demerit, is assumed in the interim. Therefore sacrifices etc. are means to heaven through the medium of the unique result, and not directly. This is what is also called the final unique result. Its instrument is the principal rite together with its prior and posterior subsidiaries, not the principal rite alone. If the latter alone produced the final unique result, the result of the rite also would accrue from that,² and hence the subsidiary rites would be redundant.

¹ Because a cause is immediately antecedent to its effect.
² From the final unique result produced by the principal rite alone.]
MIMAMSA-PARIBHĀṢĀ
OF
KRṢNA-YAIVAN

Translated and annotated
BY
SWĀMI MĀDHAVĀNANDA

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION SARADA PITHA
BELUR MATH, Dt. HOWRAH
Objection. But it is unreasonable to hold that the principal rite together with all its subsidiaries produces the unique result, for the principal rite, which perishes very quickly, can never combine with its subsidiaries.

Reply: No; because although the principal rite does not directly combine with its subsidiaries, the combination is possible through the initial unique result (utpattyaapūrva). For, in order that the principal rite may combine with all its subsidiaries, it is admitted that between it and the final unique result there exists another unique result called the initial one, which is produced by the principal rite alone. Similarly, since the subsidiary rites, too, help the principal rite only in combination with one another, and since they cannot mutually combine by themselves, the combination is understood to take place through their respective initial unique results. The helping of the principal rite by the subsidiary rites consists merely in their stimulating the former's capacity to produce the final unique result.
But in the case of the new-moon (Darśa) and full-moon (Pūrṇamāsa) sacrifices there is a difference. (To explain). The sentence, ‘Because (the cake) relating to the Fire, baked on eight thin tiles, is undecaying on the new- and the full-moon day’ (Tait. S. II vi. iii. 3), enjoins the sacrifice relating to the Fire. The sentence, ‘(Indra) offered this (cake) relating to the Fire and the Moon, baked on eleven thin tiles, to those two (deities) on the full-moon day’ (Tait. S. II. v i. 3), enjoins the sacrifice to the Fire and the Moon. The sentence, ‘One should perform the Upāṃśu sacrifice in between’ (Tait. S. II. vi. vi. 4), enjoins the Upāṃśu sacrifice, and the sentence, ‘The two (deities), the Fire and the Moon, said, ‘Performing the Upāṃśu sacrifice to us with ghee alone on the full-moon day,’’ fixes the full-moon day for it. These (three) are the principal sacrifices in the full-moon sacrifice. On the basis of the connection of these (three) sacrifices, viz., the one to the Fire, the one to the Fire and the Moon, and the one called Upāṃśu, with a particular time, viz., the full-moon
day, as is known from the respective texts, the sentence containing the word ‘knowing,’ viz., ‘He who knowing thus performs the full-moon sacrifice’ (Tāt ś. I. vi. 1x. 1), restates the three sacrifices as a group by means of the term ‘full-moon sacrifice,’ which is in the singular number. Hence wherever the term ‘full-moon sacrifice’ occurs in the Vedas, the group consisting of the (three) sacrifices to the Fire and so on is understood.

[1 They are typical sacrifices of the class called Iṣṭi-yāga
2 Viz., that each triad of the main sacrifices produces a unique result (p. 17).
3 Arranged compactly together
4 So called because in it the priest offers oblations uttering sacred texts in a very low voice.]

ननु “प्रजापतिः” ह्यति यास्ये यागवाचकपद्यस्याभावात् कथं 
यागविधायकवस्मिति हेत, मैथू। भविश्यवतः यत्स्य पुरोहितः 
इत्यथा विभिन्देवतासतुमिन्त स्थानेयः। तत्या पुरोहितः
सामानाकः विभिन्देवतासतुमिन्ता यागान्नवनः कियास्मध्यास्मभवावृ 
यागक्रियायमेव समभावनो वाच्यः। देवतोदेशेन व्रज्यतायात्य याग-
हृप्तात्मकः कारसः। अतः श्रुतिन्द्रेर्वदातासम्यानुमितो यागो भवे-
तेति कथितेर पदेन विधीयते, भविष्यत्वः पुरोहितः यागायाधिकारातः
व्यवहारिकः साधनाः। परं यत्र व्रज्यतात्राचारी
सम्बन्धमार्थं भूयते, “सौर्यज्योतिः” विषयं, तत्र व्रज्यतात्
सम्बन्धानुमितो यागो विधीयत्त्र ह्यति न कथितानि.

Objection: In the sentence, “Because (the cake) relating to the Fire,” etc., there is no word denoting a sacrifice. So how can it enjoin a sacrifice?

Reply: Not so; the word āgneya (relating to the Fire) in the text has the affix denoting a prescribed
deity, so as to mean that this cake has the Fire for its deity. Its connection with the material and the deity is known from its being in apposition to the word ‘cake’ (understood). That cannot be without a sacrifice, for the conception with the material and deity is impossible in any other act than a sacrifice. So they must be taken to relate to the act of sacrifice alone; for it is the dedication¹ of something to a deity that is held to constitute a sacrifice. Therefore the sacrifice, inferred from its expressed connection with the material and deity, is enjoined by an assumed word yajeta (should sacrifice) so as to mean. “One should bring about the desired object by means of a sacrifice of which the Fire is the deity and the cake is the material, and which is to be performed at a particular time such as the new-moon day.” Similarly, where only the connection with some material and deity is expressed, as, for example, in the sentence, “One should set apart the porridge relating to the Sun” (Tat. S. II iii. 11. 3), there a sacrifice, inferred from its connection with the deity and material, is enjoined. So there is no objection.

¹ By the sacrificer, who transfers his ownership of the article of oblation to a particular deity, saying, “This is given to the Fire (or Indra etc.) and is no longer mine.” After that the priest called adhvaryu puts the oblation in the sacrificial fire, which is ‘offering.’}
Objection. In the sentence relating to the Upāṁśu sacrifice,⁴ although the root yaji (to sacrifice) occurs, there is no optative suffix such as uth; so how can it have the force of an injunction?

Reply. Not so; it can have the injunctive force by changing yajati into yajeta.⁵ Similarly, a change is understood also in sentences like, “One should sprinkle the rice grains,” and “One should perform the Samidh sacrifice” (Tai S. II. vi. 1. 1). Some, however, maintain that such sentences can be injunctive, because the word yajati is accepted to have the force of a verbal suffix of the fifth group.⁶

Likewise, the two sacrifices with curd and milk, enjoined by the sentences, “The curd relating to Indra (should be offered) on the new-moon day” (Tai. S. II. v. iv. 1), and “The milk relating to Indra (should be offered) on the new-moon day,” as also the sacrifice relating to the Fire, enjoined by the sentence, “Because (the cake) relating to the Fire,” etc. (p. 12), are the principal sacrifices in the new-moon sacrifice.

⁴ See p. 12.
⁵ The verb yajati being in the present tense.
⁶ The sentence.
⁷ This is an allowable procedure.
⁸ Called let. Hence no change of suffix is necessary. The first four groups of suffixes are: laṭ (present), līṭ (remote past), lut and līṭ (both future).]
These three (sacrifices) have been restated as a group in the sentence, “He who knowing thus performs the new-moon sacrifice’’ (Tai S. I. vii. ix. 2), by means of the name ‘new-moon sacrifice,’ which is in the accusative singular. Therefore in the Vedas, where the word ‘darṣa’ or ‘amāvāsyā’ (‘new-moon sacrifice’) occurs, this group of sacrifices is understood. The necessity, however, of restating each triad as a group by the terms ‘new-moon sacrifice’ and ‘full-moon sacrifice’ is to explain the dual number in sentences like, “One who desires heaven should perform the new- and the full-moon sacrifice (darṣa-pūrnamāsābhyaḥ)” Otherwise, the six sacrifices relating to the Fire etc. being multiple, there should be the plural number, as darṣa-pūrnamāsaḥ. Restatement (anuvāda) is the further mention of a thing already known from some other authoritative source.

And sacrifices such as the Prayāja, Ājyabhāga and Anūyāja, which are mentioned¹ in close proximity to the sacrifices relating to the Fire etc. that produce results of their own, are subsidiaries to the above six² sacrifices.

¹ Without any reference to their results.
² Three of the full-moon and three of the new-moon sacrifice.]
Such being the case, the sentence, “One who desires heaven should perform the new- and full-moon sacrifices,” means “One should bring about the unique result leading to heaven by means of the two groups (of sacrifices) called the new- and full-moon sacrifices, in combination with each other.” Now, if it be asked how two groups (of sacrifices) belonging to different times can ever combine with each other, the answer is that although by themselves they cannot combine, yet each triad (of sacrifices) produces a unique result, and through these the two groups can combine. If it be asked how each triad also can produce its own unique result, the answer is that each triad, including all its prior and posterior subsidiary rites such as the Prayāja and Anūyāja, produces a unique result for the group. Since each triad cannot by itself combine with all its subsidiary rites, we must suppose that the three sacrifices produce three initial unique results, and through these they combine with all their subsidiaries.
Similarly, since the subsidiary rites such as the Prayāja, too, cannot by themselves combine with the principal rites, this combination must be held to take place through their respective initial unique results. Thus, it is the combination of the initial unique results accruing from the principal rites with those accruing from the Prayāja and the rest,¹ that constitutes the completeness of the principal rites, that is to say, their inclusion of the subsidiary rites. Similarly, in the full-moon sacrifice, the three unique results accruing from the sacrifices relating to the Fire and so on, helped by the initial unique results accruing from the Prayāja etc., produce a unique result due to the group. Likewise, in the new-moon sacrifice also, the three unique results accruing from the sacrifice to the Fire and the two sacrifices² to Indra, helped by the initial unique results of its³ subsidiary rites, produce a unique result due to the triad. These two unique results due to the triads, springing from the three initial unique results of the sacrifices to the Fire and so on, produce
THREE KINDS OF INJUNCTIONS

A comprehensive unique result, called the final unique result, which is the cause of the result (of the entire sacrifice), and that leads to the result.

Thus it is established that an injunction regarding performance is one which inculcates that in order that the final unique result may be produced, the principal rite, together with its subsidiary rites, should be performed, meaning thereby that one should realise heaven by the new- and full-moon sacrifices, helped by all their subsidiaries, through the medium of the unique results produced by them.

[1 Which are its subsidiary rites.
2 With curd and milk respectively
1 Of the new-moon sacrifice.]

THREE KINDS OF INJUNCTIONS

पुनर्पि विधिविधिविधि:—अयौर्विविधि:, ज्ञयाविधि:, परि-
संस्कृताविधिविषेचि।

तत्र श्रो विधिरत्नप्रात्रात्मथ्य प्राप्तयि सोऽयौर्विविधिः ;
यथा दुर्स्पृग्नारास्मातपि “प्रोक्तस्ति” हरि । पतादिपु काशवे 
दुर्स्पूर्णारासात्मयीहिः प्रोक्तस्त्यं कय्यमपि न प्राप्तसि । पतादिपु-
सत्ये तु तत्स्मात्तिभित्तिः प्रोक्तस्त्यं प्रामोद्येऽ हरि अक्ष्यत्तात
प्रात्रिप्रकाशपापात्यकादयमिविधिः।

Injunctions are again threefold, viz., original injunction, restrictive injunction and exclusive injunction.

Of these, an original injunction is that which inculcates about something utterly unknown, for example, in connection with the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the sentence, “One should sprinkle the rice grains.” In the absence of this injunction, the
sprinkling with regard to the rice grains used in the new- and full-moon sacrifices would never be known. But with this injunction, sprinkling with regard to the rice grains in question is compulsory. Hence this is an original injunction, masmuch as it inculcates about sprinkling, which was utterly unknown.

A restrictive injunction is that which restricts something that is known only as a possible alternative; for example, in the same context as above, the sentence, “One should thresh the rice grains.” In the absence of this injunction, with regard to the rice grains used in the new- and full-moon sacrifices, for the act of husking that is conducive to the emergence of rice meant for the cake—about which we know from the originative sentence relating thereto—sometimes splitting with finger-nails may, like threshing, be also thought of. In that case, threshing not being resorted to, and it still being possible to produce the effect otherwise, the threshing becomes an optional means. But with this injunction, it being fixed that the husking shall be done by threshing only, splitting (with nails) is absolutely eliminated. Hence this is a restrictive injunction.

[¹ The sentence, “Because (the cake) relating to the Fire,” etc (p. 12) ]
It cannot be urged that as the husking can be done by splitting with nails also, the restriction about threshing is futile, since there is no need for it, for a unique result due to the restriction is admitted, viz., that some unique result is produced only if the husking is done by threshing, and although no visible effect is obtained by the restriction, an invisible one is produced. And that unique result is utilised to produce, through the initial unique result of the sacrifice, its final unique result. So, it being presumed that in the absence of the unique result due to the restriction the final unique result itself would not be produced, the unique result due to the restriction is not futile. The same principle should be understood to apply to restrictions regarding materials such as rice and the soma creeper.
When something may be taken to refer to both of two alternatives simultaneously, the injunction that precludes one of them is called an exclusive injunction; for example, under the topic of brick-laying, the sentence, "One should catch hold of the rein of the horse saying, 'They seized this rein of (the horse, which is the means to) the sacrifice'" (Tai S. V i ii 1), is an injunction regarding the sacred text as a subsidiary to seizing the rein of the horse. For in the absence of this injunction, the sacred text expressing the seizing of the rein would, on account of the indication, viz., the power to express the seizing of the rein, apply invariably to seizing the rein of the donkey as well as that of the horse. With this injunction, however, one should seize the rein of the horse, uttering this sacred text, and not that of the donkey, which is to be seized just silently. Thus the sacred text is dissociated from the seizing of the rein of the donkey. And since the injunction leads to the exclusion of one of the two alternatives, to both of which something may be taken to refer simultaneously, it is an exclusive injunction. The same principle should be understood to apply also to sentences like, "'Only five' animals with five nails (on each paw) may be eaten" (Rām. IV. xvii. 39).

[¹ For constructing a pit for the fire. To carry earth for making bricks for this, both a horse and a donkey are prescribed.

² Viz., two varieties of porcupines, the iguana, the rabbit and the tortoise. Other five-nailed animals are to be shunned.]
Six Tests of a Subsidiary

पूर्व दर्श्यमण्डलम् प्रयाजावैवापरम्। तवाकल्मकोषकः प्रमाणात्म श्रुति-निर्देश-वाक्य-प्रकरण-स्थान-समाख्यास्यायनेन पदम्।
तथा “वुजा हृदयात्” इत्यादिकहरूवाक्यात् होमं ज्ञातादित्वस्नेहोत्तरं तत्त्वादित्वम् तत्त्वायाशुद्धिः विधि विधीयत
हन्ति शुद्ध्यास्तुनम्।

In the preceding portion, the Prayāja and other sacrifices have been stated to be subsidiaries to the new- and full-moon sacrifices. Now the proofs indicative of the subsidiary relation are six, viz., direct assertion (śruti), indication (tinga), syntactical connection (vākyā), context (prakarana), position (śīhāna) and designation (samākhyā).

Of these, in the sentence, “One should sacrifice with curd” (Tai. Br. II. 1. v. 6?), after homa, which is known from the sentence inculcating the Agnihotra, is referred to by the verb ‘should sacrifice,’ curd is enjoined as a means to that by direct assertion, viz., the instrumental case-ending. So the curd is proved to be a subsidiary on account of the direct assertion.

किं त्यां नाम सामायय्यात्। तथा द्विविधम्-भर्तःगतं शन्ति-गतज्ञति। आदं यदा “सुहेरणायति” इत्यवशस्त्रसामायय्यातपति
वासमनपुर्वी श्रावण सामायय्यात्तु भाषात भाषितायायाति-इश्यवशस्त्रसामायय्यात पूर्वो भुविश्वकालवाच्य कर्तु-
मश्यकालात्। श्रावणसु सुहेरणप्रकाशसामायय्यात्। यथा “ब्रह्मचर्ये
विनिताय प्रकाशम्” इति। यथा अनुस्तय निर्विकाशसामायय्यात प्रकाशसु
विनिताय प्रकाशम्। यथा मन्यत्र यथाकालसामायय्य तत्त्व तदबुत्तम्।

Indication is capability. It is twofold, viz., that which is pertaining to sense, and that which is verbal. An example of the first is this: In the sentence,
“One should divide with the ladle,” although the ladle may be taken to be an accessory to dividing in general, yet, from the indication, that is, the capability of the ladle, we understand that it is a subsidiary to a special kind of dividing, viz., that of liquid substances only like ghee, curd or milk; for it is impossible to divide a cake etc. with a ladle. Verbal indication, however, is the power of denoting something. For instance, the sacred text, “I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire” (Tait. S. I. 1 iv. 2), is a subsidiary to the act of offering, owing to the indication, viz., its power of denoting offering. A sacred text that expresses a particular meaning is a subsidiary to that.

[¹ And not to the principal sacrifice, to which the offering is a subsidiary.]

पद्मान्तरसमिश्रितारुणावर वाष्पम्। यथा “हने त्वेति विनिति”
इत्यं ब्राह्मणकर्त्तव्यं “हने त्वा” हि यथि मन्त्रो वाष्प्येन विर्धियते।
यथा “भाष्ये सुध्यम्” इत्यत्वेच “भाष्ये,” “सुध्यम्” इत्याविपवानं
विर्हितांगे त्यं गुणवाष्पातः कस्त्याविष्णिवाशंकुत्तमे।

Syntactical connection is the joint utterance with some other word. For example, in the sentence, “He should cut (the palasha branch),” saying, ‘For food (I cut thee),’ the sacred text ‘For food’ is enjoined as a subsidiary to the act of cutting by syntactical connection. Or, in the very sentence (quoted above), “I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire” (Tait. S. I. 1 iv. 2), the words ‘in an agreeable form’ and ‘to the Fire’ are a subsidiary to the act of separating, since they form a unitary passage with the words ‘I offer.’

[¹ For removing the calf from the cow before milking her. The milk is referred to as ‘food.’]
Context is mutual expectancy. * For example, in the sentence, "One who desires heaven should perform the new- and full-moon sacrifices," when it is stated that one should bring about the unique result leading to heaven by means of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, there is the expectancy: how is that unique result to be brought about by these two (sacrifices)? Similarly, in proximity to sacrifices relating to the Fire and so on, which produce definite results, are mentioned the Prayāja and other sacrifices without any results, in sentences like "One should perform the Sāmidh sacrifice" (Tā. S II. vi. 1. 1), "One should perform the Tanunapāt sacrifice" (Ibid.) and "One should sacrifice with the two oblations of ghee (to the Fire and the Moon)" (Ibid.) Since no results are mentioned for them in their respective sentences, there is the expectancy: what is the utility of these? Hence, there being an expectancy with regard to the utility of the Prayāja and the other sacrifices, and (a similar) expectancy with regard to the *modus operandi* of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, it is decided by reason of the context, which is mutual expectancy,
that the Prayāja and all the other sacrifices are subsidiaries to the new- and full-moon sacrifices.

[¹ Named, like the previous one, after its deity ]

स्थानं नाम साधिता:। यथा साङ्गाप्राप्तसाधिता “शुन्याःसु”
वति मन्त्रस्य पाठतः साधितानात् साङ्गाप्राप्तसाधितानात्तमूः।
समार्थ्या सांस्कारः। यथा अध्ययनकाण्डप्रतिपादिते कर्मादिते
आध्ययनसाधितानात्तमूः अध्ययनः: कान्तेनाःकुलम्। तथा “पेन्द्रा-
अनेकादशकाण्डां विवेकेनु प्रजास्ताम:” हत्याडितु कान्तेपरिसाधिता:।
तेषु पेन्द्राग्राहायणेः कान्तेपरिसाधितानुवाचकाण्डसाधितानात्तमूः
“उभा दासिन्द्रानी” हत्याडिता अन्तानुवाचकाण्डवेन विनिवेगः।
विनिवेगोऽनाम अग्रेस्वेनाय:।

Position is proximity. For example, inasmuch as in proximity to the (mention of the) vessels of curd and milk, there occurs the sacred text, ‘Be purified’. (Tait S. I. 1. 3 etc.), this text is taken on account of the proximity to be a subsidiary to the act of sprinkling the vessels of curd and milk.

Designation is name. For instance, with regard to the body of rites described in the section relating to the priest called adhvaryu,¹ we understand from their designation, ‘relating to the adhvaryu,’ that the adhvaryu is a subsidiary to them as their agent. Similarly, in sacrifices such as that relating to Indra and Fire, (enjoined) in sentences like, “One who desires progeny should offer (a cake) relating to Indra and Fire, baked on eleven thin tiles” (Tait. S. II. ii. 1; Mañ. S. II. i 1), which sacrifices have the designation of Kāmyesṭi, the sacred texts like, “O Indra and Fire, (to invoke) you both” etc. (Ṛ. V. VI. lx. 13; Vāj. S. III. 13; Tait. S. I. xi. xiv 1, etc.), are to be applied as yājyā and anuvākyā texts, because of
(their occurring in a section bearing) the designation, 'section of yāyā and anuvākyā hymns of the Kāṃ-
yeṣṭi sacrifice.' Application means ‘being connected as a subsidiary’.

[ ¹ Who actually offers the oblations and does the cognate functions, including preparation of the articles of offering]

श्रुत्यादीनाइकेश समायेशे पूर्वपूर्वस्त्र प्राच्यम्, सत्तरूपस्त्र
एकैदल्यम्।

यथा “कदाचन स्त्रीरत्स्त्येपत्रो गाःपत्यमुपतिलिंदे” इत्यि-
तत्त्व-अंग्न-पक्षः श्रुत्ते। तत्र मन्नायुष्य हिंद्रमकाशनसामाध्यममपायु विज्ञात
हंड्रायाध्याधकेयू बाल्यविद्या, पृष्ठेत्रिति तुलियारुप्यां गाःपत्यमाति
त्रितीयाश्रयम्य न गाःपत्योपम्याध्याधकेयविद्वानय विद्यानुवाद देशिनक
हंड्रायाध्याधकेन विनियोजो बाल्यविद्या। श्रुत्तिहे त्वति विविधोऽक्षरका।
लिङ्ग: त्विद्रमकाशनसामाध्यमाहोत्य ‘पेयद्ध्यमुपतिलिंदे,’ इति
श्रुतिकल्पनाधारा विनियोजकमिति बाल्यम्। तद्भवस्त्र न सम्बवति।

When direct assertion and the rest refer to the same thing simultaneously, each preceding item is stronger and each succeeding item weaker.

For example, we find under the topic of the Aghihotra the sentence, ‘“They should worship the Gārhapatya’ fire with the sacred text relating to Indra: ‘Thou dost never injure us’ (etc.).’ Here, from the indication of the sacred text, which is its power of denoting the deity Indra, the sentence is apparently a subsidiary to the worship of Indra. But because of the direct assertions, viz, the instrumental
case-ending in the phrase ‘with the sacred text relating to Indra’ and the accusative case-ending in the phrase, ‘the Gārhapatya fire,’ the sentence is enjoined as a subsidiary to the worship of the Gārhapatya fire, and hence its application to the worship of Indra, on account of the indication, is set aside. For direct assertion is directive by itself, whereas indication must be held to be so by assuming a direct assertion, viz., “They worship Indra with the sacred text relating to him,” in consideration of the fact that the indication has the power of denoting the deity Indra; but that is not possible here. Where there is no direction due to direct assertion, as in a sentence like, “I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire” (Tai. S 1. 1 iv. 2), there, considering the power of the sacred text to denote offering, a direct assertion is assumed, viz., “One should make an offering with this sacred text,” and thus indication is certainly directive, for there is nothing to obstruct the assumption of a direct assertion.

[¹ The remaining five items enumerated on p 23
² And in competition with one another.
³ Compare Pū. Mi. Sū. III 11. 14, which says that when these six items relate to the same thing, each succeeding item is weaker, because it conveys its meaning less directly, that is, by invoking the aid of the preceding ones.
⁴ Lit., relating to the master of the house. This is the fire in which the daily Agnihotra was performed by men of the upper three castes.]

तथा “स्थोकन्ते ललाय छ्रोमि…तस्मिन्सि सीद” इत्यथा
तस्मिविः तत्क्रयस्य पूर्वत्तत्वार्थसपेन्दसतया पक्वत्तत्वमानात
श्रवणप्रजांश्रवणप्रजां ध्योयते। उ प्रमझमन्त्र्यां माति;
आदात्य ललायकलायनसामय्यां, “तस्मिन्सि सीद” इत्यस्य साब्य-
Similarly, in the passage, “(O cake), I am making a comfortable abode for thee . . .; live in it”

(Sai. Br. III. vii v 2-3, adapted), since the word ‘it,’ in the phrase ‘in it,’ depends on the sense of the preceding sentence, the two sentences seem to be a unitary passage, and hence from the test of syntactical connection the two appear to be a single sacred text, whereas from the test of indication, they appear to be two different texts, for the former has the power of denoting an abode, while the words, ‘Live in it,’ denote accommodating. Here the decision is that since indication is stronger than syntactical connection, it supplants the latter, so that the sentence, “I am making a comfortable abode” etc., is a subsidiary to making the abode, and the sentence, “Live in it,” is a subsidiary to accommodating.

[1] Putting the baked cake in a particular vessel before use as oblation is referred to as accommodating it, and smearing the inside of the vessel with ghee before that, as making an abode.

[2] That is to say, only the first sentence is to be uttered while making the abode for the cake, and the second sentence while accommodating it there.

“स्योऽनं ते” हृदय “तस्मिन् सोद” हृदयनेत्रादाष्ट्रवत्ववच्यत्

यथाकथानुसरा साधनामय्य्यस्यस्य ठिकाँ कालित्वा ‘भनेन बिषिष्टमण्यः

साधन कुर्याद’ हिति क्षुद्यति। साधनप्रकाशमुपप्रत्यवांकिन्यः कालिन्या ‘स्योऽनं ते हृदयनेत्र सवर्ण कुर्याद’ हिति

शुद्या “स्योऽनं ते” हृदय स्वेत सवर्ण विभिन्नो शति। केवल

मन्त्रस्य नैराकांक्षात वाण्यप्रमाणातु ठिकाँ कालित्वा
The reason why syntactical connection is supplanted by indication is this: If the sentence, "I am making a comfortable abode," etc. be taken to form a unitary passage with the sentence, "Live in it," then on the strength of that an indication, viz., its power to denote accommodating, would somehow have to be assumed, and through that a direct assertion, viz., "One should do the accommodating by means of this conjoint sacred text." Now, when the direct assertion, "One should make the abode by uttering the sacred text, 'I am making a comfortable abode,'" etc., assumed by the manifest indication that conveys the making of an abode, quickly appropriates the sentence, "I am making a comfortable abode," etc. to making the abode, that sacred text leaves no expectancy just because of that appropriation, and hence the assumption of an indication based on syntactical connection, and, through that, of a direct assertion, is obstructed, because it is delayed.

Similarly one must understand that context is supplanted by syntactical connection, position by context, and designation by position. Likewise syntactical connection and the rest are supplanted by direct assertion. Thus the (six) tests signifying subsidiariness, viz., direct assertion and so forth, have been ascertained.

[^1 That is, by uttering the two sentences together
2 Answering from verbal comprehension as soon as the sentence is heard

3 In the former case, only one thing has to be assumed from the observed indication, viz., direct assertion, but in the latter case, two things have to be assumed one after the other from the apparent syntactical connection, viz., first indication, and then direct assertion. Hence the latter, being a slower process, is superseded.]

**WHAT IS A SUBSIDIARY?**

That subsidiariness means, being an accessory; that is to say, subservience to something else—which means, being the object of effort on the part of a person who is engaged in realising something else. Since the Prayāja and other sacrifices are objects of the effort of a person engaged in the performance of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the definition is applicable; while the new-moon sacrifice etc. not being objects of the effort of a person engaged in the performance of the Prayāja etc., the definition does not wrongly apply there, since nobody undertakes to perform the Prayāja etc. for their own sake.

Those subsidiaries are twofold, viz., those that are componently (sammipatya) helpful (upakāraka) and those that are directly (ārāt) so.
[That is, something which a person does to bring about a certain end]

Subsidiaries componently helpful are those that directly or indirectly constitute the body of the principal sacrifice and thereby contribute to the initial unique result springing from that sacrifice; for instance, materials such as rice, and threshing, sprinkling, etc., relating to them, deities like the Fire, and acts like recitation from memory of sacrificial (yātyā) and preliminary (anuvākyā) hymns relating to them. Here rice etc., being converted into dough, produce cakes, and through them generate the body of the sacrifice and the initial unique result arising from it; sprinkling etc. do the same thing by imparting a transcendental quality† to the rice, and threshing etc. by visible results, such as removal of the husk. The sacrificial and preliminary hymns etc. generate the body of the sacrifice by imparting some purification to the deities and thereby contribute to the initial unique result accruing from the sacrifice, while the deities do
so directly. For a sacrifice is but the dedication of materials to some deity, and it is an accepted principle that materials and deities alone constitute a sacrifice. It is these that are (also) called inherent constituents.

[1 The unique result.
2 Subsidiaries componently helpful ]

अत्तमसमवेतापूर्वजनकान्याराजुपकारकाणि; यथा प्रयाजाय-भगानुभयाजायोऽि। पत्तानि दृश्यं तं देवं तां या संस्कारं जज्ञानीति, फिन्नात्मकताद्भुतं जज्ञानीति हुत्याराजुपकारकाणि।

तथा सामान्यः कर्म ठीकिधि कर्म अर्थ्यकर्म गुणकर्म चेति।
तथात्मकश्वपूर्वजनकं कर्म अर्थ्यकर्म; यथा वस्त्रिोमदश्शपुरा्मास-प्रयाजादिकम्।

Subsidiaries directly helpful are those that generate unique results inhering in the soul; for instance, sacrifices like the Prayāja, Ājyabhāga and Anūyāja. These do not cause any purification either in the materials or in the deities, but produce unique results in the soul. Hence they are called directly helpful.

Now, rites are generally twofold, viz, principal (artha-karman) and subsidiary (guna-karman).

Of these, principal rites are those that produce unique results in the soul, for example, the Agnihotra, the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the Prayāja, etc.

[1 That is, which generate righteousness or unrighteousness in the mind of the sacrificer. This definition differs entirely from that given in the Artha-Samgraha and the Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa (Āpadevi), where these are defined as rites that contribute to the final unique result of the principal sacrifice.

2 These correspond respectively to the directly and componently helpful rites, described above. ]

3
TWO MAIN DIVISIONS OF SUBSIDIARY RITES

Subsidiary rites are those that cause purification. They, too, are twofold, viz., those that purify what has been used, and those that purify what is to be used.

Of these, the former are called rites of disposal (prati-patī-karman), for disposal is defined to be the removal to an appointed place of a material that has been used and acts as an impediment; for example, eating the remnant of the cake, throwing the black antelope’s horn, the homa of quadruple oblation, etc.
It may be objected: Eating the remnant of the cake may well come under disposal, inasmuch as it consists in the removal of a material, viz., the cake, that has been used in the principal sacrifice and acts as an impediment. But how can homa (offering in the fire) be classed as disposal, since it does not purify something that has been used in a sacrifice? For homa taking place at the same time as the sacrifice, the quadruple oblation etc. that are to be purified by the homa cannot be described as having been used.

To this the reply is. Disposal is purification of just what has been used, not of what has been used in the principal sacrifice. Were it so, then, after the killing of the animal, the removal of blood and excreta, which has to be done at the time when the omentum, heart, etc. are taken out, would not be counted as disposal, for it is not the removal of something used in a sacrifice. Similarly, the throwing of the black antelope’s horn also would not be regarded as disposal, because, although the horn has been used in scratching, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice, it has not been used in the sacrifice itself. Therefore, simply the use somewhere is meant, and this sort of use occurs even in the case cited, for the excreta and blood relating to the animal that has been used by taking out its omentum, heart, etc., are impediments that require disposal. Likewise, some sort of use takes place even in the case of the homa.

तथाहि प्रतिपत्तिरिवः—प्रथानोतरकाला, प्रथानसमकाला, प्रथानपूर्वकाला चेति। तथापि इत्याभक्षणाविवः हि तीव्रे होमाविवः। तथाहि—दशपूर्वमास्तम्यकरणं भूषयते, “सत्युपस्मुगुणति,” “हिंदुविषोपचति,” “सहस्रमिषारणति,” “फुरुस्ते—
वर्ष सुहोति हति। तत्र चतुर्भार्यक्षे होमाभादेन चतुर्वस्त्र-प्रस्त्र्ण तस्याध्यान्त्वेन न विधिपर्य, होमस्याप्रस्त्वेनानुवादासम्बचाद।

For disposal is threefold, viz.; that subsequent to the principal sacrifice, that concurrent with it, and that antecedent to it. Of these, the first is illustrated by such acts as the eating of the remnant of the cake; the second, by homa etc. To explain. In the section on the new- and full-moon sacrifices it is stated, "One should smear (the homa vessel) with ghee once, cut a slice off the oblation twice and pour ghee on it once—(thus) offer the quadruple oblation." Here, in the sentence inculcating the quadruple oblation, the material of the quadruple oblation is not enjoined as a restatement of homa as being its accessory, since the homa, not being already known, cannot be restated.

नच “यदानेय”-वाह्याद्वीमप्रार्थि। तद्राणाम्य यागाधायक-त्वेन होमाधायकत्वाभासाद। नच यागहम्मोयोर्मेव हति वाच्यम। देवतोदेवेन द्रवयायास्य यागाधायान्त्वात्। प्रज्ञाव-विशिष्टस्य यागस्य होमार्थान्त्वात्। तत्राणियोचनवत्याय यागस्य प्रास्तवेष्टिन प्रज्ञाप्रस्त्र्ण शक्त्यायाप्रस्त्वेनानुवादासम्बचाद। फिनोप-स्तराणाभवानानीमित्वाद्याययैं। प्रात्तस्य सन्तुम्मृद्धयत्स्यानुवादासम्बचाद। किन्तु “यदानेय”-वाह्याद्वीमप्रार्थि। तद्राणाम्य यागाधायक-त्वेन होमाधायकत्वाभासाद। नच यागहम्मोयोर्मेव हति वाच्यम। देवतोदेवेन द्रवयायास्य यागाधायान्त्वात्। प्रज्ञाव-विशिष्टस्य यागस्य होमार्थान्त्वात्। तत्राणियोचनवत्याय यागस्य प्रास्तवेष्टिन प्रज्ञाप्रस्त्र्ण शक्त्यायाप्रस्त्वेनानुवादासम्बचाद। किन्तु “यदानेय”-वाह्याद्वीमप्रार्थि। तद्राणाम्य यागाधायक-त्वेन होमाधायकत्वाभासाद। नच यागहम्मोयोर्मेव हति वाच्यम। देवतोदेवेन द्रवयायास्य यागाधायान्त्वात्। प्रज्ञाव-विशिष्टस्य यागस्य होमार्थान्त्वात्। तत्राणियोचनवत्याय यागस्य प्रास्तवेष्टिन प्रज्ञाप्रस्त्र्ण शक्त्यायाप्रस्त्वेनानुवादासम्बचाद। किन्तु “यदानेय”-वाह्याद्वीमप्रार्थि। तद्राणाम्य यागाधायक-त्वेन होमाधायकत्वाभासाद। नच यागहम्मोयोर्मेव हति वाच्यम। देवतोदेवेन द्रवयायास्य यागाधायान्त्वात्। प्रज्ञाव-विशिष्टस्य यागस्य होमार्थान्त्वात्। तत्राणियोचनवत्याय यागस्य प्रास्तवेष्टिन प्रज्ञाप्रस्त्र्ण शक्त्यायाप्रस्त्वेनानुवादासम्बचाद।

It cannot be urged that the homa is already known from the sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," etc. (Tāi. S II. vi. iii. 3), for that sentence enjoining a sacrifice (yāga), it cannot
enjoin *homa*. Nor can it be urged that a sacrifice and *homa* are identical, for the word ‘sacrifice’ means the dedication of something to a deity, while the word ‘*homa*’ means a sacrifice attended with offering (in the fire). Such being the case, although a sacrifice is known from the injunction conveyed by the sentence, ‘Because (the cake) relating to the Fire,’ offering is not known from the denotative power of the word, and hence its restatement is out of the question. But with reference to the quadruple oblation, conveyed by the sentence inculcating smearing with ghee, cutting off a slice twice and pouring ghee, offering is enjoined as a purification of it by the verb ‘should offer.’ And that purification is indeed a form of disposal. Because the cake, somehow utilised for the purpose of a deity like the Fire, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice on account of directions like, ‘I am pouring ghee (on thee, O cake) who art dear to the Fire,’ requires disposal, therefore the act of offering concerning a part of the cake sliced off twice should be treated as disposal.

That purification is concurrent with the principal sacrifice. For the injunction being, “One should per-
form homa when the word ‘vausat’ has been uttered’ (Sat. Br. II. iv. iii. 37, etc.), homa should be performed by the priest called adhvaryu at the next moment of the utterance of the word ‘vausat.’ The sacrifice also is to be performed at that very moment by the sacrificer, on its being recalled by the utterance of the word ‘vausat,’ which is meant to remind one of the sacrifice. Hence the simultaneity of the two is possible. All this is established in the gloss on the topic relating to ‘the offering of the whole.’

Disposal antecedent to the principal sacrifice is exemplified by the picking out of the (sacrificed animal’s) excreta and removal of the blood, enjoined by the texts, “One should pick out the excreta,” and “One should remove the blood.” This, too, is established under the topic, “The animal not being killed for the sake of the excreta and blood, these are not incentives to the sacrifice” (Pû. Mi. Sû IV. 1. 27)

[1 The commentary (in prose) called Tantra-Vârttika by Kumârila Bhatta, on Pû Mi Sû. The topic in question comprises III iv 37-41 of the Sûtras, where the decision is that not the whole cake, but a part of it, is to be offered in the fire.]

उपयोगमाणसंस्कारोपनेकविषेः—साधारणयुक्तसंस्कार:, साधारणयुक्तस युक्तसंस्कार तत्संस्कार:, विनियोगमाणसंस्कार- 
रस्मिति। तस्म भाद्रो वहा “ताहोनवस्त्रनि” हृदयांहृ “मीहिरियं- 
ञ्जत” हस्ति वाशविनियुक्तंसहिनमनवहनसंस्कारः। द्वितीयो वहा “बल्मात्मेत” हस्ति। दौहुन्वेत् साधारणयुक्तस गोपङ्कर्को- 
कर्कर्को यो शल: तत्संस्कारकबिवस्मालमभूम। तृतीयो वहा “तन्ने पापसि कुजानवति” हृदयव “सा क्षेत्रदेयामिति” हस्ति। 
वाने तद्धुनेत् निरिन्धयो दैत्र्यसि दैत्र्यदेयामासुनेवन विनियोगमाण 
यतयस्तस्तंस्कारंकर्तात् विनियोगमाणसंस्कारं कुजानवतम्।
Purification of what is to be used is also manifold, viz., purification of what has been directly prescribed, that of something helpful to what has been directly prescribed, and purification of what is going to be prescribed. Of these, an example of the first is: In the sentence, “One should thresh the rice grains,” etc., threshing is a purification of the rice grains prescribed by the sentence, “One should sacrifice with rice grains.” The second is exemplified by the sentence “One should touch the calf.” This touching is a purification of the calf that is helpful to the material, cow, which is directly prescribed as a subsidiary to milking. An instance of the third is this: In the sentence, “When the milk has been heated, one should mix curd with it” (Mait S. I x. r), the mixing of the curd is a purification of the milk which is going to be prescribed by the sentence, “That is the fresh cheese relating to the Viśvadevas” (Ibid.), as a subsidiary to the sacrifice relating to the Viśvadevas, being referred to by the word ‘that’

[¹ As a subsidiary to some rite]

The sacrifice with cakes in an animal sacrifice, however, is for the purification of the deities who have
played their part in the sacrifice and are still to do so, and in respect of the dedication it is for generating the unique result, for the deities Fire and Moon, whom that sacrifice is meant to purify, have played their part in the sacrifice with the omentum, and they are still to do so in the sacrifices with the heart and other parts of the animal. The sacrifice called Svistakṛṣṭ is, in respect of both materials and deities, for the purification of what has been used, while in respect of the dedication it is for generating the unique result. The same is the case with the oblation¹ (of the sheaf of kuśa grass) to the utterance of the hymns called Śūktavāka. Since the final Prayāja² is a purification of the deity in whose honour it is to be performed, in respect of that it is a purification of what is to be used, while in other respects³ it is for generating the unique result. The homa with fat that is performed before the sacrifice with oblations such as the (animal’s) heart, is also disposal in respect of the fat, while in other respects⁴ it is for generating the unique result, and so on, we must understand

¹ In the new- and full-moon sacrifices, this homa is enjoined by the text, “One should offer the sheaf of kuśa grass to the utterance of the Śūktavāka hymns.” Its deities are those already invoked in the main sacrifice, and the sheaf of kuśa grass has been used by pouring ghee upon it. Thus the homa purifies the deities and the material—both, however, visible purposes.

² The last of the five Prayājas, enjoined by the text, “One should perform the sacrifice to the deity Svāhākāra.

³, ⁴ That is, in respect of the dedication and the offering.

केवल—उपयोग्याणांस्कारानिर्देशस्कारकर्मत्वं प्रतिपरिकर्मत्वम्; अतुरुच्चदशयस्य होमेन मस्तीभूतस्य होमेन उपयोग्यमानत्वाभावाधू तत्जन्त्वत्वं होमेवस्तीति तःध्वस्तृतितिर्वापि: ।
A FOURFOLD DIVISION OF SUBSIDIARY RITES

Some, however, say: The rite of disposal is any rite of purification other than the purification of what is to be used. Since the material of the quadruple oblation, which is burnt to ashes by homa, can no longer be used in the latter, this homa is other than what is to be used. Hence the definition can apply there.

Here there is this difference. In a principal rite (artha-karman) the rite is more important than the material, which is an accessory to the rite, as, in the Agnihotra, for instance, curd etc are accessories. In a subsidiary rite (guna-karman), however, the material is more important, and the rite is subsidiary to the material. As, in sentences like, "One should sprinkle the rice grains," and "One should thresh the rice grains," since from the accusative case-ending it is clear that the rice grains will be subjected to some action, the material is more important than the action, while the act of sprinkling and so on is subsidiary to it.
Nīyayuñyatīyateṣu sansārakarjanaṃ kṛtaṃ mādāyaṃ utpādayatā sansārakarjanaṃ. śāstraikaraṇaṃ kṛtāṃ śāstraikaraṇaṃ ājñātyaṃ utpādayatā sansārakarjanaṃ. bhūṣṭālaṃ śāstraikaraṇaṃ ājñātyaṃ utpādayatā sansārakarjanaṃ. bhūṣṭālaṃ śāstraikaraṇaṃ ājñātyaṃ utpādayatā sansārakarjanaṃ. bhūṣṭālaṃ śāstraikaraṇaṃ ājñātyaṃ utpādayatā sansārakarjanaṃ.

Subsidiary rites are again fourfold, being divided into origination, attainment, modification and consecration. Of these, an example of the purfication called origination is found in the passage, “One should place the fire.” Since fires such as the Āhavaniya originate by being placed on a stack (of fuel) to the utterance of sacred texts, the placing, being the cause of purification that leads to the origination of fires such as the Āhavaniya, is a purification called origination. The purification called attainment is exemplified by the sentence, “One’s own Vedas should be studied” (Tait. A. II xv. 7) The Vedas of one’s own school are attained through study; hence this is a purification called attainment. An example of modification is the sentence, “One should thresh the rice grains.” Since threshing causes a change, viz., husking, in the paddy, it is a purification called modification. An instance of consecration is the sentence, “One should sprinkle the rice grains.” Here, since the sprinkling causes consecration in the form of an added virtue in the rice grains, it is a subsidiary rite of the nature of consecration. Of these, the placing (of the fire) and study, we must understand, are independent subsidiary rites, not accessories.
to the sacrifice, but sprinkling and the rest are all subsidiary rites that are accessories to the sacrifice.

1 Suādhya, the particular recension of the Vedas traditionally handed down in one's own family

a The unique result ]

�श्चर्कम विविधम —नित्यनैमित्तिककामापेनातो। तत्र "वाघ-ज्ञोषमासिहाम शहोति,ै। "सार्य शहोति,ै। "प्रातिशहोति" हति श्रोतास्वं शुज्जेग्यात्काम्यीवत्येन फलंक्यत्तया अवगतमनिन्द-होवाहिदिन नित्यम्। "अयाये पथिवेते पुरोदाशम्पापानलं निर्भवेत्" हति व्यायांमासास्तित्वितिनिमित्तस्यमन्युग्तविश्वास्यादिनैनिदिश्त नैनिमिदिश्त।

Principal rites are threefold, being divided into regular, occasional and optional rites. Of these, the Agnihotra etc. are regular rites, since from sentences like, "One should offer the Agnihotra for life," "One should perform homa in the evenings" (Tai. Br. II. i. ix 2), and "One should perform homa in the mornings" (Ibid. II i. ii. 7, 8), we know that such rites are to be unfailingy performed every evening and morning by a person as long as he lives. The व्रुत्र sacrifice known as Pathikrt, occasioned by the non-performance of the new- and full-moon sacrifices at the proper time, and other such sacrifices are occasional rites, as we know from sentences like, "One should set apart a cake baked on eight thin tiles for the Fire called Pathikrt (maker of the way)" (Tai. S. II. ii. i, Tai. Br. I. iv. iv. 10).
Some\(^1\) say that the non-performance of the regular and occasional rites inevitably leads to demerit, but their performance produces no result. Others,\(^2\) however, maintain that it does produce a result, viz., the destruction of demerit; for sentences like, "Destroying demerit by means of the regular and occasional rites alone," state the destruction of demerit as the result. It cannot be urged that in that case they, too, will become optional rites, since they produce a result; for they are not performed with the desire of obtaining results, and they are not prescribed, in the sentences enjoining them, with reference to a person desiring results, as means to his attaining them, hence they cannot be optional rites.

\[¹\] The followers of Prabhakara
\[²\] The followers of Kumārila Bhatta

Optional rites, too, are threefold, viz., those producing results only in this life, those producing results in a future life, and those producing results both here and hereafter. Of these, the first is represented by sacrifices like the Kārīrī. The latter are performed by a person desiring rain that will revive the drying
crops of the time, not by one who wants rain at some future time or in some future birth. Instances of rites producing results only in a future life are the new- and full-moon sacrifices, for attaining heaven; for heaven cannot be enjoyed in this life. Rites producing results both here and hereafter are illustrated by those that cause prosperity etc., as stated in the sentence, "One who desires prosperity should touch the white animal (a goat) relating to the deity Wind" *(Tai S II 1 1)*. All this is dealt with at length in other books.

[¹ Such as the *Tantra-Vārtika*]

...
inculcating these also really enlighten about supernatural matters. Hence the objection does not hold.

**How an Injunction Functions**

इद्दनो विद्यामाऽवस्त्र्य विद्यायत्वां प्रकरण: कथयते। तत्र "स्वागः- कामो यज्ञ" इत्यज्ञ तथिचातुरः परिते। तत्रत्येव चरित्वयमालि—
आर्थ्यात्त्वर्त्तम विद्यति। तत्र भाष्यात्त्वत्व सर्वस्यां सर्वसताधारणम्,
तत्र द्वेष्यदेश विद्यत्यः। घुल्घष्टिः प्राप्तमाणां वर्ततिहृ च। ।

Now the way in which a sentence conveying an injunction performs its function, is being described. Let us take the sentence, "One who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice." Here the suffix *ta* after the root *yaj* has two properties, viz., its character as a verb and its character as being in the optative mood. Of these, the former is common to all the (ten) moods and tenses, in so far as it is a verb, the optative suffix denotes an objective urge (*ārthī bhāvanā*) consisting in a person's inclination.

[¹ This is according to Pāṇini. Later grammarians use *ita.*]

सा वार्ष्याभावना किं, केन, कथयति प्राणश्वचनिशिष्टा।
तथापि यज्ञ इत्यत्र प्रथम प्रत्येकं भाष्येऽऽ हि तत्रत्येव।
सुख्तात्तिष्ठितानां सर्वं कारकाणां तिकन्तार्थमक्षियां विकल्पयिते
सति तिकन्तार्थम् अधारणात। तत्र च प्रत्यर्थयापेक्षा प्रत्य- वार्ष्यस्त्र्य प्राणायणात। प्रथम प्रत्ययार्थमानाया उपस्थितितियुऽका।
तत: करोतिसमानार्थमानयेऽऽ: फल्क्षेत्रवत् किं भाष्येऽऽ हि
कर्माकाः भाष्यान् भाष्यवेनायेऽऽ: स्वागः भाष्यवेनायेऽऽ:।
भाष्यवेन कर्मेनेत्यथ: साध्यबेनेति यावद। न तु समाययेपोपायो-
दिपि धार्यताः भाष्यवेनायेऽऽ:। द्वारात्मकस्य धार्यस्य हैनित-
स्वगस्त्र्य त्वायम्यात्मकत्वेऽऽ: हैनित-
That objective urge consists of three parts—what, through what and how. To explain: In the word yajeta (should sacrifice), first of all the suffix conveys the idea of ‘should bring about.’ For, since all the cases, designated as words ending in sup (attributive inflexions), must invariably be in agreement with verbs, denoted by words ending in tin (verbal inflexions), the latter are predominant. Here again, the meaning of the suffix being more important than that of the root, it is but proper that the meaning of the suffix, viz., to bring about, should first flash before the mind. Then, the verb ‘to bring about,’ which is synonymous with the verb ‘to do,’ being transitive, there is the expectancy about an object, viz., ‘What should one bring about?’—and heaven, although presented by a different term, is connected as the thing to be brought about, that is, as an object, or as what is to be realised; but the root-meaning, although presented by the same word, is not connected as the thing to be brought about. For a sacrifice, which is painful by nature, cannot be an object, which is (defined to be) the most covetable thing, while heaven, being of the nature of joy, is a most covetable thing, and as such can be connected (with the action denoted by the suffix) as an object, and that leads to the understanding, ‘One should realise heaven.’
Then, to satisfy the expectancy about the means —‘Through what?’—the sacrifice, presented by the same word, is connected as the means, signifying, ‘One should achieve heaven by means of a sacrifice.’ Next, to satisfy the expectancy regarding the modus operandi—‘How should one realise heaven by means of a sacrifice?’—subsidaries such as the placing of the fire and the sacrifices called Prayāja, are connected as the modus operandi, so as to signify: ‘One should realise heaven by means of a sacrifice, backed by the visible help given by the placing of the fire, the threshing (of rice), etc., and by the invisible help given by sacrifices like the Prayāja. The modus operandi is what satisfies the expectancy regarding the how of the thing. As, in the sentence, ‘One who desires a rice meal should cook,’ the optative suffix denotes bringing about; to satisfy the expectancy, ‘What should one bring about?’ the food is connected as the thing to be realised, in answer to the query, ‘By what means?’ we get, ‘Through cooking;’ and in answer to the query, ‘How?’ we get, ‘With (dry) grass, blowing, etc.’ So the meaning of the sentence is, ‘One should prepare a rice meal by cooking, that is, by the application of heat, helped by (dry) grass, blowing, etc. Similarly we must understand in the Vedas also.

[¹ In the form of the initial unique result.]
That very optative suffix, in so far as it is such a suffix, denotes a verbal urge called direction. Even in ordinary life, a pupil, on hearing the teacher’s words, “Fetch the cow,” understands their function, known as direction, viz., “Here is my teacher directing me to fetch the cow,” and only then he sets about fetching the cow. Thus, by the method of agreement and difference, the awareness of a direction is the cause of inclination. And since this awareness is, by the method of agreement and difference, ascertained to be due to the hearing of the optative suffix etc., it is understood in ordinary life that the optative suffix etc. denote a direction; similarly in the Vedas, too, it ought to be assumed that the optative suffix etc. denote just that (i.e., direction). But there is this difference: In ordinary life, the action known as direction, which facilitates the inclination to acts like fetching a cow, is a resolve on the part of a directing person; but in the Vedas, owing to the absence of any
directing person, that action is admitted to belong only to words like the optative suffix. Hence, being an action inherent in words, it is called the verbal urge (śabdī bhāvanā); and being the cause of an inclination towards matters like sacrifices and homa, it is also called an inducement or direction.

[1 When the presence of something is followed by that of some other thing, it is a case of agreement, and when the absence of a thing is followed by the absence of another, it is a case of difference. For instance, if there are clouds in the sky, there is rain, and if there are no clouds in the sky, there is no rain.]

This verbal urge, too, has three parts. Here the objective urge, represented by a person’s inclination, comes into relation as the thing to be achieved; the optative suffix etc., known through study, comes into relation as the means; and the knowledge of praise-worthiness that is conveyed by corroborative statements comes into relation as the modus operandi. So the cognition of the verbal urge takes the following form: “Persons who have studied the Vedas with their branches and have become enlightened by grammar, explanatory texts, etymology, etc. read by them, understand, from the optative suffix etc. which
occur in the Vedas of their own school that they have acquired through study, and which are aided by their knowledge of the praiseworthiness (of certain rites), that matters like sacrifices are to be performed by them, and that they should perform them. “Should perform’ means ‘should undertake the performance of,’ and ‘performance is a form of inclination So the fact of a person's inclination” being caused by the verbal urge is intact.

[1 They are six, viz., phonetics, ritual, grammar, lexicon, prosody and astronomy.

[2 Which represents the objective urge.]

Although this verbal urge appears in its potential form in each sentence inculcating the Jyotistoma sacrifice etc., it is not comprehended as something to be done, for it is the objective urge1 that is felt there as such.2 But the verbal urge is comprehended as something to be done only in the sentence, “One’s own Vedas should be studied” (Tait. A. II xv. 7). It cannot be maintained that here the objective urge alone is the thing enjoined, for the objective urge that is present in the sentence, “One’s own Vedas should be studied,” itself constitutes the verbal urge abiding in all sentences conveying an injunction.

[1 That is, a person’s inclination.

[2 That is, as something to be done.]
To explain: * (In the sentence quoted), the verb *adhyetavya* (should be studied) is derived by adding the suffix *tavya* in the passive voice to the root *īṛa*, meaning 'to study,' prefixed by *adhī*. The object (changed into nominative in the passive form), viz., one’s own Vedas, is predominant. Study, which purifies, that, is a subsidiary rite, like sprinkling, for instance, that purifies the rice grains. When an expectancy arises as to the purpose of one’s own Vedas, to which is imparted the purification called knowledge produced by study, that purpose is just the knowledge of the meaning (of a Vedic text), for example, a sacrifice, which knowledge is derived from the power of sentences having words with optative suffixes such as *līr* that occur in one’s own Vedas, and is conducive to performance; for it is something visible, and is a means to supernatural welfare such as heaven, through the performance of particular rites, inasmuch as it is impossible to perform rites without a knowledge of them. But no invisible purpose should be attributed, for it is improper to assume an invisible result when a visible result is possible.
So by the very injunction about the study of one’s own Vedas, all verbal urges with their three parts, denoted by the optative suffix etc. occurring in the sentences conveying injunction that form part of these Vedas, are prescribed as things to be done. In other words, persons enlightened by the study of the Vedas with their branches, understand, from the optative suffix etc. occurring in their own Vedas which they have learnt through study, backed by their subsidiary, praiseworthiness, as known from the corroborative statements (arthavāda), that sacrifices etc. producing results are to be performed, and should perform them. ‘Should perform,’ that is to say, ‘should be inclined towards’ Here, since a person’s inclination comes into relation as the thing to be done, the optative suffix etc., known from study, do so as the instrument, and the knowledge of praiseworthiness comes into relation as the modus operandi, the fact of the verbal urge also possessing three parts, like the objective urge, is acknowledged (by the old masters).
In the objective urge, the cognition of heaven etc. as being the coveted things, to be realised, also takes place on account of the injunction alone. If sacrifices etc. were not means to the ends of human life, an injunction, the function of which is to induce, could not persuade a person to perform them. This necessarily proves that sacrifices etc., which are the objects of a person's inclination caused by the injunction, are the means to heaven etc. desired by him. Otherwise the injunction would just cease to be an inducement, for inducement is but an activity that causes inclination. But in the case of suffixes denoting the indicative present tense etc., since there is no injunction, which is of the nature of an inducement, the rule that the objective urge produces the ends of human life, does not apply.

An urge (bhāvanā) is a stimulating activity for that which is to take place. Now, the objective urge being a stimulating activity for what is to take place or come into being, viz., heaven etc., the definition applies to it. The verbal urge, too, being a stimulating activity for what is to take place, viz., a person's inclination, the definition is applicable.
Object: If the sentence, "One who desires heaven should sacrifice through the Jyotistoma" (i.e., perform that sacrifice), is explained as, "One should realise heaven through the sacrifice," how can the word 'Jyotistoma' be construed?

Reply: Not so; for it can be construed as being the name of the sacrifice that is considered to be the instrument of that realisation—the construction being, "Through the sacrifice called Jyotistoma."

Object: How can the word be a name of the sacrifice?

Reply: By its derivation, viz., that in it there are verse numbers (stoma) such as nine, called Jyotis.

Object: How is it known that the sacrifice is connected with verse numbers such as nine?

Reply. From another sentence, "Nine, fifteen, seventeen, (twenty-one—these verily are those Jyotises which) constitute its verse numbers" (Tai. Br. I. v. xi. 1), we understand that what is denoted by the word 'its' refers to that sacrifice. Thus on grounds such as "declarative of that" (tat-prakhya) mentioned in this system, we must understand that certain words signify names.
FOUR TESTS OF NAMES

For in this system there are four grounds to establish that a certain word is a name, viz., declaration of a particular thing, distinctive mention from a particular feature, derivation, and split of the sentence. To explain: In the sentence, “One should offer the Agnihotra” (Tai. S I v. ix 1), the word ‘Agnihotra’ does not enjoin an accessory in the form of the deity Fire, for the deity is already familiar from the sacred text prescribed in the sentence, “One should offer an oblation in the evening, saying, ‘Fire is light, and light is Fire—svāhā’” (Maś. S I. vi 10; Tai. Br. II. 1. ix. 2). But with reference to the relation to the Fire, already familiar from the other text declaring the Fire—i.e., making it known—viz., “Fire is light, and light is Fire,” etc., the compound called Bahuvrīhi, expounded as, “There is a hotra or offering to the Fire in this,” makes the word ‘Agnihotra’ a name of the homa.
FOUR TESTS OF NAMES

'It	कृति श्रीयोस्म, 'ज्योतिर्लोक्यों' लिपिविन्यासी वास्तवम्। विद्वानां पय तर्कगणां करणांकथत्वाद्, 'जातीविर्षा करणां' हि व्यावह असाधितस्य करणांवायोगात् श्रावतत्र प्रासाधितसाध्यज्ञानानुवादकंते वा विद्वानोपपर्यंतिति तत्त्वस्य न्यायोद्भुत नामथेत्वम्।

It cannot be contended that, since the homa is a means to the objective urge1 denoted by the suffix, if the word in question be a name for the homa, then it should be in the instrumental case,2 viz., 'Agnihoṭrena' (through the Agnihoṭra), as in the case of the word 'Jyotiṣṭomaṇa' (through the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice). For the accusative case-ending can be justified on the ground that it really has by implication the force of the instrumental case-ending, or as a restatement of the fact that the homa is to be performed, which is known automatically, inasmuch as on the principle that "a thing that has not itself come into being cannot be an instrument (of something else)," the Agnihoṭra which is yet to be cannot be an instrument. Hence the word 'Agnihoṭra' is here a name, on the principle of "declaration of a particular thing."

[1 That is, a person's inclination.
2 Instead of the accusative.]

तथा "श्रेणेनामिवर्यजेत" इत्यत्र श्रेणानुपरं यागानामथेयम्।
न तु यागास्थ्यन्त्र श्रेणपतिर्पण्याबिषिद। "यथा सै श्रेयो लिपि
वास्तवे प्यः क्षेत्रां द्वितियां निपत्ताद्वृत्ति वास्तविचरति श्रेणेन्
इत्यूपमानोपमेष्ठयक्षतवस्निपत्तिष्कृत। 'श्रेणस्त्री यथा पद्धः
तव निपत्ताद्वृत्तिः प्रथममध्ये श्रेणानामकः कर्मचिर्यते श्रावत्य शर्षु
निपत्ताद्वृत्ति' हि व्यासदेशः निम्नानात्मदस्य यथा गुष्यते। यागास्थ
तथा श्रेणपतिर्बिषिदाः तु स्वस्त श्रेणोपमोपमेष्ठयक्षतः स्वात्।
Similarly, in the sentence, "He who wants to kill (his enemy) should sacrifice through the Śyena" (Śad. Br III viii 2), the word 'Śyena' is the name of a sacrifice, and not an injunction relating to an accessory, viz., a hawk, as a subsidiary to a sacrifice; for then the distinctive mention of something being likened to some other thing would be inconsistent in the sentence, "Just as a hawk swoops on and seizes (its prey), so does this man swoop on and seize his spiteful enemy—whom he desires to kill through the Śyena (sacrifice)" (Ibid. III viii 3). As a hawk swoops on and seizes another bird, so does this particular rite called Śyena swoop on and seize one's enemy—this distinctive mention would be consistent only if 'Śyena' was the name of a rite. Were it, however, an injunction about a hawk as being a subsidiary to a sacrifice, an identical thing would be likened to itself, which is not proper. Hence, on account of the distinctive mention of likeness to a hawk, the word 'Śyena' is the name of a rite. Therefore the sentence means, "He who desires to kill his enemy, should effect the killing through the sacrifice called Śyena."

Objection: Even in that case, since killing, too,
is mentioned in the Vedas, believers' (āstikas) as well would feel inclined towards rites relating to killing.

- Reply: No; killing, although mentioned in the Vedas, is not enjoined by them, since it is a result, and it has been decided (in this system) that "results are not enjoined, but only rites as means to certain desired results." Hence killing, not being enjoined, produces demerit.

[¹ Those who believe in God and an after-life inculcated in the Vedas.

² Which automatically follow from those means. For the idea see Pū. Mi. Sū. IV. 1."2b]

Similarly, in the sentence "'One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid'" (Ṭān. Br. XIX. vii 2), the word 'Udbhid' is the name of a sacrifice sought to be enjoined for attaining animals as results, and not an injunction regarding an accessory called Udbhid, as a subsidiary to a sacrifice somehow already known; for there is no accessory called Udbhid—like curd etc. In the case of a sacrifice, however, since the derivation is possible that "it shoots up (udbhid) a result," the word can be the name of a sacrifice.

नन्नु 'उध्भिदते प्रमाणेन' इति योगवर्णन खानितान्त्रिक्युद्धिकः
प्रयोगसम्बन्धेऽखानितान्त्रिक्युद्धिकः किन्तु स्थापित न च, न।
पताहुश्च ज्ञानाविदिः कापि नन्नु न शक्यस्ते। विविधयिः
Objection. Since on account of the derivation, "It digs up (udbhid) the earth," the word 'Udbhid' may refer to a shovel etc., why should it not mean an accessory such as a shovel?

Reply: No, for in a case like this nowhere can an injunction regarding an accessory be maintained, since it would give rise to the defect called 'juxtaposition of two opposing triads.' To explain: In the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid" (Tân Br. XIX. vii 2), since restatement of a sacrifice not known through some other source is not possible, a sacrifice serving as a means to the realisation of cattle as a result is enjoined—the construction being, "One should realise cattle through a sacrifice." Hence the sacrifice is something that is enjoined, being cognised as an auxiliary to a result, it is an accessory—'as an auxiliary,' that is, as a subsidiary—and since it is used by a person for attaining some result, it is something to be utilised. Thus a sacrifice has one triad (of characteristics) consisting in its being enjoined, being an accessory and being utilised
Similarly, if Udbhid be an accessory enjoined with reference to a sacrifice, then the latter is more important than the accessory sought to be enjoined, it is something (known) to which reference is made, and it is something restated; this is the second triad (of characteristics) in a sacrifice. And these two triads; opposed to each other, would apply to one and the same sacrifice. Hence the instance cited is not an injunction regarding an accessory.

It cannot be urged that just as in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with the soma," even without the mutually opposed triads, the word 'soma' is admitted to denote by implication a sacrifice that has the soma (juice) (for its characteristic), and we understand that a sacrifice characterised by the soma is enjoined—the sentence meaning, "One should realise one's desired object by means of the sacrifice characterised by the soma," so that it is an injunction regarding an accessory, viz., the soma, similarly, here, the word 'udbhid' meaning by implication something possessing that characteristic, the sentence may well be an injunction regarding a sacrifice with a characteristic called Udbhid as its accessory. For, in the case of 'soma' etc., there being no alternative, an injunction regarding something possessing a particular
characteristic is admitted by attributing to those words the implied meaning of ‘possessing a certain characteristic.’ But in the case of words such as ‘udbhid,’ since there is the possible alternative of treating them as names, it is improper to admit an injunction regarding something possessing a certain characteristic. Therefore, Udbhid and the like are names by virtue of derivation.

तथा “चिन्तन यजेत पशुकामः” हि तथा विषादप्रवर्तनार्त्येव नामः। “व्यम्भं हुस्तमापो भौतिकप्रकृतिसंशोधितार्नामः।” हि तथा ‘तत्संशोधितार्नामः’ हि समानांविगर्भवान्यथा देवतादेवतानापेक्षा उपाध्यायनानां प्रजापतिश्रेष्ठतात्समन्तः। शुद्धं तेजस्वितां यागी विधियते। विहितस्य यागम् फलायतायां “चिन्तन यजेत” हि यात्रं फलसमन्वित्वविधायकम्। तत्र फलार्थोत्चन पुनःविविधतांतत्र स्त्री प्रजापतियागम्। देवतादेवताएव उपाध्यायनाम् तत्र विषादप्रवर्तनार्त्येव नामः।

Likewise, in the sentence, “One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Citrā” (Tait. S. II. iv. vi. i), the word ‘Citrā’ is the name of the sacrifice relating to Prajāpāti. In the sentence, “Curd, honey, ghee, water, fried barley and rice—associated with these is the sacrifice relating to Prajāpāti,” from the co-ordination (of the subject and predicate) in the last
part of the sentence, we understand that a sacrifice inferred from the expressed relation of the six materials beginning with curd to the deity called Prajāpati, is enjoined. To satisfy the expectancy regarding the result of the enjoined sacrifice, the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Citrā," lays down the relation (of the rite) to the result. Here, there is a further injunction for the sake of the result, and therefore, inasmuch as that sacrifice relating to Prajāpati consists of diverse (vuciṭra) materials such as curd, the word 'Citrā' is the name of a rite; not that restating, through the words 'should sacrifice,' the animal sacrifice known from the sentence, "One should kill the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon," two accessories, viz., diversity and femininity, are enjoined. For if more accessories than one are enjoined with reference to a rite already known from some other source, it would create a split of the sentence. As it has been said, "With regard to a rite already known, more than one accessory cannot be enjoined" (Tan Vār II. 11 6) But with regard to a rite not known from any other source, the decision is that a sacrifice possessing multiple characteristics such as many deities, a cake baked on eight thin tiles and the new- or full-moon day, and inferred from its relation to materials and deities, is enjoined. As it has been said, "But with regard to an unknown rite, many accessories even are enjoined in one effort'" (Ibid.).

['That is, in a single sentence uttered with one effort']

अथ—यथा "पशुना यज्ञ" इत्ययम् मानात्मपालस्वाममहस्यां तद्भवत् यथा पशुनां इत्त्वेकक्षपदोपासाम् पशुद्वयतां कालिकुसांत्यां यथार्थय वास्यमेव् विशेष विशिष्टायेन्; तद्भवत् यद्यक्षक्षपदोपासाङ्.
Objection: Just as in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with an animal," with reference to a sacrifice already known from some other source, an injunction is admitted, without a split of the sentence, regarding three things, viz., the maternal, that is, animal, and its sex and number—all cognised from the same phrase 'with an animal'—as subsidiaries to that sacrifice, similarly, here also a constituent of the sacrifice, viz., the maternal animal, characterised by variegatedness and femininity—cognised from the same phrase’—being enjoined, there is no split of the sentence. For this very reason, since the animal which is enjoined is something that is utilised, its unity is sought to be conveyed as a subsidiary to the sacrifice, hence the sacrifice should be performed with only one animal. In the sentence, "One should scour the sacrificial cup," however, the unity is not sought to be conveyed, since it relates to a matter under reference (uddeśya). Such is the traditional decision in this system.

\[1\] 'Through the Citrā'
\[2\] That about which a predication is made.

कथम्? "प्रां संमार्थि” इत्यत् ‘प्रह्म’ धति द्वितीयप्राह्स्येनितमत्रन्तनोहेयत्वात् प्रयोजनत्वाय प्राधान्यं गम्यते। संमार्थसूत्र प्रां प्रति गुणमूलः। प्रतिगुणे गुण प्राधान्यमृत्। प्रास्तो प्रास्तो सर्वं संगम। धति निष्प्रेरति, सति प्रति प्रसारं संमार्थनियाः। धति दुस्मुक्ताय भमाबुद्धतमेकात् भूपाक्षमप्यविविक्षितम्। यथुच्छत् "नेकुद्रुहेत्यगात्रं हिन्दु
FOUR TESTS OF NAMES

स्वयं विशेषम्—प्रां प्रभु प्रकृति, तं चैकम् हृति, तथा सति
विशेषेऽदाहारंपेत: स्थात्। तथा अध्यात्मिक ज्ञानोपकारिता संस्कृत्य न विशेषिता। उद्देश्यमात्रार्थे विशेषण
विशेषितं सत् विशेषणस्य विशेषितं विशेषितं विशेषितं पर्यायम्। यथा तेषां प्रह्लग्न विशेषितम्, तत्तत्त्वस्य विशेष
उद्देश्यमात्रा विशेषितम् ज्ञानमेक्यत्वात्। तेन प्रह्लातीयसाधनस्यर्थायम्—
यामपूर्वार्थद्वायमेत्रतु असंवर्त्त्व वृत्ति स्मैतम्।

How? In the sentence, “One should scour the sacrificial cup,” from the accusative case in the word
‘cup,’ the cup, being what is most desired, is a matter
under reference, and its predominance is understood
from this fact as also from its possessing utility. The
scouring, however, is an accessory to the cup. For
on the principle, “With regard to each predominant
item the accessory is to be repeated,” we know for
certain that all the sacrificial cups that are there, are
to be scoured. Consequently, there being no curiosity
as to how many cups are to be scoured, the unity
pertaining to the matter under reference, although
expressed, is not sought to be conveyed. If it be urged
that the unity does not relate to the matter under
reference, but is itself a predicate, meaning, “One
should scour the sacrificial cup and that, too, one,”
then an extra thing being enjoined, it would create a
split of the sentence. Similarly, an injunction also
not being in order on account of the absence of curios-
ity, the number relating to the matter under reference
is sought to be conveyed.¹ Some characteristic of the
matter under reference even may be sought to be
conveyed, but it should be such that without its being
conveyed, the matter under reference itself would
not be intelligible. As, in the very instance cited, the
special character of the sacrificial cup (grahatvat) is
sought to be conveyed, for unless this is done, it would be impossible to know the real nature of the matter under reference. Therefore it is established that, since the scouring is for producing the unique result in a soma sacrifice, an accessory to which is the species of sacrificial cups (graha), it is not to be performed with regard to sacrificial bowls (camasa).

\[1 \text{ In Pu. Mi. Sū. III 1 14} \\
2 \text{ Viz., the cup} \\
1 \text{ In Pu. Mi. Sū. III. 1 17} \]

"पशुना यज्ञ" प्रयत्न तु, यागभावति पशुविषयतवादगुणभूतः। प्रतियुप्ता प्रवहारविनास्तीति कियथि: पशुमि: यागः: कर्तव्य। इत्याकारणाय। एकवचनेः प्रतीत्यां विशेषगतेऽनेकत्वं विविधतिम्, बुध्विसतितवात्।

किञ्च विकृतसंहिताभिशेषितस्य पशुद्वलयर्पनरजस्य एकवचनोपास्त्य विशेषत्वाभिशेषाय पशुद्वाय। तत्रतिकृतसंहितायेदः कियात्त्वादेकतथं विविधतिम्।

But in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with an animal," the animal, being the thing enjoined, is an accessory to the sacrifice. Since the principal item is not to be repeated with each accessory, there is the expectancy regarding how many animals would be required for the sacrifice, and to satisfy this, the unity of the thing enjoined, which is obvious from the singular number, is sought to be conveyed, since one desires to know about it.

Moreover, since the material animal, which is a constituent of the sacrifice, which is specified in respect of sex and number, and which is cognised from the same word, is the thing enjoined, through the enjoined animal its sex and number are also subsidiaries: the
rite, and therefore the unity of the animal is sought to be conveyed.

[1 Ibid. IV. i. 15.]

Or, the sex and number denoted by the instrumental case-ending and appropriated by the power of the instrumental case denoted by that case-ending, may, to the disregard of their relation to the meaning of the stem, viz., the maternal animal, be, just like the latter, directly enjoined as subsidiaries to the rite, and then mutually related on the analogy of "the red, one-year-old," etc., so as to mean that the animal that is enjoined as a subsidiary to the sacrifice is one and a male. To explain: In the sentence, "One should buy the soma creeper in exchange for a red, tawny-eyed, one-year-old cow," since the rule is that cases should be construed with the verb, the four items, viz., redness, tawny-eyedness and so on, are related, on account of their instrumental case-endings, as subsidiaries to the buying of the soma creeper, without at all being construed with one another. And
since redness etc. being attributes\(^1\) and formless, cannot

directly be the means to a rite, they, as limiting the

one-year-old cow which is the means to the rite, are

afterwards\(^2\) connected with each other by a subsequent

relation, meaning: The cow that is one-year-old is
tawny-eyed and red. The above-mentioned case is

analogous to this.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Not substances.

\(^2\) After the initial total comprehension

\(^3\) \textit{Pū. Mi. Sū.} III 112.]

Thus, then, it is established that the characteristics

of the matter under reference are not sought to be con-

veyed, but those of what is utilised are. Hence, inas-

much as by the word 'Citrā' \(^4\) a constituent, viz., an

animal characterised by both variegatedness and

femininity, can be enjoined for an animal sacrifice to

the Fire and the Moon, restated by the words 'should

sacrifice,' how can 'Citrā' be a name?

Reply: Not so; for in that case the sacrifice to

Prajāpati, which is the topic under discussion, and

which needs to be related to a result, would be

abandoned, and a sacrifice to the Fire and the Moon,

which is not the topic under discussion, would be

conjured up. Both these are improper. Therefore

\(^4\) \textit{Citrā}
the word 'Citrā' is the name of a rite. So, from any one of the grounds such as 'declaration of a particular thing,' we are to understand everywhere that a given word is the name of a rite. Thus the authoritiveness of a sentence inculcating an injunction has been discussed.

[1 In the sentence, "One who desires animals should sacrifice through the Citrā"]

**Corroborative Statements**

अध्यायांशो विचारये। अध्यायांशाना सु उत्तारपरस्य प्रयोजनाभवारणयथिपथियोऽनन्त्यवेधवक्त्रविशयङ्किताभिषवेत्यवलंशियत्वक्त्रविश्रावसानमहारता विविधाश्चैवरुक्षाक्षतयो भागात्वण।

सं सप्तविचार—निन्दा-प्रशंसा-परम्पराकथित-पुरुसार्वसेवायाम।

तत्र निन्दा अध्यायांशो यथा "अस्त्रं या पतुम्प्रक्ष्योमोम्,"

“प्रशंसां हि रजतं यो बहुषिव ब्रह्मति पुराण्य संवत्तसाधुपुरूषोऽक्षितं” इत्यादि।

प्रशंसा अध्यायांशो यथा "शोभलोक्य सुसंव च एवं वेद,—" "वायुभूती चेपिष्य देवता, बायुभूत स्वेन भागघण्योपधावति, स एवं भूतं गमणति” इत्येकमादिः।

Now corroborative statements (अर्थांश्वाद) are being discussed. Since corroborative statements will be of no use if their import be for its own sake, they must, on account of the injunction regarding study, necessarily be for the purpose of imparting a knowledge of useful things, hence they are authoritative only as forming a unitary passage with sentences inculcating an injunction, by demonstrating the praiseworthy of what is enjoined. They are of four kinds, being divided into condemnation, eulogy, heroic performance and past incident.
Of these, instances of condemnatory corroborative statement are passages like, "It is no sacrificial session (sātra) that is devoid of the three syllabic numbers—twenty-four, forty-four and forty-eight" (Tait. S. VII. iii vi 2, etc.), and "He who bestows silver, which is produced from tears, in the sacrifice called Barhis, has lamentation in his home before the lapse of a year" (Tait. S I v 1. 2).

Instances of eulogistic corroborative statement are passages like, "He who knows thus has a shining face" (Tān. Br. XX. xvi. 6) and "The Wind is indeed a very swift deity; if a person approaches (i.e., worships) him only with the special offering of the deity, the latter certainly makes him attain prosperity" (Tait S II 1 1 1).

[1] It will be of no good to anybody merely to know, for instance that the Wind is a very swift deity, for this will not impel him either to do anything or to desist from any action.

[2] In the sentence, "One's own Vedas should be studied" The Vedas include the corroborative statements.

[3] Representing the Gāyatrī, Tristubh and Jagati metres respectively.

[4] The story is this. Once the gods went out to fight the demons, depositing their valuables with the deity Fire. Fire took a fancy to the treasures and fled with them. The victorious gods, on their return, saw his treachery, hunted him out and forced him to return their deposits. Fire thereupon fell to tears, and these became silver.

[5] The passage follows the injunction about a rite called Gargatnātra.

[6] The quotation is preceded by the injunction, "One who desires prosperity should touch the white animal (a goat) relating to the deity Wind.

परेण महता वुक्सेणेद्वं कर्म इत्तत्त्विति प्रतिपत्तिः सर्वस्य अग्निः परस्परविभावं फर- रस्तिः। यथा "भजियो भक्तामयत" हत्यायिः।
CORROBORATIVE STATEMENTS

* Heroic performance\(^1\) is that corroborative statement which demonstrates that a particular work was done by a great personage; for example, the passage, "Fire desired," etc.\(^2\) (Tai. Br. III. i. iv. i).

Past incident is that corroborative statement which demonstrates something that has been narrated by another; for example, the passage, "He cursed it, saying, 'May people kill you whenever they have a mind to (or, by various devices)!'" (Tai S. II. vi. vi i)

\(^1\) Authorities differ on the definitions of this and the next item. According to Kumārila Bhatta and others, both these are narrations of some past event, the former by one person and the latter by many persons.

\(^2\) The passage reads thus "Fire desired, 'Let me be a voracious eater among the gods.' He offered this cake baked on eight thin tiles to the deity Fire and the Pleiades. From that, verily, he became a voracious eater among the gods,'" etc. The commentator Sāyana explains the first word 'Fire' as a man who in the next cycle became the deity Fire by performing the requisite rite.

The deity Fire decided not to carry any more offerings to the gods, lest he, too, should die of exhaustion like his three elder brothers. He fled and hid himself in water. The gods started in search of him, and when they happened to come to that water, a fish betrayed the deity Fire thereupon cursed the whole species that way. Then he agreed to resume his service to the gods on their acceptance of his term that whatever offerings fell outside the boundary of the sacred fire would go to his departed brothers. This explains the injunction, 'One should put a boundary' (round the fire with three fagots), which follows the corroborative statement]
Of these, condemnatory corroborative statement
devotes itself to praising the thing enjoined by
condemning things other than that. Since the
condemnation of silver in the passage, "He who bestows
silver," etc. is intended to praise what is enjoined,
 viz, not making a gift of silver, there is no contradic-
tion. The other three are but directly eulogistic. The
corroborative statement, "The Wind is indeed," etc.
suggests that the Wind, being swift in movement, is
an exceedingly laudable deity, and therefore a rite
with that as its deity is praiseworthy. It thus forms a
unitary passage with the injunction by demonstrating
the praiseworthiness of the deity that is enjoined.

The passage, "Fire desired," etc. suggests that
the sacrifice of which the deity is Fire was performed
in ancient times by Fire and is therefore praiseworthy, and because of its superiority should certainly be performed by other sacrificers even to-day. So it forms a unitary passage with the injunction through its praise of the rite that is enjoined. The same is to be understood in the other cases also.

Sometimes corroborative statements do other functions, too. For example, in the injunction, “One should spread soaked gravel (on the altar),” the word ‘soaked’ suggests a liquid substance in general. When a doubt arises as to what that substance may be, we conclude from the corroborative statement, “Ghee verily is light” (Tas. S. II. ii. ix. 4), that it is ghee. So this corroborative statement is authoritative as deciding a doubtful meaning as well.

SACRED TEXTS

प्रथ अनुविचारः। मन्नाराजमिर्ग प्रभववनविविधवा उत्तन-स्वाभाविक फलविद्येनान्यान्यायाचेत, न त्वाहर्ष्यत्वम्। हृद्रे सम्भवायुज्जवलयोगात्। प्रयोगकाले कर्मण्येव विना कर्माः-झानायोगात् कर्मोपरिकारणां मन्वे रियते।

न श्रोतेश्चनानीयांपर्यंतसर्गवस्मावाधितुष्मानोपपर्यंतित वाच्यम्। मने रेवाय भासुत्वाःकुतुम्ने सति परं भवित भावयति नियमावतारात्। नियमावत्तुष्मानोजरात् तद्भावे तज्ज्वत्ता-हृदृश्यौ तम्मुल फर्तं न सिस्मृतौति क्षयनाव।

Now sacred texts⁴ (mantras) are being discussed. They, too, on account of the injunction about study of one’s own Vedas in their entirety, are solely for imparting a knowledge of useful things, and not for any invisible purpose; for where a visible result is
possible, it is improper to assume an invisible one. Since performance of rites is impossible without a knowledge of them at the time of performance, sacred texts furnish a knowledge of things that are helpful to the performance of (those) rites.

It cannot be urged that performance can take place inasmuch as recollection of those things is also possible through the utterance of the instructor etc.; for the restriction is admitted that results will accrue only if the performance takes place after recollection of the things concerned through sacred texts, and not otherwise. And it being held that the restriction leads to the unique result, it is assumed that in its absence the unique result due to it will be missing, and hence the ultimate result accruing therefrom will not follow.

[¹ As opposed to sacred commentaries (brāhmanas). See p 2]

नन्दे हस हसनां खचकाष्ठ्यज्यों बिनियोग इति पालितम्।
बिनियोगोनाम शेषावेगानाम्। शेषाय नाम अहि सम्। तत्तथा
"इमामपूर्णम् रामाम्" इति मन्त्रये राजानाध्यायनसामायाम्—
मस्तीति राजानाध्यायनसामायाम्यं राजासाहित राजानाध्या-
इतिहासे: "इमामपूर्णम् राजामुर्तस्य इत्यहारधिप्पात्मानामसे"
इति वचनं जिमार्यमिति चेतु, न; परितिल्यार्धिन्तात्। वायुं-
प्रकरणोत्सर्वानामि गर्भमर्यादाम् चेति इत्यमति। तथा
खिलािस्वर्जनायं मन्त्रप्रसाद्यमुच्यमात्रायं खिलािस्वर्जनायं
नायामपि मन्त्रः प्रातः, श्रीतो भवष्काजनायामेव मन्त्रः कार्यः; न
गर्भसर्वानापिति मन्त्राविभृष्टोपरिसंग्राहायं विचि:।

Objection. So it is evident that sacred texts are applicable to the things expressed by them. And application is being related as an accessory, which means a subsidiary. Therefore, inasmuch as the
sacred text, "They seized this rein," etc. (Tai. S. V. 1. ii. 1), has the power of expressing the seizing of the rein, it is clear from the very indication (liṅga), viz., the power of expressing the seizing of the rein, that the sacred text is a subsidiary to the seizing of the rein; so what is the use of (the additional clause in) the sentence, "One should catch hold of the rein of the horse, saying, 'They seized the rein of (the horse, which is a means to) the sacrifice'" (Ibid.)?

Reply Not so, for it is for the purpose of exclusion Under the topic of brick-laying, there are two acts, viz., seizing the rein of the horse and seizing that of the donkey. Now, if it be said that from the indication the sacred text is applicable to the rein of the horse, then, the indication being the same, the sacred text may also apply to the rein of the donkey. Hence this injunction is for the purpose of exclusion, viz., withholding of the sacred text (from one of the two items), meaning that it is to be recited in respect of (seizing) the rein of the horse only, and not that of the donkey.

[1] See note 1 on p. 22]

That exclusion has three defects, viz., abandonment of the primary meaning, acceptance of a strange meaning and annulment of the prima facie view. Now, the primary meaning of the sentence, "One
should seize the rein of the horse,” is that one should catch hold of the rein of the horse, uttering this sacred text; that is abandoned. The withholding of the sacred text from (the seizing of) the rein of the donkey is a strange meaning; that is accepted. And the sacred text (minus this clause) applies *prima facie,* from the indication, to (the seizing of) the rein of the donkey also; this is annulled by this clause. Thus exclusion, which has these three defects, is admitted, since there is no alternative. It would not be admissible if there were any alternative.

Similarly, option (*vikalpa*), which is vitiated by eight defects, is also admitted, there being no alternative. For example, the consecrated cake (*purodāśa*) relating to the Fire, baked on eight thin tiles (p. 12), is known to be a subsidiary to a sacrifice. Now, with regard to the *purodāśa*, which is a kind of cake, one may ask what is its constituent material; and any material without restriction may be put forward as a
prima facie view. The sentence, "One should sacrifice with rice grains," however, restricts it to rice grains only. Similarly, the sentence, "One should sacrifice with barley grains," restricts it to barley grains also. Since both serve the same purpose, there is an option between them.

Likewise, the sentence, "One should use the cup sōdasīn in the Atirātra sacrifice," enjoins the cup named sōdasīn in the Atirātra sacrifice. Again, from the negation, "One should not use the cup sōdasīn in the Atirātra sacrifice," its non-use is enjoined. Since use and non-use, which are contradictory to each other, cannot both be resorted to in the same performance, therefore in some performance the cup is used, while in some other it is omitted. Thus here also there is an option.

स चास्यस्वेषुः। तथाहि—पूर्वं भौहिस्वयो यथशाखस्य स्वायतानुपक्रातित्वाक्षणप्रामाण्यपरित्यागः; धाननुपक्रातित्वाक्षणप्रामाण्यपरित्यागः। ततो द्वितीयप्रयोगं यथानुपाताने यथशाखस्य पूर्वं त्यसं यथप्रामाण्यं तत्स्वेष्टिः; श्रीकृष्णं यथप्रामाण्यं तत्प्रतित्यागं—वेषेति यथशाखे चत्वारो दोषः। एवं पूर्वं यथप्रयोगं भौहिशाखास्य स्वायतानुपक्रातित्वाक्षणम् यथप्रामाण्यं तत्प्रतित्यागं; धानन्तरानुपक्रातित्वान्य यथप्रामाण्यं तत्स्वेष्टिः। पुनःद्वितीयप्रयोगं भौहिशाखास्य स्वायतानुपक्रातित्वान्य यथप्रामाण्यं तत्प्रतित्यागं; श्रीकृष्णप्रामाण्यं—परित्यागश्वेति भौहिशाखे चत्वारो दोषः; इत्यादियुक्तो विकल्पः।

And this option is vitiated by eight defects. For example, if the performance is first with rice grains, then the authority of the text prescribing barley, consisting in an inducement to utilise its primary meaning, is abandoned, and its unauthoritateness,
in the form of a lack of inducement to utilise that meaning, is admitted. Next, if in the second performance barley is used, then that authority of the text prescribing barley which was first abandoned is admitted, and its unauthoritativeness that was admitted is discarded. So the text prescribing barley is subject to four defects. Similarly, if barley is first used, that authority of the text prescribing rice grains which consists in an inducement to utilise its primary meaning, is abandoned, and that unauthoritativeness of the text which takes the form of a lack of inducement to utilise that meaning, is admitted. Again, if in the second performance rice grains are used, then the abandoned authority of the text prescribing rice grains is admitted, and its admitted unauthoritativeness is discarded. So the text prescribing rice grains is subject to four defects. Thus an option is vitiated by eight defects.

This option is sometimes due to things having a common purpose, that is, doing the same function. For example, there is an option between rice and barley, since each of them can produce the cake. Sometimes it is due to a scriptural statement. For example, in the sentence, “The *prśtha* should consist of the *brhat*” (Tai. Br. I. 11 11. 4), a hymn called *prśtha*, which is made up of verses called *brhat-sāman*, is enjoined; while in the sentence, “The *prśtha* should
consist of the *rathantara*” (*Sat. Br. V. iv. v. 7*), another hymn called *prṣṭha*, made up of verses called *rathantara-sāman*, is enjoined.

A hymn (śloṭra) is a principal rite, since it is for the purpose of producing the unique result, like the Prayāja etc. The sāman, however, is a subsidiary rite, since it is a purificatory rite, for sāmans are admitted as means to hymns through the purification they produce in the form of disjoined articulation of the syllables of the rces called stotriyās, which are means to the hymn. A hymn is the recital of attributes abiding in a possessor of them, such as Indra, which is produced by sacred texts that are sung. The last clause means: which is produced by the rce syllables manifested by the sāman. A āśastra is the recital of attributes abiding in their possessor, which is produced by sacred texts that are not sung. The sāman is a mode of singing. A rce that serves as a means to a hymn is designated as stotriyā. And stoma is a particular number such as nine or fifteen with regard to the stotriyās. These are the differences among them.
So, although the *prśtha* hymns called *bṛhat* and *rathantara* are meant to produce different unique results, and as such do not serve an identical purpose, yet there is an option between them solely on the strength of the scriptural statement, “The *prśtha* should either be composed of the *bṛhat* or it should be composed of the *rathantara.*”

कचित् व्यवस्थितविकल्पः। यथा द्वितीयप्रार्ज्जकर्मणि नाराशंस-तनूनामनेऽपि द्वितीयविकल्पः। स च “राजन्यवासिष्ठायि नाराशंसौ महत्त्वे प्रायासस्तनूनामनेऽपि” हि व्यवस्थितविकल्पः।

तदेवं चोदनापरयायायां विधिवाक्यानामः अंशान्विविषयवित्त्वः भावनाविभागफलत्वात् प्रामाण्यम्। उद्विद्धार्थानां नामात्वा, अर्थां बाधानां विधिवाक्यस्त्वपरतेऽतः, मन्त्रानामाधिकस्यस्त्वपरतेऽतः प्रामाण्यात्मिति हृदस्वय वेदस्यालंकृत्तिके धम्माकर्मज्ञयेऽविवेकाय प्रामाण्यस्त्वतः।

Sometimes there is an option according to specification. For instance, in the second Prayāja sacrifice, since the sacred texts relating to the deities Narāśāṁsa and Tanūnapāt have an identical purpose, there is an option between them; and because of the sentence, “For kings and for the descendants of Vaśiṣṭha, etc. the second Prayāja is to be performed with the sacred texts relating to the deity Narāśāṁsa, while for others it is to be performed with the sacred texts relating to the deity Tanūnapāt,” it is a case of an option according to specification.

Therefore, in the foregoing manner, sentences inculcating an injunction (*vidhi*), which is another name for direction (*cudanā*), are authoritative, inasmuch as they enjoin an urge with three parts; words
such as 'Udbhid' are so on account of being names; corroborative statements are authoritative as setting forth the praiseworthiness of what is enjoined; and sacred texts are so as calling to mind things that are to be performed. Hence the authority of the entire Vedas with regard to transcendental matters called righteous and unrighteous actions is obvious.

[1 See pp 47 et seq.]

मन्याहिमखीतानि स्मृतिनामापि बैद्याञ्जक्क्तस्त्यात्स्याक्कालो
भवेऽन्तिमालम्। "श्रुत्तिरग्रीवी सर्वा बैद्य कित्वा" हति स्मृतिप्रामाणम्।
"श्रुत्तिरग्रीवी सुस्वहृद्यस्वाते " हति प्रत्यक्षमूलितिविवक्तात्।
सवैद्यश्च सति श्रुत्यमुक्ष्यस्य जरुरमशक्तवात्।
"बैद्यमंजरीमिदं व्यासोऽप्र्युंगृहिति" इत्यादि स्मृतिप्रामाणम्।
श्रुत्यापिबुद्धि तैत्रेयपि तौक्ष्यमुक्तक्वात्।

The Smṛtis composed by Manu and others also possess authority with regard to righteous ceremonies such as the Astakā,¹ since they are based on the Vedas. The Smṛti text, "The entire (post made of the) fig branch is to be covered," is, however, not authoritative, inasmuch as it contradicts the manifest Śruti text, "One should chant (the Udgītha) touching the sacrificial post made of the fig tree"; for if the entire post be covered, the touching mentioned in the Śruti would be impossible. Smṛti passages such as, "The cloth relating to the valedictory homa should be received by the adhvaryu,"² are unauthoritative, because, although not contradictory to the import of the Śruti, they spring from greed.

¹ A ceremony in honour of the departed
² See note 1 on p 27 ]

तथा शिष्टाचारोपि स्मृतिचारा श्रुतिमुक्तचातु श्रमापमुः।

6
Similarly, usage among the cultured is authoritative, since it is based on the Sruti through the Smrti. Such usage among the cultured as marrying a maternal uncle's daughter, however, is unauthoritative, because this is forbidden by the Smrti text, "Marrying a maternal uncle's daughter," etc., and therefore contradicts the Smrti.

Thus the authority of the Sruti, Smrti and (approved) usage in the determination of righteous or unrighteous action has been described

[¹ The concluding part of the verse lays down an expiation, viz., candrayana, for the offence.]

CRITERIA OF A DIFFERENCE OF RITE

स च धर्मः परस्परं भिन्नं। मेत्रुक्षमाणानि तु शास्त्रानं

तथाहि-यागश्रानहोमानं यज्ञ-दृष्टी-दृष्टिपर्यंशायुष्मयति-
प्रतिपाद्यत्वाच्छान्तरादेव। स्वस्तवृत्तिवृत्तिपूर्वकं परस्तवता-
पाद्यानं दानम्।

"समिवी वज्ञति" इत्याविधं पञ्चानं धार्यानं मथे पक्षे
कर्मविद्वज्जकस्मस्येण तस्मिन कर्मणि गुणविद्वयक्षेत्रिविद्वे
वियमकाभावानुपप्लवे कर्मविद्वयक्ष्ये दियते विहितस्य कर्मणः
पुर्वविलास्वर्गमिति गुणविद्धानसामाध्यातु पूर्वविलास्विहितकषमार्गे-
द्वेषा उच्चोत्तरवायतविहितस्य कर्मणो मेवः सिद्धांत्येतादेव-
स्थलेखविशेषपुष्पमुतिरपायात्प्राय्ञ्यासात् कर्मेष्वः।

Such righteous acts are different from one another,
the evidences of difference being a different word and so on.'

To be explicit: A sacrifice, a gift and an offering (homa) are different from one another on account of different words (denoting them), since they are expressed by the verbs 'to sacrifice,' 'to give' and 'to offer,' which are not synonymous. A gift is the termination of one's own right and the establishment of another's right (to a thing).

Of the five sentences beginning with, "One should perform the Samidh sacrifice" (Tai. S. II. vi. i 1), since there is nothing to determine that only one of them enjoins a rite and the others accessories to that rite, it is clear that all of them enjoin rites; and since it is futile to re-enjoin a rite already enjoined, the very fact of their being re-enjoined establishes the difference of each succeeding rite from the preceding one. Hence, in such cases, the repetition of the identical term 'should sacrifice' in the Shruti proves, on the ground of repetition, that the rites are different.

[¹ That is, repetition, number, name, accessory and a different context]

"सिस्मण भाइतृज्ञेयति" यथा जुहोतियज्ञ्यासामात्वेपि 
जुहोतित्वाय होमे जित्वसंस्क्यायार्यश्चरस्मे सिस्मणयो होमा 
प्रति संस्क्यायाः कर्मेवः

"व्रतेऽव ज्योतिर्यैव विभ्ज्योतिर्यैव सर्व्योतिर्यैव सहस्राद- 
वर्गितेन वजेत" हति ज्योतिर्योत्करणे कुतानामपि ज्योति-प्राप्ताः 
वर्गां यथासंत्यापत्त्वं ज्योतिष्योत्त्वं व्रतम् संस्कल्प- 
कर्मानु ज्योतिष्योपाप्तत्वं खेतः। सिस्मणशास्त्रात् नवाणं 
परव्या खेत तत्र संस्कया कर्मेवः

In the sentence, "One should offer three oblations" (Tai. S. II. iii. ix. 3, Tai. Br. I. iii. x. 3 etc.;
Sat. Br. IX. 11. i. 2 etc.), although there is no repetition of the term 'should offer,' the number 'three' comes into relation with homa, which is the meaning of the verb 'to offer,' and this proves that these three homas are mutually different. Hence here there is a difference of rite on account of number.

Although three sacrifices called Jyotis etc. are mentioned under the topic of Jyotistoma in the passage, "Now this is Jyotis (light), now this is Visva-jyotis (universal light); now this is Sarva-jyotis (all-light); one should sacrifice through this, with a thousand (cows) as remuneration for the priests," they are different from the Jyotistoma sacrifice, inasmuch as three names different from 'Jyotistoma' have been given to them. Since the three (sacrifices) are mutually different solely on account of different names, this is a case of difference of rite because of names.

तथा "तत्रे पवित्रि दश्यान्यं, ता बैश्वदेवय्यासिष्ठा, बाजिन्धो
बाजिनम्" इति "ता बैश्वदेववी" द्वित वाक्ये विस्वदेवदेवताःसिस्मभा
द्वायर्मण्याभावितो यागो विधीयते। "बाजिन्धो बाजिनम्" ह्या
शापि बाजिनदेवत्य-बाजिनद्वृष्ट्य-कामान्तरं विधीयते। न तु पूर्ण
विधिते बैश्वदेवयागे बाजिनद्वृष्ट्यपुः गुणो विधीयते, पूवणागस्त्यः
सकसमाजयासककत्तवेय तत्र बाजिनस्य निवेशायोगात्। न च शुभति-
यथव्यक्तिद्रव्यः। बाजिनस्योऽसंख्यामात्राय, विश्यस्यायि-
साथविक्यायोगात्। बैश्वदेवयागोपविक्षिष्टान्यं पञ्चमासिस्माणं; शिष्यत्
स्यूद्यपातिरित्व:। शिष्यर्वे विधीयत् दृष्टर्व:। बैश्वदेवायामाहत्वपने
कर्मणि बाजिनस्येऽशिष्यो विधितो बाजिनमुक्त। उत्पक्षितं।
तत्योपवे उत्पक्षितं। श्रवणः, श्रवणपरस्परविक्षिष्टे कर्मकृत्वेये
कर्मतत्वात्। उत्पक्षितो बाजिनमुक्तोऽसान्तः प्रभोऽसान्तः विचारति-
तत्तत्वेय दुर्बलस्याति तत्पुर्वकर्मणि निवेशायोगायो बाजिनदेवताः।
Similarly, in the sentence, "One should add curd to hot milk, that fresh cheese belongs to the Viśvadevas, and the whey is for the Vājins" (Mai. S. I. x. i), in the clause, "That fresh cheese belongs to the Viśvadevas," a sacrifice, inferable from its relation to the deities, viz., Viśvadevas, and the material, viz., fresh cheese, is enjoined. In the clause, "And the whey is for the Vājins," also, another rite, of which the deity is Vājin and the material whey, is enjoined. It is not that an accessory, viz., the material whey, is enjoined in the sacrifice to the Viśvadevas, already enjoined; for the previous sacrifice being confined to the accessory fresh cheese, there is no scope for the whey to be introduced (as an accessory). Nor is here an option as between rice grains and barley, for the whey and the fresh cheese are not prescribed with the same status, and between things that are prescribed with a different status, there can be no option. The accessory fresh cheese is enjoined only in the sentence originating the sacrifice to the Viśvadevas, so it is something prescribed in connection with origination. "Prescribed," that is, enjoined. The accessory whey is prescribed—that is, enjoined—by another sentence in a rite originated by the sentence relating to the Viśvadevas; so it is something prescribed in connection with what has been originated. And between the two, the one that is prescribed in connection with origination is stronger, for it is cognised as a subsidiary to the rite at the very time that the rite is originated. But the accessory whey, prescribed in connection with what has been originated, although it is cognised
immediately after, is weaker on account of its appearing later, and for that reason does not find a place in the previous rite. So, on account of its relation to another deity, viz., Vājīn, it converts the sentence in which it occurs into an injunction regarding another rite. Hence here is difference owing to an accessory. In the text quoted, the fresh cheese (śāniśā) is coagulated milk, and the whey (vājina) is the water that is left.

Thus, by the so-called word for the practice of this, the text states—“Upasthitāhṛtā Māsthāni-
hortam Śukṣmāt” occurs. And the purūṣa-karmāṇi, the acts of the mind, being the actual Nityānanda-chandāh, Prakāśakāntara-dhyāna, Pratisākhāśīhottāh, Śaṁkara-prakāśa, and so on, the karmāṇi, acts in the way of the text quoted is to offer up the Agnihoṭra. Thus, the text states—

Similarly, it is stated in connection with the sacrifice called ‘the way of the kundapāyas,’ “After going through the ceremonies called Upasads, one should offer the Agnihoṭra for a month.” Here no previously known rite whatsoever is present before the mind; owing (rather) to the cognition of an original rite—which means a different context—a different rite possessing the characteristics of the well-known Agnihoṭra and bearing its name is enjoined. It is not an injunction regarding an accessory to the well-known Agnihoṭra, restated by the word ‘Agnihoṭra.’ For, if with regard to a rite already known, more accessories than one, viz., sequence and (the duration of) a month, are enjoined, it would create a split of the sentence.
Hence here is a difference of rite on account of a different context. The expression ‘well-known Agni-hotra’ means the compulsory Agni-hotra, that is to say, the daily Agni-hotra.

Thus, then, a difference of rite has been demonstrated on account of different words, repetition, number, name, accessories and a different context.

[¹ As opposed to the optional Agni-hotra ]

THREEFOLD VEDIC SUBJECT-MATTER

Now let us discuss things to be known and so on. Things to be known from the Vedas etc. are threefold: those contributing to the sacrifice, those contributing to human needs, and those doing both. Of these, the Prayāja etc contribute only to the sacrifice. The result and its means contribute to human needs; as, for example, heaven etc. and Jyotiśoma etc. Curd etc. on the other hand do both; for, on account of not mentioning results, such as, “One should perform homa with curd,” it contributes to the sacrifice, while on account of its being enjoined for the sake of results by the sentence, “For a person desiring (vigorous) organs (the priest) should perform homa with curd” (Tait. Br. II. 1. v 5, adapted), it contributes to human
needs. So it has been stated, "But as regards the
same sentence having both characteristics, a difference
of sentences (is the deciding factor)" (Pū Mi. Ṣū.
IV. iii. 5). 'Samyoga' (in the original) means a
sentence, its 'difference' or separateness is the deciding
factor in respect of the same sentence having both
characteristics—this is the sense.

With regard to what contributes to the sacrifice,
for example, the Prayāja, the sacrifice is the incentive
(prayojaka), while with regard to what contributes to
human needs, the result is the incentive. By an
incentive is meant that which leads to its performance.
That for the sake of which an injunction causes some-
thing to be done, is an incentive with regard to that
The injunction about the new-moon sacrifice etc.
causes these to be performed for the sake of heaven
etc.; hence the latter are the incentives to the new-
moon sacrifice etc. The injunction regarding the
Prayāja etc. causes them to be performed for the sake
of the new-moon sacrifice etc.; hence the latter are the incentives to the Prayāja etc. The injunction about the adding of the curd causes this to be done for the sake of the fresh cheese, not for the whey; for the adding of the curd being done for the sake of the fresh cheese, the whey is automatically produced. Hence it is the fresh cheese, and not the whey, that is the incentive to the adding of the curd. In the sentence, “One should separate the husks with the thin tile used for the cake,” the tile is enjoined as a subsidiary to the separation of the husks. Yet this separation is not the incentive to the tile, for the separation of the husks is achieved through the very tile that is used for the sake of the cake, but it is the cake that is the incentive to the tile. And so on.

Order

अय कमनिल्पयम्। नन्ते विदिना साक्षु प्रधानं कर्तव्यते
बोधाते। तत्रात्तुर्वा प्रधानान्त: व कर्मणां बहुत्वात् कम्पणानुञ्जान सा वाच्यम्।
तत्काल्यामकं प्रमाणं संमिलितं चेतु, न; सुत्यादीनामिति कमनियामकत्वात्।

तथाहि—“अयूपूर्वहृपति त्रृतत्वत्वम् प्रधानं वीर्यति” इत्यत्र
क्षत्वाधृत्या गृहपतितिर्द्वारा प्रधानेश्वरि शैक्षकम्।

Now order is being ascertained.

Objection: An injunction prescribes a principal rite together with its subsidiaries as the thing to be done. Now, since the principal and subsidiary rites are many, we must say that they are to be performed one after the other, and what can be the criterion that regulates this order?

Reply: Not so, for direct assertion etc. regulate the order.
To explain: In the sentence, "The priest called adhvaryu," having initiated the master of the house," should initiate the superintending priest," the direct assertion, viz., the participial suffix *ktvā* (in the original), shows that the initiation of the superintending priest follows that of the master of the house. So here is order according to direct assertion.

[¹ The criteria are as follows direct assertion, purpose, reading, position, principal rite and procedure. They are in a descending order of importance.
² See note 1 on p 27.
³ In a sacrificial session (*ṣatras*) there are seventeen sacrificers, instead of the usual one. Sixteen of them serve as priests, and the remaining one stands for the sacrificer, who is here referred to as the master of the house.]

"समिधो यजति," "तनूपातं यजति" इत्यादिव विविधावष्य-पाठकमादेव समिविचित्रायगानुधानकः।

"अविशिष्टं युजति, यथां यजति" इत्यतः यथाव्यवस्था होमार्थेतेव पाकादं पूवं होमस्य हतुपश्चर्तवात् पाठकम्
त्यत्तत्वार्थकः: स्वीकारः। अर्थः: प्रयोजनं होमादिरूपम्, तद्रीतीः
कः: अर्थम्।। तेन पूवं पाकं पाषाद्वृः।।

In passages like, "One should perform the Samidh" sacrifice (*Tait. S II. vi. 1. i.*), and "One should perform the Tanūnapāt sacrifice" (*Ibid.*), the order of performance of the sacrifices Samidh etc. should be just according to the order of reading of the sentences inculcating the injunctions.

In the (consecutive) sentences, "One should offer the Agnihotra" (*Tait. Br* II. 1. v. 6), and "One should cook rice gruel" (*Ibid.*), since the cooking of the barley is for the purpose of *homa,* it is impossible to perform the *homa* before the cooking. Hence, giving up the order according to reading, that accord-
ing to purpose (artha-krama) is to be adopted. ‘Artha’ is purpose, such as homa; order depending on that is artha-krama. Therefore, first there should be cooking and then homa.

Similarly, in the sentence, “One should kill seventeen animals relating to Prajāpati” (Sat. Br. XI. v. vi. 3; Tai Br I iii. iv. 3), seventeen sacrifices, of which as many animals constitute the material and Prajāpati the deity, are enjoined as the thing to be done. Now, the first item, called touching, may begin with any animal and end with any (other) animal. Tying and other items, however, are to be done exactly in the order in which the touching proceeded. How? In the typical sacrifice (called Daikṣa), since the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon is one, first touching is done, then in the very next moment tying, and in the third moment itself sprinkling; for there is nothing to determine the imposition of any
interval (among them). Here (in the Vājapeya sacrifice), however, on account of the text inculcating simultaneous use of the seventeen animals, the touching, first done with any of the animals, stands an interval of sixteen seconds—but no more—for the tying to be done in respect of the animal that received the touch. If, however, tying is not done, in the order of touching, in respect of the first animal, and some other animal is first tied and then the first animal, it would cause an interval of more than sixteen seconds, which is not supported by the scripture. To avoid that, the tying etc. should be done exactly in the order in which the touching proceeded. So here we have order according to procedure.

Similarly, the three animals designated (respectively) as the one relating to the Fire and the Moon, the one relating to the pressing of the soma juice (savanīya), and the final one (ānubandhya), which are to be utilised in the Jyotustoma' sacrifice in succession beginning with the day of sojourn of the gods, are understood from the sentence, “One should kill the animals together,” to be together—that is, utilised in the performance at the same time—in the soma-sacrifice called Sādyaskra, and that, too, is (obviously) enjoined at the time allotted to the animal relating to
the pressing of the soma juice. Here, inasmuch as the contiguity is (obviously) enjoined at this particular time, setting aside the order of the typical sacrifice, therefore first the animal relating to the pressing of the soma juice is to be touched, then the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon, and lastly the final one. So this is order according to position. The day of sojourn of the gods is that preceding the day of the pressing of the soma juice.

'Jyoustoma' is the general name of a group of soma-sacrifices in which the main function of offering soma juice thrice takes one day, and is preceded by four days of preliminaries. The typical sacrifice in this group is the Agnistoma. Sometimes soma-sacrifices would extend for weeks and months, nay for a whole year or more.

Which precedes that of the main sacrifice

In which one of the animals, viz., that relating to the Fire and the Moon, is to be killed on the fourth day, the second in the morning of the fifth or last day, and the third at the end of the sacrifice on that day]

तथा दूसरा साजाप्रमाणां शाखाज्ञेयोद्वारें पूर्तम्, ब्राह्मणोजानां निथिपादार्थानां अनन्तरं प्रत्यापि सुरूपोपारस्तात्प्रत्याय- यात्यों परं भाष्यायनात्तथ पूर्णमुद्धरणामहूः सुरूष्योपारस्तात्तथा पुरोहितास्य श्रवाणेश्वराधिकारणम्, तदं पवित्रपाकाधिकारणम् हरि सुरूष्योपारस्तात्तथाधिकारणम्।

तत्वें सुरूष्यं-पाठ-स्थान-सुरूष्यं-पद्धितिष्ठितं कर्मोनुभावम्।

सुरूष्योपारस्ताते बृंदे वैश्वतित्यः।

हि हि श्रीकृष्णाय ज्योतिः मीनांतिपरिधा समाता।

Likewise, in the new-moon sacrifice, although acts like the cutting of the palāśa (Butea Frondosa) branch, which are features of the curd and milk sacrifices, take place first, and acts like the setting apart (of handfuls of rice), which are features of the sacri-
ifice to the Fire, take place next, ¹ yet, inasmuch as between the two main sacrifices, viz., the sacrifice relating to the Fire and the curd and milk sacrifices, the former is performed first, therefore in accordance with the order of the principal sacrifices, the ghee left over after the Prayāja sacrifice is first poured on the cake relating to the Fire, and then on the milk cake. Here the order of pouring is according to that of the principal sacrifices.

Thus, rites are to be performed according to the order of direct assertion, purpose, reading, position, principal rite and procedure. Performance in any other manner will lead to defects.

Let us not proceed further.

¹ Hence, according to the order of procedure, ghee should first be poured on the milk of the curd and milk sacrifices and then on the cake relating to the Fire. But the order according to the principal sacrifices reverses this.
INDEX

Actions, righteous and unrighteous 2
their authority 2
Adhvaryu 27 n, 38, 81 90
Agnihotra 4, 87
Agreement and difference 50 n
Context 25
Corroborative statements 3, 69
— condemnatory 70, 72
— eulogistic 70, 72
— heroic performance 71
— past incident 71
— their other functions 73
Direct assertion 23
Disposal defined 34, 35, 11
— is threefold 36
— antecedent to the principal sacrifice 38
— concurrent with it 37
— subsequent to it 36-37
Exclusion its three defects 75
Homa defined 37
Incentive 88
Indication twofold 23
Injunction how it functions 46-54
— its fourfold division 1 n
— is again threefold 10
— exclusive 22, 75
— original 10
— restrictive 20
— regarding performance 8-19
Injunctive force sometimes inferred 15
Jyotistoma 55, 84, 93 n 1

Kumārīka Bhatta iv, 38, 44 n 2, 71
Manner or modus operandi 9
Mīmāṃsā its subject-matter 2
Names determined by declaration of a particular thing 56-57, distinctive mention 58, derivation 59-62, a split of the sentence 62-69
— taken as accessories lead to opposing triads of characteristics 60-61
— tentative argument for taking them as accessories 64-68
New- and full-moon sacrifices 12, 16, 17
— their peculiarity 17
— their principal sacrifices 12, 15
— their subsidiaries 16, 27
Option 76-77
— has eight defects 77
— its varieties 78, 80
Optional rites threefold 44
Order of rites determined by
direct assertion 90
— reading 90
— purpose 91
— procedure 91
— position 92
— the order of principal sacrifices 93
Position 26
Prabhākara iv, 44 n 1
Principal rites threefold 43
Purification of what is to be used is various 39-40
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras iv, 28, 38 n, 59 n, 2, 88
Rites their triple aspects 5
— generally twofold 33
— principal 33
— subsidiary 34
— difference between these two 41
— are again fourfold 42
— regular and occasional 43
— do these two produce any result 44
— their difference determined by — different words 83, repetition 83, number 84, names 84, accessory 85, different context 86
Śācra’s commentaries 2
— their varieties 47
Sacred texts 2
— their utility 73-74, 80
— some special terms 79
Sacrifice defined 14, 33, 37
— sometimes inferred 14
Sentences originating a rite 4
— dealing with accessories 4
— enjoining results 5
— incantating accessories for results 6
— originating a rite with accessories 7
Smṛtis derive their authority from the Vedas 81
— sometimes lack authority 81
Soma 7
Subsidiary defined 31, 34
— is twofold 31
— componently helpful 12
— directly helpful 33
— another twofold division 34
— its six tests 23-31, their relative strength 27, reason for this 28, 38, 34
Syntactical connection 21
Tāntra-lārtika 48 n, 45 n 45
Unique result established 19
— final 16, 19, 21
— initial 11, 18, 21
Urge defined 54
— objective 46, 54, its three parts 47-18
— verbal 49, 51-53, its three parts 50
Usage also generally authoritative 82
Vedas their two forms 2
— enlighten about supernatural matters 45
— their branches 51 n
— their threefold subject matter 87
Visvadevas 85